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ABSTRACT
In 2021, over 30 million people were displaced by disasters, most of which were weatherrelated and nearly half of which were the result of storms. While research on disaster displacement
has provided broad observations of post-hurricane human mobility and the socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics that influence displacement, few studies examine the factors that
influence household mobility decisions after a disaster. My dissertation uses a primarily qualitative
research approach to empirically investigate the relationship between mobility and the capacity of
displaced households to cope and adapt to the impacts of hurricanes through a detailed examination
of Hurricane Dorian displacement in the Bahamas. My research findings are based upon 40 semistructured interviews with displaced individuals and 14 semi-structured interviews with disaster
response organizations, pastors and local government, rapid ethnography and in-depth
observations, and secondary data.
Key findings highlight that household mobility decision-making is dynamic throughout
displacement and reflects household’s available assets and priorities. My research shows that
households continue to make rational and informed decisions throughout displacement, weighing
the benefits and challenges of their decisions as they attempt to recover in various locations to
determine what is best for their households. It also demonstrates how a secondary event, such as
the Covid-19 pandemic, can influence the ability of displaced households in islands to respond to
future hurricanes. My research reveals that, when faced with multiple hazards, households reassess
their assets and resources, and capacity to rebuild these assets and resources in order to prepare for
future events, which in turn influences their decisions on where to live.
The research informed my development of a conceptual model to illustrate the relationship
between household adaptive capacity and disaster mobility, highlighting opportunities to advance
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and enhance climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in small islands. Results of
the research demonstrate that island-specific hurricane planning created in coordination with
residents, local leaders and island-based NPOs can provide comprehensive assessments of the
existing skills, knowledge and physical resources on islands that can be used in disaster
preparedness and response. My dissertation contributes to scholarship examining adaptive
capacity, displacement and mobility, emphasizing the importance of grounding research in the
experiences of displaced populations to provide a nuanced and rich understanding of household
post-disaster decision-making.
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1. Introduction
Human migration and displacement due to disasters are likely to be two of the most
significant humanitarian challenges of the 21st century (Barrett et al., 2021; IDMC, 2021; Nansen
Initiative, 2015). In 2021, disasters displaced over 30 million people, 98% of which were weatherrelated and nearly half of which were the result of storms (IDMC, 2021). Long-term disasterinduced displacement is an indication of failures in adaptation to hazards. The projected increased
intensity of hurricanes increases the risk of disasters in small islands, which can be mitigated
through adaptation that addresses household exposure and adaptive capacity to hurricane hazards
in addition to slower-onset hazards such as sea level rise, freshwater stress, and heatwaves (IPCC,
2021; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022)
Hazards may be natural, anthropogenic or socionatural and are defined by the UNDRR as
‘a process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health
impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation’
(UNDRR, 2022d). Hazards interact with existing vulnerabilities to create disasters. The United
Nations Office for Disaster Risks Reduction (UNDRR) defines disaster as
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society at any scale due to
hazardous events interacting with the conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity,
leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental
losses and impacts (UNDRR, 2022a)
Although hazards are characterized by location, intensity or magnitude, frequency and
probability, disasters are a result of hazard(s) interacting with the societal factors that result in
people's varying levels of exposure and vulnerability to the hazard(s) (Hewitt, 1983; IPCC, 2012;
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Kelman et al., 2016; Wisner et al., 2004). Hazards, exposure, and vulnerability are key components
of understanding risks in the context of climate change. The concept of vulnerability provides an
important link between the climate change adaptation and disaster risk communities and is defined
in the IPCC WGII AR6 as ‘the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected’ and includes
a ‘lack of capacity to cope and adapt’ (Begum & Lempert, 2022, p.18). As a consequence of
disasters people may become displaced or choose to adapt by migrating to new locations to
mitigate future disaster risks (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Koubi et al., 2016a).
The impacts of climate-related hazards are already being experienced on small islands,
including warmer air and ocean temperatures, sea level rise, and increased intensity of hurricanes
in the North Atlantic and South Pacific (IPCC, 2021a). Climate-related hazards, particularly
extreme events such as hurricanes, may trigger initial displacement and interact with other
livelihood factors to influence individual and household decisions to re-establish elsewhere or
return home (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Foresight, 2011; McLeman et al., 2021; McLeman, 2014).
Many of these factors have little to do with the event itself, suggesting underlying non-climatic
factors influence the duration and circumstances of displacement (Black et al., 2011a).
As a result of displacement, new risks to livelihoods can emerge for displaced persons
including homelessness, food insecurity, and unemployment (Adger et al., 2018). These social
challenges are compounded by a disruption in social cohesion and a loss of place attachment
(Adger et al., 2018; Thomas & Benjamin, 2019). The culmination of these risks can lead to further
impoverishment and a weakening of household capacity to cope and adapt to future events (Black
et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2014b). Unequal social structures are amplified due to environmental
risks, highlighting disparities in the social and capital assets that influence mobility and immobility
in disasters (Adger et al., 2018; Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Foresight, 2011).
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Populations of least developed countries (LDCs) and small islands are significantly
impacted by disaster-induced displacement and migration, with small island developing states
(SIDS) representing five of the 20 countries most affected by disaster displacement (Nansen
Initiative, 2015). In 2019, SIDS had the highest average annual internal displacement per capita
and the top six were Caribbean islands (Francis, 2019). SIDS face challenges to their habitability
due to both slow- and sudden-onset events linked to climate change (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). In
the case of sudden-onset events, common drivers of disaster-induced displacement are similar
across small islands and include the informal nature of settlement development and the lack of safe
land for settlements, unenforced building codes, poverty, lack of insurance schemes and social
safety nets, environmental degradation, and the erosion of traditionally strong social bonds which
interact with political factors to shape displacement risk (Hamza et al., 2017). It is anticipated that
the frequency, intensity and/or geographical locations of many types of hazards, including
hurricanes, will increase due to climate change, which will have severe implications for small
islands (IPCC, 2021a; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).
Disaster displacement research has typically been hazard-focused and informed by large
datasets that 'do not consider the structure of society as a baseline for decision-making about
disaster risk' (Chmutina et al., 2021, p.786). The social and cultural influences and implications of
displacement and migration decision-making are understudied, though a growing body of literature
recognizes the importance of individual agency (Adams, 2016; Blitz, 2011; Foresight, 2011;
Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022; Suckall et al., 2017). The relationship between adaptive capacity and
mobility decision-making is another area of research that requires further exploration (Cisse &
McLeman, 2022; Koubi et al., 2022).
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My research broadly addresses gaps in existing policy and scholarship that rely on large
datasets by exploring the experiences of Hurricane Dorian displaced households in the Bahamas
and highlighting factors that influenced household hurricane vulnerability and mobility decisionmaking during displacement. In addition, my research highlights opportunities to strengthen
national and household adaptive capacity in disaster risk management and climate change
adaptation in the Bahamas.

1.1 Research Questions and Objectives
My research questions evolved throughout my Ph.D. studies. I began in March 2019 by
focusing on proactive climate change adaptation planning for coastal hazards in the Bahamas, but
then transitioned to examining the response and recovery following Hurricane Dorian in
September of 2019. The hurricane provided me with an opportunity to examine how displaced
households adapted to an event, rather than projecting how adaptive capacity would be mobilized
in response to future hazards. The post-hurricane circumstances of displaced households inspired
me to work with those impacted to understand their situation and mobility decision-making to
better inform policy and planning for future hurricane disasters. While I was conducting my
research, the Covid-19 pandemic introduced additional risks and restrictions in the Bahamas,
compounding the disaster and challenging the recovery of displaced households. In response, I
expanded my research to examine how the Covid-19 pandemic complicated household recovery
and the effect this had on household capacity to adapt to future hurricanes. My research purpose
has evolved to empirically investigate the relationship between mobility and the capacity of
displaced households to cope and adapt to the impacts of hurricane displacement in the Bahamas.
The questions guiding my research have become:
4

1. After evacuation, where did Hurricane Dorian survivors go, and what factors influenced
their decision-making? This includes the following subset of questions:
a. What factors influenced household decisions about where to go after the hurricane?
b. What factors influenced household decisions to return home or relocate?
c. How did the Covid-19 pandemic influence household mobility decision-making?
2. What did Hurricane Dorian reveal about household hurricane vulnerability, and how have
the impacts of the hurricane affected future household hurricane vulnerability? This
includes:
a. What factors influenced household vulnerability before Hurricane Dorian?
b. What factors influenced household vulnerability after Hurricane Dorian?
c. What were the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on household vulnerability?
3. How can national disaster risk management in The Bahamas be enhanced to build
household adaptive capacity to hurricanes? This includes:
a. What where the strengths and weaknesses of the Hurricane Dorian response?
b. What existing capacities did Bahamas-based disaster response organizations
mobilize to support displaced households?
The specific objectives of my research have included:
1. Generating demographic and socioeconomic profiles of people displaced by Hurricane
Dorian in the Bahamas.
2. Documenting factors influencing household mobility decision-making during hurricane
displacement.
3. Examining the capacity of displaced households to cope and adapt to the social impacts of
hurricane displacement.
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4. Assessing the impact of the pandemic on displaced households’ capacity to cope and adapt
to future hurricanes.
5. Developing a conceptual framework of post-hurricane interactions of mobility, adaptive
capacity and displacement.
6. Identifying improvements for future displacement planning that reduce the adverse social
impacts for displaced households and receiving communities in the Bahamas.
My research is exploratory and uses an approach inspired by grounded theory to formulate
and answer research questions that emerged from the data (Creswell, 2014; Glaser, 2013). In the
period from October 2019 until March 2020, I worked in the Bahamas on the island of Eleuthera
as a volunteer with a local NGO, the One Eleuthera Foundation (OEF), that was providing
assistance to people displaced by Hurricane Dorian. Through this work I met individuals who had
been displaced from the islands of the Abacos and Grand Bahama. I developed my research
questions based on informal conversations with displaced individuals and disaster response
volunteers as well as my later analysis of secondary data collected by OEF. Through this initial
exposure to the circumstances of displaced households and observations in the data, I developed
semi-structured interview questions to capture the experiences of Hurricane Dorian displaced
survivors to create a rich, descriptive narrative of households' capacity to cope and adapt after the
hurricane, the subsequent impacts of the pandemic, and other factors that influenced their posthurricane mobility. My research findings are based upon semi-structured interviews, rapid
ethnography and in-depth observations, and secondary data.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the literature informing my dissertation. The
chapter explores three bodies of literature: climate change adaptation, disaster risk management,
6

and environmental mobility. The chapter introduces key concepts and literature concerning: postdisaster mobility, adaptive capacity as a component of vulnerability, and vulnerability and disaster
risk in small islands.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the Bahamas and then describes
the impacts, response, and recovery of Hurricane Dorian in the islands of the Abacos and Grand
Bahama.
Chapter 4 details the methodology used in my dissertation. I first describe the
development of my research questions in response to Hurricane Dorian and the pandemic. I then
describe the methods used to collect the data used in my research and the rationale for selecting
these methods. I conclude the chapter with a description of my positionality as a researcher, my
relationship to the research participants, including the implications that had on my findings, and
the limitations that stem from the methods used and my own positionality.
Chapter 5 focuses on post-hurricane mobility. In this chapter, I analyze data collected (1)
in questionnaires administered by OEF and the Red Cross immediately after the hurricane and (2)
in a follow-up questionnaire administered by OEF 22 months after the hurricane. The
questionnaire data is complemented by data I collected during interviews with displaced
individuals. This chapter responds to objectives one and two by providing demographic and
socioeconomic profiles of the displaced population on Eleuthera and documenting the factors that
influenced household mobility decision-making during displacement. The chapter begins with an
overview of the general statistics of movement after the storm. Section 5.2 presents a summary of
data collected by OEF and the Red Cross upon displaced households arrival, or shortly after arrival
on Eleuthera. In June 2021, almost two years after the hurricane, OEF administered a follow-up
questionnaire with displaced households who OEF had supported during their displacement on
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Eleuthera. Section 5.3 presents a summary of the data collected in this follow-up questionnaire.
Section 5.4 introduces the common factors identified in the interviews that contributed to displaced
survivors’ decisions to return to their home settlement or relocate after Hurricane Dorian. This
chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings.
Chapter 6 examines changes in household adaptive capacity throughout displacement and
the Covid-19 pandemic. This chapter responds to objective three by examining the capacity of
households to adapt to the social impacts of hurricane displacement and objective 4 to assess the
impact of the pandemic on displaced households’ vulnerability to future hurricanes. I begin this
chapter by introducing a proposed conceptual model I developed to examine household
vulnerability at different stages of “normal” life throughout the research. The following three
sections of this chapter present findings from three different stages of the disaster process; before
the hurricane, after the hurricane, and during the pandemic. The chapter concludes with a summary
of the key findings and an expanded model to illustrate how mobility influenced household
hurricane vulnerability.
Chapter 7 identifies the lessons that Hurricane Dorian revealed about disaster risk
management and hurricane displacement in the Bahamas. This chapter addresses objective six by
identifying ways that disaster risk management and climate change adaptation can be strengthened
to support all people affected by hurricanes in the Bahamas. This chapter begins with a brief
overview of disaster response in the Bahamas and an introduction to the various actors and
agencies active in Hurricane Dorian response and recovery. I then summarize critiques of the
government’s preparedness and response to Hurricane Dorian before providing a detailed account
of the supports provided by Bahamas-based NPOs and civil groups to hurricane survivors. Finally,
I present opportunities to strengthen future hurricane response as expressed by displaced
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interviewees and representatives from disaster response organizations before summarizing the key
findings of the chapter.
Chapter 8 integrates the results from the three main findings chapters into a proposed
model to assess pre- and post-hurricane household adaptive capacity in relation to mobility
responses (objective 5). I then discuss how my research contributes to the existing literature
examining adaptive capacity, displacement and mobility, and disaster risk in islands. This is
followed by a discussion about the the broader implications of my research for disaster
management in The Bahamas, highlighting the need to prepare and plan for long-term
displacement. I then introduce avenues for future research that expand on my research findings
before presenting my concluding remarks.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
As more people are displaced globally because of disasters, there is a need to understand
better the motivations, capacities and pressures that influence decision-making before, during and
after disaster events. This is particularly important in the context of small island developing states
(SIDS), which are disproportionately at risk of displacements due to hurricanes and other extreme
weather events (IPCC, 2021a; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). While research on disaster displacement
has provided broad observations of post-hurricane human mobility and the socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics that influence displacement (DeWaard et al., 2016; Fussell, 2015;
Fussell et al., 2010; Ponserre & Ginnetti, 2019), few studies examine the factors that influence
household mobility decisions after a disaster. My research addresses this gap by investigating
household vulnerability before and after a hurricane, and how differences in adaptive capacity
influence post-hurricane household mobility and recovery during displacement.
Three broad areas of existing literature inform my research: climate change adaptation,
disaster risk management and environmental mobility (Figure 2-1).

Climate change
adaptation

Disaster risk
management

My research

Environmental
mobility

Figure 2-1 Areas of research interest
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Through my research, I examine changes in household vulnerability as a result of posthurricane adaptations, including temporary and long-term migration, by assessing household
exposure and adaptive capacity at different stages of displacement. I examine household mobility
and decision-making in the Bahamas before and after Hurricane Dorian, and the implications that
the Covid-19 pandemic had on mobility, changes in adaptive capacity and the institutional capacity
to support households’ adaptive capacity. This chapter reviews foundational literature to
contextualize and situate my research into the broader discussions of climate change adaptation,
disaster risk management and environmental mobility.
Section 2.2 provides an overview of important concepts applied in my research. Section
2.3 reviews how adaptive capacity, as a component of vulnerability, is conceptualized and assessed
in the hazards, climate change adaptation and development literature. Section 2.4 reviews the
dimensions and factors of post-disaster mobility and migration decision making and outlines how
displacement is addressed at different policy scales. Section 2.5 examines disaster risk in small
islands to illustrate how hazards, exposure and vulnerability create disaster risk in the Caribbean.
Section 2.6 provides a brief summary of the reviewed bodies of literature to highlight research
gaps and detail how my dissertation's research questions address these gaps.
2.2 Introduction to key concepts
In this section, I introduce the major concepts applied to the research before discussing
them in more detail in the following sections. These concepts are introduced to provide definitions
and context to how I am using the terms and applying them to my research.
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2.2.1 Vulnerability and adaptation
There is no clear definition of vulnerability in the climate change adaptation literature,
though it is generally understood as a system’s adaptive capacity and susceptibility to climate
change impacts, and in some cases includes a system’s exposure (Adger, 2006; Begum & Lempert,
2022; Ford & Smit, 2004; IPCC, 2007). In the IPCC’s fourth Working Group II (WGII)
Assessment Report (AR4, 2007), vulnerability was conceptualized as a function of exposure,
sensitivity and adaptive capacity. The concept of vulnerability in the context of climate change
adaptation has shifted from an ‘end point’ approach to a ‘starting point’ approach for vulnerability
assessment (Das et al., 2020; Füssel, 2007; Füssel & Klein, 2006; Sharma & Ravindranath, 2019).
This can be seen in more recent IPCC reports, where exposure is treated as external to
vulnerability, representing a distinct characteristic of risk. The IPCC’s WGII Fifth (AR5) and Sixth
Assessment Reports (AR6) define vulnerability as
The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a
variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of
capacity to cope and adapt. (Begum & Lempert, 2022, p. 18)
The disaster risk management literature defines vulnerability as
The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or
processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or
systems to the impacts of hazards (UNDRR, 2022e).
Vulnerability is an important concept in climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management and provides a critical link between the two research and practice communities.
Climate change adaptation strategies are meant to reduce the vulnerability of populations, reducing
exposure and sensitivity, while enhancing adaptive capacity. In the 1980s, as the development
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discourse highlighted the role of social, political and economic processes in shaping vulnerability,
a new framework emerged concentrating the conditions of vulnerability at the centre of the
discussion (Kelly & Adger, 2000). Vulnerability assessments began to consider opportunities to
enhance the adaptive capacity of particularly exposed or sensitive populations to cope with risks
rather than focusing on the hazard itself (Burton et al., 2002; Eakin et al., 2014).
Climate change is one factor that with contribute to vulnerability and disaster risk of
households and communities (Mercer 2010). Disaster risk reduction, the policy objective of
disaster risk management, seeks to minimize vulnerabilities through the development and
application of policies, strategies and practices that prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk.
Addressing vulnerability and the root causes of this vulnerability is more explicitly acknowledged
in the DRR literature and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction than it is through the
climate change adaptation literature and practice (Mercer 2010).
In 1994, Blaikie et al. introduced the Disaster Pressure and Release Model (PAR; Figure
2-2) to illustrate the need for addressing the root causes of vulnerability. They emphasized that
disaster and risk is the intersection of: (1) those factors generating vulnerability, which can be
spatially and temporally near or far, and (2) the natural hazard event that, with its occurrence,
“releases” the built-up pressure of accumulating vulnerability and triggers the disaster event (later
Wisner et al., 2004). The model suggests that there are three factors that mutually reinforce
vulnerability: root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions. Dynamic pressures,
processes such as urbanization, foreign debt, and rural-urban migration, translate effects of root
causes both temporally and spatially into unsafe conditions (Wisner et al., 2004). The local risks
(unsafe conditions) are understood as the symptoms of the deeper global systems (root causes) that
may be distant in time and space (Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Wisner et al., 2004). The role of global
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systems in limiting the capacities of individuals and thereby creating the vulnerability of
populations in developing countries is inherent in this model.

Figure 2-2 Pressure and Release Model (based on Wisner et al. 2004, p.51)

2.2.2 Disaster risk
Disaster risk management and climate change adaptation have followed a similar
evolution, beginning with a focus on the hazard and broadening their scope to address underlying
causes of vulnerability. A disaster is a moment along the disaster risk continuum which highlights
unmanaged risks and skewed development problems (IPCC, 2012; Wisner et al., 2004). The
UNDRR defines disaster risk as
The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a
system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determine probabilistically as
a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity (UNDRR, 2022b).
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Weather and climate events may modify coping capacity and adaptive capacity, which
affects livelihood options and vulnerability to future extreme events (IPCC, 2012). Wisner et al.
(2004) use the Access model (Figure 2-4), which is embedded within the PAR model as the
magnifying glass (Figure 2-2) to signify the point where an explanation of disaster risk can be
examined from the individual and household scale. The more detailed examination stems from the
understanding that when faced with similar hazards, the risk is different depending on the capacity
of an individual or household to absorb and respond to the impacts (Cardona, 2003).
The Access model is a valuable framework to organize and explain the process of disasters.
It is designed to categorize 'complex and varied sets of social and environmental events and longerterm processes that may be associated with a specific event that is called a disaster' (Wisner et al.,
2004, p.88). The model suggests that the same structures that dictate “normal” life will impact a
household's ability to respond and adapt to an event that can lead to disaster. A series of boxes
representing different processes and aspects of “normal” life are linked by arrows illustrating cause
and effect linkages. When the trigger event, the hazard, interacts with the structures and relations
that dominate capacities, disaster begins. The model highlights the iterative nature of “normal” life
suggesting that compounding events will affect the capacity of households to adapt to stresses.
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Figure 2-3 Access Model (Wisner et al,. 2004, p.89)

Disaster research has moved beyond assessing the implications of a singular hazard event
to explore the role of political, economic, social, cultural, physical and psychological systems in
determining risk (IPCC, 2012; Wisner et al., 2004). The SREX (2012) used a similar framework
to the IPCC’s WGII AR5 risk propellor to introduce a framework illustrating the relationship
between the key concepts of disaster risk, where vulnerability is one blade of the disaster risk
propellor (Figure 2-5). The framework highlights that interactions between vulnerability,
exposure, and hazards, within the context of climate change and socioeconomic processes, result
in disaster risks specific to the household or system. The framework makes a distinction between
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exposure and vulnerability to explicitly emphasize the social context of vulnerability independent
of physical events (IPCC, 2012).

Figure 2-4 The IPCC SREX conceptual framework of disaster risk (IPCC, 2012, p.4).

The IPCC increasingly sees disasters and disaster risk reduction in the context of climate
resilient development pathways to support sustainable development and reduce social vulnerability
(Schipper et al., 2022). The social vulnerability approach moves past the assumption that the preexisting physical conditions and proximity to hazards is the basis of vulnerability, to explore how
adaptive capacity is influenced by underlying social conditions (Cutter et al., 2000; Smit &
Wandel, 2006). The social constructivist lens, based in political ecology and human geography,
recognizes the contribution of socio-economic factors, limited access to resources, cultural beliefs
and demographics of a population to vulnerability (Smith, 2001). Cutter et al. (2003) suggest that
the interaction of specific indicators, with one another and the environment, will reflect the social,
political and economic processes they are situated in, influencing decision-making and actions to
reduce risk.
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In other words, before an event, humans' choices, actions, behaviours, attitudes, and
decisions contribute to the vulnerability and exposure of people who experience the hazard (IPCC,
2012; Kelman et al., 2016; UNISDR, 2017; Wisner et al., 2004). Over time, decisions, actions and
choices, produce and compound disaster risk and when an event occurs, the implications of these
(in)actions are revealed (IPCC, 2012; Wisner et al., 2004). As a result of disaster, vulnerabilities
may be revealed or may emerge according to the susceptibility to impacts of different groups and
their capacity to recover (Birkmann & Fernando, 2008). Disaster risk in Caribbean islands is
explored in more detail below.

2.2.3 Adaptive capacity
Originating in the natural sciences, adaptation is seen as a multi-scalar process to negotiate
climate risks in different social and environmental contexts (Adger et al., 2009; Mortreux &
Barnett, 2017; Smit et al., 2000). The IPCC defines adaptation in human systems as ‘the process
of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit
beneficial opportunities’ (p.18). Adaptations are used to reduce the negative impacts of climate
change and are the manifestations of adaptive capacity (Smit & Wandel, 2006).
In the context of climate change, adaptive capacity refers to a ‘system's potential or ability
to address, plan for, or adapt to exposure' (Ford & Smit, 2004, p.393). The IPCC (2014) defines
adaptive capacity as 'the ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to
potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences' (p.118).
Enhancing adaptive capacity expands the 'range of variability with which [a system] can cope'
(Adger, 2006, p.270). Adaptive capacity is commonly used across the hazards literature (Eiser et
al., 2012; Gaillard et al., 2019; Wisner et al., 2004), vulnerability and climate change adaptation
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literature (Adger, 2003; Begum & Lempert, 2022; Hogarth & Wójcik, 2016; Smit & Wandel,
2006), and environmental migration literature (Gilbert & McLeman, 2010; Koubi et al., 2022;
McLeman & Smit, 2006).
Adaptive capacity can be understood as being composed of generic capacity, which include
basic human development needs, and specific capacity, which are the resources and tools used to
manage specific threats (Eakin et al., 2014; Lemos et al., 2013). Generic adaptive capacity might
include income level and savings, education levels, health status and material assets at an
individual level, while specific capacity includes climate risk insurance, protection of private
property and adoption of technologies to reduce climate impacts (Eakin et al., 2014).
Most communities and sectors can cope with normal climatic conditions and moderate
changes, though extreme events may exceed the limits of the coping range (Smit & Wandel, 2006;
Figure 2-3). The coping range is the extent to which, should there be climate variation or extreme
events, the community can manage. When the boundaries of this extent are reached, thresholds are
met that require decisions to be made on how to sustain the community's needs. Coping ranges are
dynamic, expanding through the enhancement of adaptive capacity, and flexible in responding to
changes in economic, social, political, and institutional arrangements (Smit & Wandel, 2006).
Since

the

1990s,

conceptual

frameworks of adaptive capacity have
expanded
frameworks

from
to

earlier
include

assets-based
psycho-social

factors and processes that might explain
adaptation (Cinner et al., 2018; Jones et al.,
2010b; Mortreux et al., 2020; Mortreux &

Figure 2-5 Coping range and extreme events (Smit & Wandel, 2006,
p.287)

19

Barnett, 2017). Though there is limited consensus on the definitions and determinants of adaptive
capacity, there are consistencies in how adaptive capacity is described and assessed in the hazards,
climate change adaptation and development literature. These assessments are discussed in more
detail below.

2.2.4 Environmental migration and displacement
Human mobility in the context of environmental change refers to the 'full spectrum of
population movements—whether voluntary or forced, assisted or spontaneous, long- or short-term,
and long- or short-distance' (Guadagno, 2016, p.31). Research published since the IPCC’s WGII
AR5, highlights the ‘continuum of agency or voluntarity’ in climate-related migration (McLeman
et al., 2021). Some people will choose to migrate as an adaptation to hazards, while others are
forced to migrate as a result of direct and indirect impacts of climate change (McLeman et al.,
2021).
Displacement and migration in the context of climate change are reflective of a households'
capacity to adapt. Displacement, as a 'manifestation of vulnerability' (p.30), and migration, as a
form of adaptation, represent 'distinct facets of vulnerability to environmental risk' (Adger et al.,
2018; Hugo, 1996). Mobility and immobility will also be restricted by the capacities accessible to
individuals and households, as illustrated in Figure 2-6 (Foresight, 2011).
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Figure 2-6 The drivers of migration (Foresight Report, 2011 adapted in Black et al. 2011b, p.448)

Black et al. (2011b) recognize that migration due to environmental change will be
'mediated through personal and family characteristics, and the barriers and facilitators of
movement' (p.510). Personal characteristics include ‘age, sex, educational level, wealth, marital
status, attachment to place, and attitudes and preferences’ and family characteristics refer to the
power relationships and family structure (Black et al. 2011a, p.S10). In addition, while some
people may be “trapped” due to limited access to capital or commitments to their community,
others may choose to stay due to place attachment and overall satisfaction with their local social
capital (Adams, 2016).
While some people are more in charge of their mobility than others, some are essentially
“imprisoned” by it (Massey, 1993, p.62). These relationships of 'asymmetric power relations' at
the global, national and regional scale define the uneven capacities of different groups facing
similar impacts of climate change, limiting some peoples' ability to adapt and build resilience
(Sheller, 2020; Sheller & León, 2016, p.32). Social structures and inequality are amplified as a
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result of environmental risks, highlighting the disparity in the social and capital assets that
influence mobility and immobility in disasters (Adger et al., 2018; Foresight, 2011).
The interaction between the proactive movement of migration and the reactive movement
of displacement is illustrated in Figure 2-7. Migration suggests an element of agency and choice
in mobility, involving a 'conscious decision to change place of residence' (Adger et al., 2018, p.30).
Displacement typically occurs as a response to an extreme event (Cisse & McLeman, 2022). Initial
displacement may be a temporary means to cope with an extreme event, though, over time, it may
result in short-or long-term migration as an adaptation strategy. A further discussion regarding
migration and displacement in the context of hurricanes is provided in section 2.5.

Figure 2-7 Migration and displacement interacting with sudden-onset and slow-onset climatic events (Adger et al.,
2018, p.31)

This section has introduced key concepts and frameworks applied and examined
throughout my research. The concepts introduced above are commonly used in both the fields of
disaster risk management and climate change impacts and adaptation, though they are
operationalized differently. Whereas the IPCC takes a risk-based approach in relation to hazards
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that will arise from climate change, disaster risk management seeks to reduce risks through
addressing contextual vulnerability, reflecting the field’s background in sustainable development
and humanitarian work. A formal integration of the two communities of thought would ensure that
actions taken to reduce disaster risk do not contribute to maladaptation to future climate change
impacts. Overall, integrating actions from disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation
should be used to ensure that development is climate proofed and does not contribute to further
creation and amplification of vulnerabilities as a result of future climate risks (Schipper et al.,
2022).
The following sections provide a more detailed examination of the literature I have applied
to my research to understand the relationship between household mobility, displacement, and
adaptive capacity after Hurricane Dorian in the Bahamas.

2.3 Assessing community and household adaptive capacity
The anticipated impacts of a changing climate continue to demand the research and practice
of assessments as a means of identifying areas to build adaptive capacity at the household and
community scale (Hogarth & Wójcik, 2016; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Smit & Wandel, 2006).
Informed by vulnerability assessments, adaptation strategies can be designed to support and enable
the capacities of individuals, households, and communities to adapt to risks.
The term adaptation is used across a variety of disciplines including biology, anthropology,
sociology, organizational and business management, in addition to climate change vulnerability
and resilience, sustainable development and disaster risk management (Engle, 2011). Adaptive
capacity refers to the ability to adapt. In the climate change literature, adaptive capacity is closely
related to Sen’s capabilities theory and is assessed to explain the resources and skills that a system
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relies upon to adapt to change (Jones et al., 2019; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017). Rather than assessing
adaptations, which cannot be assessed until after change has been made, adaptive capacity is used
to determine how well a system can be anticipated to cope and adapt to stresses. Generic adaptive
capacity refers to the overall system’s ability to adapt to various hazards and stresses, whereas
specific adaptive capacity is assessed to suggest how a system will adapt and cope with a particular
hazard, such as a hurricane (Eakin et al., 2014). Assessments of adaptive capacity have commonly
taken an assets-based approach, though there is a shift to examining the psychosocial
characteristics that prompt individuals, households and communities to mobilize their adaptive
capacity (Cinner et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2010b; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017).
The concept of adaptive capacity is commonly applied to research and practice in climate
change adaptation, disaster risk management and sustainable development (Birkmann & Fernando,
2008; Engle, 2011; Ford & Smit, 2004; Kelly & Adger, 2000; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Smit et
al., 2001; Smit & Wandel, 2006). Within these three areas, adaptive capacity is assessed to identify
opportunities to build the skills and resources of a system in order to mitigate vulnerability. Early
frameworks of adaptive capacity suggested that if a system had access to resources and skills, that
they would be better able to adapt (Smit et al., 2001). However, more recent research suggests that
access to resources, or capitals, does not explain how and if a system adapts, and that additional
determinants prompt people to mobilize their resources and skills to adapt (Cinner et al., 2018;
Jones et al., 2010a; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017).
In this section, I review the evolution of adaptive capacity conceptual frameworks in the
climate change adaptation, hazards, and development literature to introduce the different domains
and mediating factors that influence adaptive capacity. I then propose that a community-based
vulnerability assessment is an appropriate tool to examine adaptive capacity at the household and
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community scale and identify opportunities to strengthen community-identified strengths and
weaknesses.

2.3.1 Determinants/components of adaptive capacity
Two general approaches are adopted in climate change adaptation and hazards research to
measure adaptive capacity at the household and community scale, which I refer to as (1) the assetsbased approach and (2) the assets + approach. This section introduces the factors and determinants
considered in these two types of assessment approaches by presenting examples employed in the
adaptive capacity literature.
Assets-based approach
The assets-based approach is foundational to assessments of adaptive capacity. Early
research on adaptive capacity suggested that the key determinants of adaptive capacity was access
to capitals which was based on Sen’s capabilities theory (1983) and the Sustainable Livelihoods
Frameworks (Department for International Development, 1999). In an assets-based approach, the
capitals used to assess adaptive capacity and sustainable livelihoods include access to: natural
capital, physical capital, financial capital, social capital, and human capital. These assets are
described in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1 Description of capitals used in assets-based assessments

Asset
Financial capital
Social capital
Human capital
Physical capital
Natural capital

Examples in the literature
Income, credit, savings
Wealth, employment
Extended family and other social networks
Bonding capital, bridging capital, linking capital
Education, local knowledge, language proficiency, mental health,
physical health, skills
Shelter, tools, materials
Land, forest, products, water
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The assets-based approach has been used to determine national adaptive capacity by
measuring aggregate indicators of the capitals such as Gross National Income, regional literacy
rates and infant mortality rates (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017). However, assessments of adaptive
capacity at this scale remove the context-specific nature of adaptation and do not examine how
capacity translates into action (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017). The scale of assessments of adaptation
and adaptive capacity must respond to the system being examined to determine appropriate
indicators of capitals. Assets-based approaches may be better suited to finer scale assessments such
as those taken at the household or community scale (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Vincent, 2007).
Using the assets-based approach to assess adaptive capacity suggests that having access to
capitals would result in high levels of adaptation (Smit et al., 2001). The Sustainable Livelihoods
Framework (Department for International Development, 1999) incorporated an assets-based
approach to analyze the livelihoods of people in poverty within a context of vulnerability (Figure
2-8). In this framework, access to livelihood assets interact with policies, institutions, and
processes to inform livelihood strategies that result in different outcomes. The simplified model
can be used to identify opportunities to reduce household poverty (Department for International
Development, 1999).
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Figure 2-8 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (copied from Jones et al., 2010, p.14)

Circle of capacities
Hazards research more commonly refers to ‘capacities’ rather than adaptive capacity to
refer to the ‘resources and assets that people possess to resist, cope with, and recover from disaster
shocks they experience’ and their ability to use needed resources (Wisner et al. 2012, p.25).
Practitioners and researchers in the field of hazards refer to the endogenous capacities of a
community, which are constrained by exogenous structural forces (Gaillard et al., 2019; Wisner et
al., 2012).
Wisner et al. (2012) developed the circle of capacities to ‘draw upon the classification of
resources that are used to characterize the concept of livelihood’ and ‘appraise the diversity of
people’s capacities and their multiple usage in dealing with disasters’ (Gaillard et al., 2019, p.867).
The framework was later adapted by Rampengan et al. (2014) to highlight the interconnections
and relationships between resources which determine capacity (Figure 2-9).
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Figure 2-9 Conceptual framework for analyzing the capacity of small island communities to cope with hazards. (Adapted from
Wisner et al., 2012 in Rampengan et al., 2014, p.250)

The circle of capacities is another example of an assets-based approach, incorporating
natural, political, economic, social, human, and physical resources to assess capacity. The outer
layer of the framework shows the outcomes that emerge based on the identified resources,
highlighting how livelihood resources become livelihood outcomes through livelihood strategies
(Rampengan et al., 2014). Between the inner and outer layers of circle, resources interact and
combine to determine capacity.

Local Adaptive Capacity (LAC) Framework
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The Local Adaptive Capacity (LAC; 2010) framework was developed to link the
disciplines of climate change and development to support vulnerable people and communities.
Development and adaptation are closely related as many development interventions influence local
adaptive capacity (Begum & Lempert, 2022; Jones et al., 2010a; Kelman et al., 2016). The
framework was developed to go beyond a focus on assets and capitals as indicators of adaptive
capacity to examine the processes and functions that support mobilizing adaptive capacity (Jones
et al., 2010b). The LAC framework highlights the importance of intangible processes in addition
to the asset base (Table 2-2 and Figure 2-10). The developers of the LAC framework argue that
national-level indicators do not adequately capture the processes and contextual factors that
influence not just what a system has to enable it to adapt, but how it adapts (Jones et al., 2019;
Jones et al., 2010a, 2010b). To assess adaptive capacity, all five characteristics presented in the
LAC framework need to be considered together (Jones et al., 2019).
Table 2-2 LAC’s five characteristics and their features (Jones et al. 2010b, p.4)
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Figure 2-10 The relationships between characteristics of adaptive capacity at the local level (Jones et al., 2010b, p.4)

Interlinked domains of adaptive capacity
In response to the urgent need to address climate change in coastal communities, Cinner et
al. (2018) synthesized literature from a range of disciplines to identify five key domains to building
adaptive capacity. In addition to access to assets, they identify flexibility, organization, learning
and agency as additional domains which are interlinked (Figure 2-11; Cinner et al., 2018). A
description of these domains and indicators identified in their research are outlined in Table 2-3.
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Figure 2-11 Five domains of adaptive capacity to climate change (Cinner et al., 2018, p.118)
Table 2-3 Description and indicators of domains of adaptive capacity to climate change (Cinner et al., 2018)

Domain
Assets that people can
draw upon in times of
need

Description
People have assets to draw
upon

Indicators
Financial, technological and service
resources that people have access
to. Individually owned or public
goods. Social investments that limit
the use of their own resources to
manage change eroding capacity to
adapt to future shocks (poverty
traps).

Flexibility to change
strategies

People’s flexibility to better
adapt to climatic impacts

Diversity of potential adaptation
options available. Switch to
different occupational sectors
temporarily or permanently.
Change locations. Flexibility in
rebuilding of housing and
infrastructure. Diversification.

Ability to organize and
act collectively

The ways in which society is
organized to enable (or
inhibit) cooperation,
collective action and
knowledge sharing.

Learning to recognize
and respond to change

People’s capacity to generate,
absorb and process new
information about climate

Cooperation, collective action and
knowledge sharing. Formal and
informal relationships. Multi-scale.
People helping one another, state
agencies coordinating short-term
recovery and long-term resilience
strategies. Bonding, bridging and
linking social capital.
Formal education and informal
forums for learning. Access to
critical information. May emerge
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Agency to determine
whether to change or
not

change, adaptation options
and ways to live with and
manage uncertainty.
Ability of peopleindividually or collectivelyto have free choice in
responding to environmental
change.

locally generated or self-organized
triggered by crisis. Single loop,
double loop learning.
Power and freedom to mobilize
other domains to shape their future.
People’s own belief in their ability;
empowerment, motivation and
cognition. Source of resistance and
opposition to adaptation.

In their descriptions of the domains, the authors highlight the relationships between the
domains and emphasize the need to evaluate trade-offs and feedbacks that emerge as different
domains are activated. For example, they suggest that learning is tightly coupled to the other
domains, requiring that other domains be developed in order to support learning. In addition, they
identify that agency is used to activate the other domains; if communities are unwilling to use their
information and assets to support adaptation it is less likely people will adapt (Cinner et al., 2018).

Mobilizing adaptive capacity at the household scale
The frameworks expanding on the assets-based approach introduced above, provide
examples of the domains and determinants of adaptive capacity that can be applied more
appropriately at the local scale. In order to examine adaptive capacity at the household scale,
Mortreux and Barnett (2017) propose examining additional psycho-social factors that mobilize
capacity. While the LAC Framework and Cinner et al.’s domains of adaptive capacity provide
descriptions characteristics to strengthen adaptive capacity mobilization in addition to assets
(assets +), Mortreux and Barnett (2017) examine the factors that prompt active use of assets at the
household scale. Drawing from literature in the disaster risk reduction and behavioural sciences,
they propose five mediating factors that can help advance understanding of the relationship
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between capacity and adaptation. These factors include risk attitudes, personal experience, trust
and expectation in authorities, place attachment, and competing concerns (Table 2-4).
Table 2-4 Descriptions of psychosocial factors influencing mobilization of adaptive capacity (Mortreux and Barnett, 2017)

Factor
Risk attitudes
Personal
experience
Trust and
expectations in
authorities
Place attachment

Competing
concerns
Household
composition and
dynamics

Description
Ways in which individuals perceive the probability and severity of
climate risk, the way in which they perceive their capacity to adapt, the
perceived costs and benefits of adapting and cognitive biases.
Previous experience with hazards may increase people’s preparation or
decrease preparations. Adaptation is influenced by intensity of
experienced event, when the event occurred and if they felt they had
control over the situation.
Adaptation is influenced by communities placing too much trust in
authorities or too little trust in authorities to adhere to advice.
The emotional, economic and social ties that ‘root’ someone to a
particular place influences their willingness to plan for extreme events.
Housing status and financial investment in place may lead people to
overlook risks or invest in adaptation.
People have a limited capacity to worry. When faced with multiple
stressors, everyday issues are prioritized which can limit concern about
adaptation.
How decisions are made and adaptation actions performed within a
household influences household adaptation. Household composition, in
particular the presence of children, influences households hazard
preparedness.

In a 2020 study, Mortreux et al. examined the relationship between adaptive capacity and
adaptation to wildfires in Australia, where they found that risk attitudes, personal experience and
expectations of authorities influenced households’ adaptation. Households that had a high level of
concern about wildfires, a direct personal experience with wildfires and who had trust in authorities
but did not rely on their assistance were more likely to be ‘adapting well’ (Mortreux et al., 2020).
Assessing the psycho-social factors can provide insight into how households mobilize resources
to prepare for and respond to hazards.
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2.3.2 Assessing household and community adaptive capacity to specific risks
Adapting to climate change is a complex process that cannot be anticipated solely on a
system’s access to resources and skills. The above frameworks suggest several dimensions and
domains to consider in assessing how systems prepare for, respond to and recover from climate
change through adaptation. However, many of these intangible dimensions cannot be evaluated
directly (Jones et al., 2010b).
The most common forms of assessment of adaptive capacity are taken at broad scalesnational or local- using aggregated data and indices to provide insight into generic adaptive
capacity, or capacity to adapt to change in general (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017). Though aspects of
the frameworks introduced in this section could be analyzed using secondary and aggregated data,
the success of these frameworks to assess adaptive capacity are based on the promotion of
‘dialogue and learning processes amongst stakeholders in discussing the manifestations’ of these
domains and the context in which they are situated (Jones et al., 2019, p.11). The characteristics
and determinants of adaptive capacity are highly context specific.
Practical research approaches like Smit and Wandel’s (2006) community-based
vulnerability assessment (Figure 2-12), have been used to examine how a community experiences
changing conditions and decision-making processes used to adapt or improve adaptive capacity
(Hogarth & Wójcik, 2016). The emphasis of adaptive capacity in the vulnerability approach
extensively considers local, non-climatic factors at a specific point in time, providing a snapshot
of the economic, social, cultural and political barriers to action within a community. Hogarth and
Wójcik (2016) use this framework to assess the adaptive capacity elements of the LAC framework
in Soufriere, Saint Lucia, to determine the assets available for adaptation and the processes through
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which the community adapts. In these assessments, specific adaptations to address specific risks
provide insight into the adaptive capacity of a community or household.
In the first stage of the assessment, current vulnerability is captured through community
members narratives of experiences, observations, and traditional knowledge to 'characterize
pertinent conditions, community sensitivities, adaptive strategies, and decision-making process
related to adaptive capacity’ (Ford & Smit, 2004; Smit & Wandel, 2006, p.285). The assessment
of current vulnerability is followed by assessments of future vulnerability to inform where capacity
can be enhanced based on anticipated risks and an examination of past responses to climate
variability and extremes (Ford & Smit, 2004). The outcomes are practical adaptive responses
tailored to address the conditions identified by the community as contributing to vulnerability
(Smit & Wandel, 2006).

Figure 2-12 Conceptual framework for vulnerability assessment and mainstreaming (Smit
& Wandel, 2006, p.288)
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Distinctive to this vulnerability assessment approach is the use of community-defined
indicators of exposures, sensitivities and adaptive capacity rather than predetermined indicators
(Burton et al., 2002; McCubbin et al., 2015; Smit & Wandel, 2006). Assessments of vulnerability
and adaptive capacity with the community, rather than of the community, creates opportunities to
document the actual experiences of individuals and their decision-making process that can
influence adaptation (Smit & Wandel, 2006). Community-defined indicators of adaptive capacity
can then be analyzed using the various frameworks and domains of adaptive capacity to identify
opportunities to support existing capacities at the individual, household, local, and national level.

2.3.3 Weaknesses of current adaptive capacity assessments
Research on adaptive capacity is fragmented and there is no uniform method for assessment
though in practice similar factors are observed and discussed (Siders, 2019). A lack of common
terminology and definitions compounds the challenges to assessing adaptive capacity. Commonly,
studies on adaptive capacity attempt to assess the determinants or characteristics of adaptive
capacity using indices and proxy outcomes (Siders, 2019). In most studies that use an index-based
approach, authors develop their own set of indices to measure based on determinant scores. In
order to measure latent adaptive capacity, researchers use proxy outcomes to measure adaptive
capacity, or presume that past adaptations are indicative of future actions (Siders, 2019). In most
cases, assessments are quantitative and use statistical analysis to determine measures of adaptive
capacity (Siders, 2019). As a result of the lack of standardize measures of adaptive capacity, it is
difficult to apply broadly to decision-making and policies to support capacity building (Engle
2011).
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It is becoming more common in research examining adaptive capacity to move beyond an
assumption that high access to assets indicate high levels of adaptation (Eakin et al., 2014; Engle,
2011; Mortreux et al., 2020; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Siders, 2019). However, intangible
domains that influence or mediate adaptive capacity are difficult to assess without an in-depth
understanding of the context in which assessments are taking place. In addition, indicators
determined by researchers or practitioners can overlook the social and cultural relationships that
contribute to adaptive capacity (Cinner et al., 2018; Smit & Wandel, 2006). These indicators may
not be specifically discussed in interviews or be evident in aggregated data.
Assessments of adaptive capacity- particularly national and local level assessments- may
overlook certain populations that are not engaged in the assessments. Aggregated data and indices
that evaluate generic adaptive capacity can skew understanding of the actual capacity of
households to adapt to specific hazards (Siders, 2019). Smit and Wandel’s (2006) communitybased vulnerability assessment framework (Figure 2-12) provides an opportunity to assess
adaptive capacity based on the experiences and perceptions of affected communities and
households. Although the framework has the potential to provide an in-depth, context-specific
assessment of community and household generic and specific adaptive capacity, it requires a
substantial time commitment and cannot be generalized.
Assessments are useful in providing a snapshot of the assets and determinants or domains
of adaptive capacity at the time of assessment, but they do not explain how adaptive capacity
changes as a result of adapting and coping to stresses. Dynamic system components such as
adaptation, learning and multiple scales need to be incorporated in assessments to create a rich
understanding of adaptive capacity in action (Engle, 2011).

37

Creating a more comprehensive and holistic approach to assessments is challenged by the
highly scale- and context-dependent nature of adaptive capacity (Siders, 2019). Although it may
not be feasible to develop standard indicators for adaptive capacity, researchers can work towards
developing a better understanding the relationship between determinants and the trade-offs
between them (Siders, 2019).

2.4 Disaster mobility
The relationship between climate change and migration reflects a community, household
or individual's vulnerability and capacity to adapt to environmental change (Black et al., 2012;
Black et al., 2011a, 2011b; McLeman, 2014). Should a threshold be hit by island communities
where the system lacks the capacity to support the population, individuals or households may
decide to leave (Barnett, 2001; McLeman, 2018; Piguet, 2013), though migration is often the ‘last
resort’ or ‘ultimate adaptation’ (Black et al., 2011a; Cisse & McLeman, 2022; McLeman, 2014;
Weir & Pittock, 2017). Although migration may be an option for those with the resources and
networks to leave, this creates a new set of risk and opportunities for the individual, the receiving
and the sending community (McLeman, 2014). If there are options available to remain in place
through adaptation, individuals will stay in place (Adger et al., 2013; McLeman, 2014; Mortreux
& Barnett, 2009). The IPCC’s WGII AR6 outlines five key messages from research on climatemigration linkages that warrant emphasis:
-

Climatic conditions, events and variability are important drivers of migration and
displacement (high confidence), with migration responses to specific climate hazards
being strongly influenced by economic, social, political, and demographic processes
(high agreement, robust evidence).
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-

Specific climate events and conditions may cause migration to increase, decrease, or
flow in new directions (high confidence) and the more agency migrants have, the
greater the potential benefits for sending and receiving areas. Conversely, displacement
is associated with poorer outcomes.

-

Most climate-related migration displacement observed currently takes place within
countries (high confidence).

-

In many countries, the frequency and/or severity of floods, extreme storms and
droughts is projected to increase in coming decades, especially under high-emissions
scenarios, raising future risk of displacement in the most exposed areas (high
confidence).

-

There is growing concern among researchers about the future prospects of immobile
populations: groups and individuals that are unable or unwilling to move away from
areas highly exposed to climatic hazards (high confidence) (Cisse & McLeman, 2022,
p.49).

The decision to be mobile prior to sudden-onset events or in response to gradual onset
changes depends on a range of factors, including attachment to place (Mortreux & Barnett, 2009).
Place attachment can also lead to households choosing not to move prior to sudden-onset events
which can result in disaster displacement if the impacts of the hazard are severe (Adams, 2016;
Koubi et al., 2022). The Foresight Report (2011) summarized the factors that drive migration in
the context of global environmental change as social drivers, political drivers, demographic
drivers, economic drivers, and environmental drivers which interact with personal household
characteristics and intervening obstacles and facilitators to influence migration decision making
(Figure 2-6). These drivers of migration will vary across households, with some factors influencing
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individual and household decisions to migrate more than others. If policies are not designed based
on empirically grounded research, these policies may exacerbate the risks of those 'unable or
unwilling to relocate' (Black et al., 2011b, p. 447). Drivers of migration need to be understood in
the context of future climate change and hazards while acknowledging and addressing existing
vulnerabilities (Kelman, 2014). A thorough understanding of the drivers of migration in the
context of climate change can inform adaptation to reduce the risk of displacement in small islands.
This section first provides a brief explanation of the interaction between climate-related
migration and risk. I then review the characteristics of voluntary and involuntary mobility, which
is followed by an overview of the categories of human mobility in the context of hazards and
environmental change. I then introduce disaster displacement and review existing displacement
policies in small islands.

2.4.1 Conceptual framing of the links between climate change risks and migration
Migration can improve or erode household adaptive capacity depending on the
circumstances in which the decision to move is made (McLeman et al., 2021). When migration
decisions are made with higher agency, it is commonly believed that there is higher potential to
build adaptive capacity for migrants (McLeman et al., 2021). The IPCC’s WGII AR6 uses a model
developed by the contributing authors to diagram the interactions between climate risk and
migration processes and outcomes (Figure 2-14).

40

See

Figure
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Figure 2-13 Conceptual diagram illustrating the interactions between climate risk and mobility responses (McLeman et al., 2021,
p.23)

The left side of the diagram represents the risk propellor used in the IPCC’s WGII AR5.
Risks are initially addressed by in situ adaptation, which do not require people to move. If in situ
adaptation is successful, risk decreases and there is no further consideration of climate-related
migration. This is illustrated by the propellor in the top right corner labelled risk decreases. Should
in situ adaptation be unsuccessful in addressing the risk, households with the means to migrate
may initiate mobility-based responses. When the risk threshold is reached, there is a split in
households that have mobility options and those that lack the resources or choose to remain in
place, the immobile. The diagram indicates that the risk for those households with mobility options
may increase or decrease as a result of these decisions. Households that remain mobile are more
likely to experience increased risk. The arrows from the right hand side of the diagram, increased
and decreased risk, loop back to the original risk to illustrate the dynamic and ongoing nature of
risk.
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The authors’ detailed breakdown of mobility outcomes is shown in Figure 2-15. The
diagram divides mobility responses into voluntary migration and involuntary migration
(displacement). The width of arrows in the diagram suggest the relative volume of migrant flows,
with most migration occurring withing countries (McLeman et al., 2021).

Figure 2-14 Mobility response to climatic risks along the continuum of agency, duration and distance (McLeman et al., 2021, p.24)

2.4.2 Human mobility responses in the context of hazards and environmental change
Migrants can be categorized by the duration, distance and decision-making agency in their
migration (McLeman, 2014). Mobility patterns associated with climate change have been
organized into four temporal outcomes: temporary displacement (less than three months), shortterm migration (3 months to 1 year), long-term migration (more than 1 year) and immobility or
trappedness (Black et al., 2012; Piguet, 2010). McLeman (2014) uses the categories of seasonal,
temporary, recurrent, continuous, indefinite, and permanent categories.
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The movement of people can also be defined by the types of boundaries that are crossed
and characterized by the origin and destination of migration (Fussell et al., 2014; McLeman &
Hunter, 2010) Whether people move across international borders or remain internal to their
country has implications for their protection and recognition. Mobility can also be observed as a
way of life, with displaced people being 'repetitively mobile, gradually mobile, seasonally mobile
and locally mobile' (Gill et al., 2011, p.305). Tacoli (2009) suggests that understanding the
'duration, destination and composition' of migrant flows is imperative to creating policies for both
origin countries and host countries of people displaced by environmental change (p. 104).
The spatial and temporal dimensions of mobility are combined with socioeconomic
contexts and vulnerabilities to identify migration patterns (Black et al., 2011b). If migration is
planned and facilitated appropriately, it can be used as a tool for people to decrease vulnerability
(Foresight, 2011). This section will review five scenarios of populations affected by environmental
change: migration, internal displacement, international displacement, forced immobility and
immobility by choice.

Voluntary migration
The decision to migrate is made at the individual or household level. Migration can be used
as an adaptation measure to avoid risks when other adaptation strategies have failed (McLeman,
2014). Households with access to resources to facilitate movement are often more willing to take
risks associated with migration (McLeman, 2014; Suckall et al., 2017). However, perceptions of
the potential impacts of hazards and environmental change compared to perceptions of life in a
new place are central to people's decision to migrate (Suckall et al., 2017). These perceptions act
as environmental push-pull factors: if life in a new place offers opportunities and security, this
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may pull a household to migrate, especially if risks at home are high (McLeman, 2014; Mortreux
& Barnett, 2009). Alternatively, if people's perception of environmental change or risk of hazards
is low and the opportunities and security of moving to a new place are unclear, people are more
likely to accept a ‘declining quality of life’ (Suckall et al., 2017, p.306).

Internal displacement
Where environmental change is a factor in migration, people are more likely to stay local
and move internal to national borders (McLeman, 2014; Piguet, 2013). Movement within borders
is often attributed to the high cost of international relocation (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Foresight,
2011; Suckall et al., 2017) or a household’s ability to deal with change rather than risk moving to
a new place (Suckall et al., 2017).
Increased internal displacement suggests that local and national governments need to
develop strategies in anticipation of the movement of people, particularly in their development of
urban areas (Black et al., 2011a). Cities will be the destination for many environmentally displaced
populations, though perhaps not as many as previous research has suggested (Cisse & McLeman,
2022; Foresight, 2011; Tacoli, 2009). Movement to urban areas will put pressure on infrastructure
and resources and requires creative planning to build sustainable and resilient cities. In many
poorer countries, migration to cities results in people living in equally hazardous locations as they
did initially (Black et al., 2011a). Ensuring that settlement patterns of the displaced are safe and
resilient to hazards will need to be a priority of local governments to protect them from future
disasters.
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International displacement
While the current migration situation identifies that most people will remain within their
borders or region, increased sea level rise could lead to more forced international migration from
islands in the future (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Tacoli, 2009). The loss of land as waters rise could
result in populations becoming stateless, which prompts questions of state power and sovereignty
and issues of national identity and cultural resources (Blitz, 2011). Migration is the last option for
many people because migration would mean detachment from their identity (Mortreux and
Barnett, 2009).
The possibility of island states disappearing to the sea has prompted proactive resettlement
schemes, mainly through the South Pacific. This strategy may aid in ensuring cultural elements
are preserved through the relocation of an entire population, but it also faces many challenges.
Blitz (2011) summarizes these challenges as issues surrounding the political will of national and
international partners, the financial investment necessary to relocate and rebuild the physical and
social infrastructure, issues about land rights and the rights of migrant populations in a host
territory. Resettlement is also criticized for being a strategy that deteriorates the infrastructure of
an island prematurely through institutional means rather than through environmental change
(Kelman, 2014; Mortreux & Barnett, 2009).

Immobility
Involuntary mobility and displacement are key risks identified in the IPCC’s WGII AR6.
A simplistic view of migration as a response to environmental change would suggest that the
presence of disaster risk drivers would result in migration. This environmental deterministic
understanding disregards the decision-making ability of populations faced by environmental
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change (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Foresight, 2011). Individuals and households will respond
differently to the drivers of risk, not necessarily moving due to their presence, but making informed
decisions based on family characteristics and adaptive capacity (Black et al., 2011a).
The world's poorest people will find it challenging to access the social and economic capital
to move from hazardous locations, leading to people being 'trapped' in vulnerable locations
(Foresight, 2011). Additionally, some people will choose not to leave. The IPCC’s WGII AR6
Assessment Report suggests that immobility occurs when ‘adverse weather or climatic conditions
warrant moving, but households are unable to relocate because of lack of resources, or choose to
remain because of strong social, economic or cultural attachments to place’ (Cisse and McLeman,
2022, p.54).
The decision-making process should not overlook the importance of attachment to place.
Suckall et al. (2017) argue that ‘even under situations of extreme environmental change,
populations will have a desire to remain in places they are attached to’ (p.308). Place attachment
has important policy implications, particularly when countries explore resettlement options.
Individuals and households may be more inclined to stay in place and find adaptation strategies to
maintain their connection with their home (Koubi et al., 2016a, 2016b; Mortreux & Barnett, 2009).
Strategies for building resilience and adapting to environmental change need to be informed by
the willingness of people at the local level to accept them.
Environmental change can exacerbate the vulnerabilities felt by people, particularly those
living in precarious living conditions in developing countries. Poor people in the global south are
faced with a 'double vulnerability,' often forced to live in hazardous areas vulnerable to the impacts
of environmental change and without the social and economic capital to migrate out of them
(Adams, 2016, p.430). Development has been presented as a way to rebuild better in the face of
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environmental change (Kelman, 2014; Zetter, 2014). Kelman (2014) suggests that this will only
successfully mitigate hazards if the initial 'wide-ranging and longstanding development concerns'
that created these vulnerabilities are addressed (p.126).
People who remain in place will require functional warning systems and emergency
evacuation processes to decrease their vulnerability (Black et al., 2011b). In their focus on
migration, governments and policymakers will have to provide equal attention to those that
environmental change limits from moving as it does to those that it forces to migrate (Guzmán et
al., 2009).

2.4.3 Disaster displacement
Disaster displacement occurs when people are evacuated from their homes following an
event due to physical danger, damaged or destroyed housing, lack of essential services, and loss
of livelihood (Ponserre & Ginnetti, 2019). Disaster displacement is defined by the Nansen
Initiative Protection Agenda (2015) as
Situations where people are forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence as a result of a disaster or in order to avoid the impact of an immediate and
foreseeable natural hazard. Such displacement results from the fact that affected persons
are (i) exposed to (ii) a natural hazard in a situation where (iii) they are too vulnerable and
lack the resilience to withstand the impacts of that hazard. (p.28)
As a result of displacement, new risks to livelihoods can emerge for displaced persons,
including the risks of homelessness, food insecurity, and unemployment (Adger et al., 2018).
These livelihood challenges are compounded by a disruption in social cohesion and loss of place
attachment (Adger et al., 2018; Thomas & Benjamin, 2019). The culmination of these risks can

47

equate to further impoverishment, leading to weakening household capacity to cope and adapt to
future events (Black et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2014a). For example, survivors challenged by
transient poverty, a temporary state of deprivation, prior to a hurricane may slide into chronic
poverty or a poverty trap due to the erosion of assets to respond to disaster (Olsson et al., 2014a).
Though displaced persons can benefit a destination community by introducing labour,
skills, and ideas, anticipatory planning is necessary to avoid social tensions and conflicts that can
arise in economically stressed environments (Adger et al., 2018). If appropriately planned for,
investments in sustainable development and social welfare can benefit displaced populations and
receiving communities (Black et al., 2012; Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Kelman, 2014).
The amount of time that someone has spent in a location will inform how they can observe
their environment changes. Mortreux and Barnett's (2009) research in Funafuti highlighted that
older people in the community were better able to identify slight changes in the environment
resulting from climate change than younger generations or people who were new to the
community. Without spending an extended period in a place, it is challenging to observe and
compare change, resulting in increased vulnerability (Mortreux and Barnett, 2009).
The circumstances of disaster displacement in the Caribbean undermine the resilience of
island states and communities, exacerbating the risks of climate change, natural hazards and
environmental degradation (Nansen Initiative, 2015). As governments redirect funds to pay for
short- and long-term response and rebuilding in situ, displaced populations may become more
vulnerable as they are faced with uncertain futures in unfamiliar places.
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2.4.4 Displacement policies
Where environmental change is a factor in the migration decision, people are more likely
to stay local and move internally due to the high cost of international relocation and the ability of
people to deal with change rather than the risks of moving to a new place (Foresight, 2011; Piguet,
2013; Ponserre & Ginnetti, 2019; Suckall et al., 2017). In 2020, approximately 30 million people
globally were internally displaced by extreme weather events (IDMC, 2021). Movement within
borders suggests that local and national governments need to develop strategies for the internal
movement of populations (Cisse & McLeman, 2022).
Global policies have begun to recognize the importance of addressing displacement in
climate change discourse. Frameworks such as the Sendai Framework, the Agenda for Sustainable
Development and Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement acknowledge the
challenges of protecting human rights in the context of climate change and disaster-induced
displacement (Government of Vanuatu et al., 2018). As a result of the Paris Agreement, the Task
Force on Displacement has emerged to recommend ways to 'avert, minimize, and address
displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change' (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 2018, p.1). In addition, policies targeted explicitly at protecting internal and crossborder displaced populations, such as The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and The
Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced persons in the Context of Disaster and
Climate Change, highlight the rights and protections that must be afforded to people on the move
(Government of Vanuatu et al., 2018)
It is likely that climate-related migration will increase for small islands (Mycoo & Wairiu,
2022). Proactive planning for climate change migration and displacement is more prevalent in the
Pacific region than in the Caribbean, though evidence of disaster-induced displacement and
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migration suggests the need for durable solutions and policy (Thomas & Benjamin, 2018).
Relocation in the Caribbean is happening with no clear plans, and it is often used as a preventative
measure to mitigate the impacts of environmental change (Hamza et al., 2017). This omission of
a plan may be due to the lack of acknowledgement of displacement on the parts of governments,
as disasters are seen as a political failure (Hamza et al., 2017). Proactively adapting to climate
change requires that governments in the Caribbean have policies that acknowledge the challenges
of climate-induced displacement and provide clear and attainable strategies to reduce risk and
respond effectively.
For example, to prepare for and respond to environmental and non-environmental stresses
leading to displacement, the archipelago nation of Vanuatu has developed a national policy on
climate change and disaster-induced displacement (2018). The policy identifies strategic systemslevel and sectoral-level priorities to ensure that displacement and human mobility are
mainstreamed into planning and policy initiatives across the scales of governance (Government of
Vanuatu et al., 2018). Developing a durable solution to displacement requires the coordination of
stakeholders to ensure the security, rights and well-being of the displaced population and the host
communities (Government of Vanuatu et al., 2018).
In their assessment of Bahamas government policies, plans, and legislation and UNFCCC
documents, Thomas and Benjamin (2019) found that in the context of climate-induced
displacement and non-economic loss and damage in The Bahamas, the national policy landscape
is 'scarce, outdated and fragmented' (p.8). Although some of the plans acknowledged the potential
social consequences of disaster events and climate-induced displacement, only two documents
were found to reference policy approaches. The First National Communication on Climate Change
to the UNFCCC was the only document to refer to climate-induced displacement in any detail.
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Only the National Policy for the Adaptation to Climate Change recommends developing a
relocation policy (Thomas & Benjamin, 2019).
Without adequate displacement policies to guide displacement in The Bahamas,
Government action following hurricane evacuations has been slow (Thomas & Benjamin, 2019).
As a result, individuals, communities, and organizations initiate ad hoc responses to re-establish,
rebuild and return to normalcy. The delay in government action can result in protracted
displacement, extending time away from social connections and normalcy, contributing to the noneconomic loss and damage of disaster (Thomas & Benjamin, 2019). In addition, the ad hoc
approach to mobility could result in maladaptation in both sending and receiving communities
(Thomas & Benjamin, 2018).
Ensuring that settlement patterns of the displaced are safe and resilient to hazards will need
to be a priority of local governments to protect people from future climate change impacts. The
IDMC (2018) argues that because disasters are local phenomena, information regarding the
number of people displaced, their living conditions and the duration and severity of displacement
must be examined and shared with local governments. A better understanding of protracted
displacement associated with disasters is needed to inform response and relief efforts (Ponserre &
Ginnetti, 2019).

2.5 Caribbean small islands and disaster risk
The IPCC (2022) states with high confidence that tropical cyclones are severely impacting
small islands (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022, p.3). The impacts of changes in extreme events are expected
to indirectly amplify key risks in smalls islands, through cascading effects (Mycoo and Wairu,
2022), which influence the capacity of small islands to respond to and recover from additional and
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simultaneous events (Begum & Lempert, 2022; Pescaroli et al., 2018). The disaster risk of small
island states is attributed to both high exposure to hazards such as SLR and tropical storms and
high vulnerability to hazards due to a high dependence on ecosystems for livelihoods, limited
economic diversity, and low adaptive capacity attributed to isolation, smallness and weak
governance systems (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Weir & Pittock, 2017).
Research on small islands’ exposure and vulnerability to climate change, suggest that
political, environmental, socio-economic and cultural factors contribute to increased exposure and
vulnerability (Betzold, 2015; McCubbin et al., 2015; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). In this section I use
the IPCC 2012 SREX framework (Figure 2-5) to introduce how hurricane hazards, exposure and
vulnerability interact in Caribbean small islands to create disaster risk. Although small islands are
threatened by a variety of slow- and sudden-onset climate change impacts and weather-related
hazards (Table 2-5), this section is particularly interested in hurricane hazards to inform this study.

2.5.1 Climatic and weather hazards in Caribbean small islands
The observed climate-related drivers of risk in small islands include sea level rise,
inundation, shoreline change, coral bleaching, species shifts and decline, increasing temperatures,
and changes in precipitation (Nurse et al., 2014). Thomas et al. (2020) present how these drivers
are projected to change and the hazard that will result from these changes (Table 2-5). The impacts
of these hazards have already been observed to impact tourism and livelihoods, human health,
migration patterns and island economies (Nurse et al., 2014).
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Table 2-5 Climate change-related physical parameters, projected changes, and corresponding hazards for tropical Atlantic,
tropical Pacific, tropical Indian, and South Pacific Regions (copied from Thomas et al., 2020, p.5)

Trends in tropical cyclone, or hurricanes, damages vary across regions (Gettelman et al.,
2018; Mendelsohn et al., 2012) though it is suggested that the islands of the Caribbean are among
the highest at risk (Mendelsohn et al., 2012). More commonly referred to as hurricanes in the
Caribbean, losses from tropical cyclones have increased substantially in recent decades (Done et
al., 2018).
The IPCC WGI Sixth Assessment Report projects that fewer but more intense tropical
cyclones will occur with a 2 degrees Celsius global warming level (IPCC, 2021a). While changes
in hurricane patterns are being observed globally, these changes are inconsistent making it difficult
to make projections about storms and how they will interact with other climate impact drivers such
as sea level rise (IPCC, 2021a). This uncertainty poses challenges in communicating the actual
risks to coastal settlements as it is often unclear where a hurricane will make landfall until it is too
late to evacuate. In addition, the limited amount of scientific baseline data in small island states
contributes to the challenge of preparing for hurricanes based on the observations of historical
trends (IPCC, 2014). Residents rely on local knowledge and their past experiences of hurricanes
to inform preparations (IPCC, 2012, 2022).
While it is likely that the global frequency of hurricanes will decrease or remain unchanged,
increased maximum wind speed, increased heavy rainfalls associated with hurricanes and mean
sea level rise pose a specific challenge for tropical small islands (IPCC, 2012, 2021c; Mendelsohn
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et al., 2012; Mure-Ravaud et al., 2019). Throughout the 21st century, the global mean sea level
will likely rise faster than observed in the past, putting coastal systems and low-lying areas at risk
even if the global goal of a maximum mean temperature rise of 1.5°C is realized (IPCC, 2014).
Current model-based projections suggest that by 2100, should the global 1.5°C target of global
warming be achieved, SLR would be an estimated .48 metres (IPCC, 2021c). Scenarios with
slightly higher temperature targets will result in millions of people being more exposed to SLR
risks and are likely to lead to planned relocation, migration, and displacement (IPCC, 2018,
2021c).
Hurricanes produce intense precipitation that can trigger disastrous floods. In addition, a
pronounced slowdown in the movement of hurricanes combined with higher precipitation rates, is
likely to cause significant flood hazards (Collins et al., 2019). These changing characteristics
combined with sea level rise which will lead to unprecedented storm surges require appropriate
adaptations to reduce disaster risk.

2.5.2 Exposure of Caribbean small islands to climatic and weather hazards
Many small islands in the Caribbean are highly exposed to hazards as they are situated in
areas that frequently experience hurricanes and have high intra- and inter-annual variability in
precipitation. In addition to the sudden storm events, gradual processes such as erosion from sea
level rise (SLR) have implications for the ecology and infrastructure of small islands (Mycoo &
Wairiu, 2022; Scott et al., 2012). Sea level rise is recognized as one of the greatest threats to coastal
areas, particularly in small islands where there is limited capacity to move inward should
communities be inundated or shorelines be eroded (Nurse et al., 2014). More than 50 per cent of
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Caribbean and Pacific small islands populations live within 1.5 kilometres of the coast and
approximately 22 million people in the Caribbean live below 6 metres elevation (Mycoo, 2017).
In Caribbean Small islands, tourism is coast-focused which has contributed to the high
exposure of coastal settlement and infrastructure (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). As a result, there is a
high presence of people, infrastructure and livelihoods exposed to the impacts of SLR and the
storm surges and flooding associated with hurricanes.
In small islands, there is a growing number of people living in informal settlements on
marginalized lands which increases the exposure of the populations to hurricane impacts (Mycoo
& Wairiu, 2022). The informal and ad hoc nature of building in informal settlements leads to
unsustainable land use practices and structures that do not follow local building codes, increasing
the exposure of people to hurricane events (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). In addition, many informal
settlements are in low-lying areas which are being affected by storm surge coming further inland
than in the past (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).

2.5.3 Vulnerability of Caribbean small islands to climatic and weather hazards
Despite being diverse in many ways, small islands are characterized by their similarities in
‘geographical remoteness, isolation, narrow resource bases, heavy dependency on external trade,
vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks, economic volatility and limited access to
development finance’ (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). The risks of climate change to small islands are
amplified by their ‘boundedness (surrounded by ocean), their small land areas, and often their
remoteness from more populated parts of the world’ (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).
Though island states are unique in their characteristics, they are faced with similar physical
and socioeconomical threats (Weir & Pittock, 2017). In islands, vulnerable ecological systems
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exposed to the impacts of climate change interact with weak governance structures and
undiversified economics effecting the adaptive capacity of local population (Barnett & Campbell,
2010; Pelling & Uitto, 2001). Risks to food security, livelihoods that rely on natural capital and
the habitability of coastal villages and towns, where the majority of the population lives, creates
vulnerability amongst individuals and households, as well as the nation as a whole (Lowitt et al.,
2015; Robinson, 2018; Weir & Pittock, 2017).
A long history of economic dependence and colonialism has contributed to the
vulnerability of small islands (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Betzold, 2015; Briguglio, 1995; Nurse
et al., 2014; Thomas, 2016). The loss of food security, shift in livelihood patterns and the
introduction of new forms of governance and power are examples of how the legacy of
colonization and continued globalization limit the adaptive capacity of island populations (Barnett
& Campbell, 2010; Nunn & Kumar, 2018; Weir & Pittock, 2017). Island states are dependent on
key imports such as fuel and food, while relying on the tourism sector a and a narrow range of
exports for economic prosperity (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).
The vulnerability of small islands stems, in part, from their dependency on external
economies and conditions outside of their control (Nurse et al., 2014). For example, in the
Bahamas, the tourism sector is largely dominated by external investors, which creates
complications for adaptation decision-making in small islands (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). Many
small islands have invested heavily in tourism infrastructure, which is already being impacted by
more intense hurricanes amongst other climate change impacts (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). The
dependence on tourism leaves small islands vulnerable to non-climatic hazards as demonstrated
during the Covid-19 pandemic. In addition, there is a high cost of doing business in small islands
which is attributed to the high cost of transport of both raw materials and supplies and the challenge
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of product sales in distant markets (Nurse et al., 2014). This can result in economic volatility based
on the decisions and changes to external factors that are outside of the nation’s control.
Thomas and Benjamin (2019) describe the climate change situation of SIDS as an
‘unvirtuous cycle’ where the costs of climate change require that governments spend funds in
response to disaster impacts, limiting the resources available to invest in building capacity and
resilience. Relative to the small size of small island state economies, the cost of hurricane damage
to infrastructure is high, reducing the capacity to adapt to future events and influencing decisions
to rebuild (Mendelsohn et al., 2012; Mycoo, 2018; Thomas & Benjamin, 2019). The International
Monetary Fund estimates that ‘SIDS lose approximately 2% of their annual GDP on average as a
result of natural hazards, four times the global average' (IMF, 2016 in Hamza et al., 2017). For
example, the losses from Hurricane Maria in Dominica equated to more than 225% of the annual
GDP (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). As a result. disasters also pose significant challenges to meeting
the Sustainable Development Goals of small islands as capital is diverted from developmental
needs such as education, health and poverty reduction to prioritize the basic needs of those citizens
affected by disaster (Thomas & Benjamin, 2018). These social costs erode national, community
and household adaptive capacity while exacerbating existing vulnerabilities (Thomas & Benjamin,
2018).

2.5.4 Climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in small islands
Originating in the natural sciences, climate change adaptation is largely accepted by the
social sciences as a multi-scalar process to negotiate climate risks in different social and
environmental contexts (Adger et al., 2009; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Smit et al., 2000). The
IPCC (2022a) defines adaptation in human systems as ‘the process of adjustment to actual or
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expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities’
(p.18). Disaster risk management is concerned with promoting disaster preparedness through
‘policies and strategies to prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage
residual risk, contributing to the strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses’
(UNDRR, 2022c). As climate risk and disaster risk continue to be addressed simultaneously, the
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction communities becoming increasingly
integrated (Begum & Lempert, 2022).
There are many calls to have the two areas of practice, disaster risk management and
climate change adaptation, become more integrated in order to address the increasing scale and
intensity of disasters (Islam et al., 2020; Kelman et al., 2015; Schipper et al., 2016), though
different perspectives on whether climate change adaptation should be embedded in disaster risk
management (Kelman et al., 2015) or disaster risk management should fall under the umbrella of
climate change adaptation (Schipper et al., 2016). Linking the two schools of practice would be
beneficial to building community adaptive capacity to climate impacts to address the root causes
of vulnerability to environmental hazards and support sustainable development (Schipper et al.,
2016).
In small islands, disaster risk management and climate change adaptation need to be
considered simultaneously to prepare for compound events that create cascading and cumulative
impacts in islands is necessary to ensure sustainability. Small islands are faced with the challenges
outlined by the ‘double exposure’ framework, which refers to the simultaneous impacts of climate
change and globalization that certain regions and sectors are faced (O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000).
climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in islands need to consider the multiple
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processes of change associated with globalization and global environmental change to effectively
prepare for and respond to the interactions between distinct hazards (Thomas, 2016).
Climate change adaptation in islands is categorized into structural or physical, social and
institutional (Klöck & Nunn, 2019). Within these categories adaptation has included hard
infrastructure, policies, climate modelling and assessments, ecosystems-based adaptations, and
education and awareness-raising in small islands (Klöck & Nunn, 2019; Robinson, 2018; Thomas
et al., 2020). While the need for effective adaptation strategies has become evident in small islands,
islands are faced with a number of barriers in meeting their adaptation goals. Sovacool (2012) lists
these barriers as: inadequate access to financial, technological and human resources, issues related
to cultural and social acceptability of measure; constraints imposed by existing political and legal
frameworks; the emphasis on island development and sustainability; tendency to focus on the
short-term climate variability rather than long-term climate change; and community preferences
for ‘hard’ adaptation. Table 2-6 provides examples of adaptation options, barriers and limits in
small islands. As shown by the examples in the table, SIDS must adapt to slow- and sudden-onset
risks, which include but are not limited to hurricanes, while also navigating barriers such as costs,
governance and social acceptance.
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Table 2-6 Examples of adaptation options, barriers and limits in small island developing states (SIDS) (copied from Thomas et al.,
2020, p.14)

Disaster risk management in small islands is generally focused on reducing climate changedriven risk and contributing to sustainable development goals (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). Feasible
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DRM requires strong institutions, good governance, local engagement, and trust in the actors
(Schipper et al., 2022). These actions include strengthening national and community capacity to
enhance early warning systems, build social capital and support adaptation decision-making in
small islands (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).

2.5.5 Barriers to climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in small islands
Adaptation and disaster risk management are challenged by lack of capacity, inadequate
institutions, limited coordination and communication across levels of government, lack of
transparency and accountability and poor communication (Schipper et al., 2022). In small islands,
barriers include challenges related to governance, finance and risk transfer mechanisms, and
education and awareness-raising (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). Specific governance related barriers
include: lack of coordination between government departments and limitations to policy
integration, lack of ownership of adaptation and implementation, and difficulties integrating
Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge into adaptation initiatives (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).
Corruption in government, lack of governance in urban planning and competing development
priorities create barriers in mainstreaming adaptation (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).
Challenges exist within small islands, where outer islands or rural communities are isolated
from government cores (Betzold, 2015; Weir & Pittock, 2017). While the national governments
of small islands are instrumental in negotiating change and accessing funds globally, their
awareness of the vulnerabilities of their peripheral islands and communities is limited (Weir &
Pittock, 2017). This lack of vulnerability awareness is used by the international community as
evidence of the limited capacity of island governments to support their citizenry, suggesting the
need for external support rather than as an opportunity to encourage good governance and strong
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leadership (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). The continued reliance on external support by local
communities limits trust in national authorities' capacity, shifting responsibility and limiting
mobilization of local adaptive capacity (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017).
The international discourse of islands as vulnerable continues to act as a barrier to
adaptation in islands. Focusing attention on the helplessness of islands due to their isolation,
poverty and smallness, ignores the adaptation strategies to hazards employed by island populations
throughout history (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Nunn & Kumar, 2018). Rather than promoting a
discourse of support and responsibility, 'invulnerable' external experts are relied upon to provide
an evaluation of the vulnerability of islands (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). The IPCC’s WGII AR6
emphasizes the need for local knowledge to inform adaptation in addition to scientific data
(Begum & Lempert, 2022). Prioritizing the opinions of foreign 'experts' over local knowledge
through a discourse of island vulnerability reproduces the global power relations representative of
the legacy of colonialism in islands states (Barnett & Campbell, 2010).
The discourse of island vulnerability is amplified across media, international observers,
and representatives of small islands though they are not aligned with the residents' everyday
experiences (Nunn & Kumar, 2017). The contradictions in statements indicate a lack of political
will and maintain that climate change is a foreign problem to be dealt with somewhere else
(Betzold, 2015; Oculi & Stephenson, 2018; Weir & Pittock, 2017).
Caribbean small islands have reported that low technical capacity and poor data quality
and availability limit adaptation (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). For small islands, accessing funds and
resources to support adaptation often relies on evidence presented in reports and generated through
expert opinion (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). Adaptation funds in small islands are often focused
on sectors such as water, biodiversity and coastal zones rather than addressing the root causes of
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vulnerability in low income small islands (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). Countries that have wealth,
like Trinidad and Tobago, do not necessarily use these funds to invest in adaptation and disaster
risk reduction (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022).
There is a lack of awareness around climate change and adaptation in small islands. In a
study on adaptability to sea-level rise in the Bahamas, Petzold et al. (2018) found that competing
knowledge systems across local authorities, non-governmental organization (NGO) and the
broader population in regard to climate change challenged adaptation decision-making. Similarly,
Thomas and Benjamin (2018) found that although the surveyed population in the Bahamas
understood the general risks of climate change, awareness of the severity of the impacts was low.
These findings support that the IPCC’s WGII AR6 findings that more workshops, training and
awareness about risks of climate change are ‘crucial at the local scale to build communities’
capacity to take action’ (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022, p.49).

2.6 Summary of literature review
Section 2.1 introduced the areas of research reviewed to inform the study: climate change
adaptation, disaster risk management, and environmental mobility.
Section 2.2 introduced key concepts used in the research.
Section 2.3 reviewed the climate change adaptation, hazards and development literature to
examine how adaptive capacity is determined and assessed. This section introduced examples of
frameworks used to understand and evaluate adaptive capacity and the factors that influence a
system’s adaptation actions. Smit and Wandel’s (2006) community-based vulnerability
assessment is introduced as a framework to assess adaptive capacity in practice. Finally, the
limitations to assessing adaptive capacity are discussed.
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Section 2.4 reviewed the literature on human mobility in the context of environmental
change and hazards, with a particular focus on disaster displacement. This section emphasizes the
role of agency in mobility decision-making at the individual and household scale. Most studies
examining displacement and return rates of evacuated individuals and households after disasters
were conducted on a broad scale to identify socioeconomic and demographic characteristics
related to post-hurricane mobility. Few studies examine the experiences of displacement at the
individual and household scale, limiting the understanding of how survivors’ perceptions of risks
and priorities influence post-hurricane decision-making. This section closes with a review of
displacement policies in small islands.
Section 2.5 used the components of the IPCC SREX (2012) disaster risk propellor (Hazard,
Exposure and Vulnerability) to describe the changing characteristics of hurricane hazards in small
islands and suggests how small islands are vulnerable and exposed to these hazards. This section
emphasizes how current and historical social, economic, and political systems have influenced the
exposure and vulnerability of residents in small islands through planning that locates people in
highly exposed areas and unequal development. The section concludes by introducing some of the
barriers to implementing climate change adaptation in disaster risk management in small islands.
The literature review revealed several gaps that require further investigation. First, there is
a need to explore how hurricane-displaced populations decide where to go in the aftermath of a
hurricane. Understanding the needs and priorities of hurricane-displaced households can inform
future disaster risk reduction, adaptation and displacement policies and practices. Second, there is
a need to examine the adaptive capacity of hurricane-affected populations before, during and after
the storm to identify opportunities to promote and enhance local strengths and expand existing
capacities. Finally, there is a need to evaluate how national climate change adaptation and disaster
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risk management policies can enhance household adaptive capacity to reduce vulnerability to
future environmental hazards.
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3. Overview of the Case Study
This chapter briefly introduces the Bahamas and provides and overview of the impacts,
response, and recovery to Hurricane Dorian. In Section 4.1, I present environmental,
socioeconomic, demographic, political and cultural characteristics of the Bahamas to illustrate the
context in which the research is situated. In Section 4.2, I describe Hurricane Dorian and its
impacts on the Abacos and Grand Bahama islands. Following the overview of the impacts of
Hurricane Dorian, I summarize the response and recovery efforts taken by different actors posthurricane.

3.1 The Bahamas
3.1.1 Geography/environment
The Bahamas is an archipelago nation of over 700 islands and 2,400 cays on the eastern
edge of the Caribbean region. The chain of islands extends over a large area in the Atlantic Ocean,
though landmass makes up a small portion of the area. The islands have a foundation of fossil
coral and limestone and are rocky with very thin soil. The Bahamas islands are low-lying; the
highest point in the Bahamas is Mount Alvernia on Cat Island, 63 metres (207 feet) above sea
level, and the average elevation above sea level in the Bahamas is 10m (Simpson et al., 2012).
Approximately 130,000 people live less than 1 m above sea level in the Bahamas (IDB, 2020).
The Bahamas is located within the Caribbean hurricane belt. During the annual hurricane
season, which begins on June 1 and ends on November 1, hurricanes are more likely, and residents
of the islands have a heightened awareness about changes in the weather patterns. Betweem 1990
and 2019 The Bahamas has experienced 34 tropical storms and hurricanes (Figure 3-1). Since
2015, the Bahamas has been devastated by four large hurricanes, three of which have category 5
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classification, including Hurricane Joaquin (2015), Hurricane Matthew (2016), Hurricane Irma
(2017) and Hurricane Dorian (2019) (Figure 3-2). The dispersal of the islands across a large area
increases the country's exposure to hurricanes, though in most hurricanes only some of the
country’s islands are affected.

Figure 3-1 Tropical storms and hurricane in the Bahamas (1990-2019) (IDB and ECLAC 2021)

My research focuses primarily on the displaced population from the islands of the Abacos
and Grand Bahama, where Hurricane Dorian made landfall in the Bahamas (Figure 3-7).
Additionally, Eleuthera and New Providence Island, are discussed as many Hurricane Dorian
survivors evacuated to these islands. I use the term “the Abacos” to describe collectively the
‘mainland’ of Abaco, Great Abaco Island and the surrounding cays, including Elbow Cay, ManO-War Cay, and Great Guana Cay.
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Figure 3-2 Hurricanes in the Bahamas 2015-2022 (created using NOAA hurricane tracker app).

3.1.2 Demographics
The most recent census from 2010 reported that the Bahamas had a population of 351,461
(Department of Statistics, 2012b) and is growing by less than 1% a year (World Bank, 2022). Most
of the population (70%) lives on New Providence Island (NPI), where the capital of the Bahamas,
Nassau, is located (Department of Statistics, 2012b, Figure 3-3). Grand Bahama and Abaco are the
second and third most populated family islands (Department of Statistics, 2012b). Nassau is the
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political and economic centre of the
Bahamas. The ‘Family Islands’, islands that
are not Nassau, have local administrators
that oversee the affairs of their districts.
The median age of people in the
Bahamas was 29.4 in 2010, and the
working-age population (15-64) made up

Figure 3-3 Distribution of population across islands (Department of
Statistics, 2012b, p.3)

66.8% of the population (Department of Statistics, 2012b). Gender ratios were fairly equal though
the number of females outnumbered males on New Providence, Grand Bahama, and Spanish Wells
(Department of Statistics, 2012b).
Married persons accounted for 38.8% of the population, single or never married persons
accounted for 51.3%, and divorced persons accounted for 4.5% (Department of Statistics, 2012b).
Most households in the Bahamas range from one to five people though larger households are not
uncommon. The average household size is 3.4 people per household (Department of Statistics,
2012b). There were more male heads of households (61%) than female heads of households (39%)
in 2010, which was consistent with previous years (Department of Statistics, 2012b).
The population of the Bahamas consists of people from many different cultures,
backgrounds, ethnic identities, races, and religions (Joseph, 2014). Immigration has been essential
in the historical development of the Bahamas (Perry, 2017). In 2010, 17.3% of the census
population reported they were citizens of another country (Department of Statistics, 2012b). Figure
3-4 shows a breakdown of the home countries of migrants in the Bahamas.
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Figure 3-4 Percent distribution non-Bahamian population by country, 2010 (Department of Statistics, 2012, p.10)

Almost one-quarter of adult females have some college education compared to 16% of
males (Department of Statistics, 2012b). The percentage of Bahamians who earned university
qualifications rose over the past two decades. Of the people with degrees, women account for 63%
(Department of Statistics, 2012b).
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3.1.3 Housing

Figure 3-5 Private dwelling by type of tenure, 2010 (Department of Statistics, 2012, p.16)

The 2010 Census counted 126,493 dwelling units in the Bahamas, of which 23,631 were
vacant (Department of Statistics, 2012b). The number of vacant dwellings almost doubled between
2000 and 2010 (Department of Statistics, 2012b). Vacant dwellings were categorized as ‘any
dwelling unit which is suitable for occupancy but was unoccupied at the time of the census’
(Department of Statistics, 2012b, p.170) and included winter residences, secondary residences, for
rent, for sale or seasonal vacancies. Of the occupied dwellings, 59% were homeowner occupied,
and 35% were renter-occupied (Department of Statistics, 2012b). Information about homeowner
occupied dwellings was disaggregated into different types of tenure in the 2010 Census, which are
presented in Figure 3-5. Homeownership was more common in the Family Islands than in Nassau
(Department of Statistics, 2012b). On Grand Bahama, 64% of people owned their homes, 28% of
whom had a mortgage (Department of Statistics, 2012b). Similarly, on Abaco, 64% of people
owned their own homes and 16% had a mortgage (Department of Statistics, 2012b). It is common
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for people in the Bahamas to build their homes incrementally as they save money to avoid having
a mortgage, or to inherit generational homes.

3.1.4 Economy
The Bahamas is one of the wealthiest countries in the Americas in terms of GDP per capita
(Simpson et al., 2012). Tourism, international banking and investment management drive the
economy; together, they comprise up to 85 percent of the country's GDP (U.S. Department of
State, 2021).
The economy relies heavily on American tourist dollars; most of the tourists who visit the
Bahamas each year are Americans (Department of Statistics, 2019). Tourism has grown to be the
primary industry for The Bahamas, accounting for 38.2% of total national GDP and 51.5% of total
employment in 2019 (Tourism Economics, 2021a). A comprehensive assessment done in 2012
reported that the tourism sector supported 72,931 total jobs (Tourism Economics, 2021b). The
assessment also reported that 5.9 million visitors travelled to the Bahamas, 75% of whom were
related to cruise excursionists (Tourism Economics, 2021b). Though most tourists vacation in
Nassau, the Family Islands, including the Abacos, have a high number of repeat visitors (Ministry
of Tourism, 2019a). Grand Bahama and the Berry Islands have a higher number of cruise tourists,
while islands like the Abacos have a higher number of stop-over tourists travelling by air, both
commercial and private planes, as well as yachts and private boats (Ministry of Tourism, 2019b).
One effect of the existing tourism model in the Bahamas, which privileges wealthy visitors'
priorities to maintain the country's competitiveness in Caribbean tourism, is a growing wealth gap
between the poor and the rich. The Bahamas has the second-highest economic and social inequality
in the Caribbean (OECD et al., 2019). The Abacos exemplify this disparity, as they are known for

72

their marinas, golf courses and all-inclusive resorts, yet are also the site of some of the largest
shantytowns in the Bahamas (Shanty Town Task Force, 2018). In order to sustain the economy in
the Bahamas, there is a need for cheap labour, often Haitian migrants who reside in the
shantytowns (Simpson et al., 2012).
Many second homeowners are also in the Bahamas, particularly across the northern islands.
There are few restrictions on foreigners buying property in the Bahamas, and if the purchase price
is over US$1.5 million, the buyer can qualify for permanent residency (Government of the
Bahamas, 2021). As a result, some of the world's wealthiest people live in the Bahamas, and their
large household incomes are factored into the Department of Statistics reporting (Lowe, 2012).
The Bahamas is therefore considered a high-income country, making it ineligible for Office of
Development Assistance (ODA) funding after a hurricane (Deopersad et al., 2020). Recurrent
disasters, as experienced in the last decade, contribute to and extend government debt (Deopersad
et al., 2020).

3.1.5 Political structure
The Bahamas became independent in 1973, though it remains part of the British
Commonwealth. The national government is based on the Westminster Model, where the
Governor-General represents the Queen. The country has two spheres of government: central and
local. The central government is made up of the executive, legislative and the judicial branches.
Government ministries and departments are in Nassau, the capital, where central government is
situated.
Local government is empowered by the Local Government Act of 1996 and is overseen by
the Ministry of Transport and Local Government (Commonwealth Local Government Forum,
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2018). There are 32 local government districts that fall under local government jurisdiction. The
districts do not have revenue-raising power and instead receive transfers from national
government.
Local government consists of a town committee and a district council who are elected and
a Family Island administrator who is appointed by central government (The Government of the
Bahamas, 1996). Town committees are responsible for general health and sanitation. District
councils are responsible for hospitals and clinics, potable water, transportation and the upkeep of
schools and government-owned buildings, including hurricane shelters (Commonwealth Local
Government Forum, 2018). Administrators on the Family Islands are responsible for every aspect
of public service and government agencies including infrastructure, transportation, port revenue
collection, and disaster response (The Government of the Bahamas, 1996). The appointed
government administrator is the primary link between the central and local government, acting as
executive secretary, financial officer and coordinator of all government functions in the district
(Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2018).
The goal of the Local Government Act was to establish leaders to govern Family Island
district affairs to bring government closer to the people, allowing for further autonomy (Smith,
2020). Despite the attempt to decentralize to provide more autonomy to Family Islands, the local
government system is challenged by a lack of fiscal capacity to govern effectively, breakdowns in
relations between central and local government, interference of party politics and a lack good
governance (Smith, 2020).
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Figure 3-6 Diagram showing the organizational structure of NEMA (NEMA, 2011)

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is a central government agency
which operates under the executive branch of government (Figure 3-6). In the event of a hurricane,
the Department of Meteorology will send out a warning and NEMA will mobilize shelters in the
appropriate islands. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), such as shelter, health, transportation,
are activated and led by various government ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of
Social Services and Urban Development, in response to the hurricane (OCHA, 2019). Once the
damaged has been assessed, NEMA works in conjunction with the Royal Bahamian Defence Force
to move canned goods and water to the affected islands. NEMA will also evacuate people who
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need to be evacuated. If police presence is needed, they will be deployed in addition to the RBDF
to ensure safety.
After Hurricane Dorian, the national government created the Disaster Reconstruction
Authority (DRA) which works in coordination with NGOs, charities, churches, businesses and
partners in the private sector and civil society to rebuild in Abaco and Grand Bahama (Disaster
Reconstruction Authority, 2020a).

3.1.6 Migration and citizenship
The implications and context of migration and citizenship are of direct importance to
examining post-hurricane mobility in the Bahamas. Although there is a long history of Caribbean,
British and American migration to the Bahamas, Haitians are the most scrutinized migrants (Perry,
2017). The earliest period of Haitian migration occurred after the Haitian Revolution (Craton &
Saunders, 1998). Before the 1950s, Haitians migrating to the Bahamas practiced circular migration
(Marshall, 1979; Perry, 2017). As tourism developed in the Bahamas, labour was needed, which
led to many Haitians migrating to the Bahamas. As the Bahamas gained a reputation as a place of
affluence, Haitians continued to migrate, relying on existing social and familial networks across
the archipelago (Perry, 2017). Though Haitians and descendants of Haitians born in the Bahamas
contribute substantially to the economy of the Bahamas, they are seen as a burden and a 'problem'
(Joseph, 2014; Sears, 1990). Anti-Haitian sentiment continues to the present, and the 'problem' of
Haitians persists, partly due to the citizenship laws and immigration policies restricting Haitians'
assimilation into Bahamian culture (Belton, 2010; Bethell-Bennett, 2021; Johnson et al., 2005;
Perry, 2017).
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The governments of the U.S. and the Bahamas work together to reduce crime and address
illegal migration, as the political stability of the Bahamas is important to the U.S. (U.S. Department
of State, 2021). Historically, Bahamians have migrated to the U.S. for employment and education
(Craton & Saunders, 1998), which has resulted in a large diaspora of Bahamians (49,940) living
in the U.S relative to the population of the Bahamas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). The U.S.
maintains 'preclearance' facilities at the airports in Nassau and Freeport to allow faster connections
times into the U.S. Bahamians do not need a visa to enter the U.S. if they are traveling for business
or pleasure for a short duration as long as they have a passport that shows they are a citizenship of
the Bahamas and they are in possession of a police record that shows they do not have a criminal
record (CBP Preclearance Requirements, 2021).

3.2 Hurricane Dorian
Hurricane Dorian is considered the strongest hurricane on record in the Atlantic due to the
wind intensity and the storm surges (Deopersad et al., 2020). It is estimated that storm tides from
the category 5 hurricane reached 18 to 23 ft (5.5 to 7m) and that over 3 ft (.91m) of rain fell across
the Abacos and Grand Bahama (World Meteorological Organization, 2019). When the eye of
Hurricane Dorian made landfall on the Abacos on September 1, it had reached a maximum
sustained wind speed of 185 mph (280 km/h) with wind gusts over 220 mph (335 km/h)
(Deopersad et al., 2020; World Meteorological Organization, 2019). While these winds battered
Great Abaco Island and the scattered cays along the island's eastern side, storm surge and flooding
continued to rise. On September 2, the storm maintained its strength as it travelled to the eastern
side of Grand Bahama. The storm's eye then stalled over Grand Bahama for the next 24 hours. The
extreme destruction of the storm has been attributed to the slow-moving nature of the hurricane
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(World Meteorological Organization, 2019). The islands’ most severe damage resulted from storm
surge and flooding; approximately 60% of Grand Bahama Island was submerged during the
Hurricane (ICEYE, 2021). Figure 3-7 illustrates the path and windspeeds of Hurricane Dorian.

Figure 3-7 Hurricane Dorian path and wind strength (Deopersad et al., 2020, p.27)

3.2.1 Hurricane Impacts
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in coordination with Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), assessed the economic damages,
losses and additional costs of Hurricane Dorian on the Bahamas at $3.4 billion (Deopersad et al.,
2020). This assessment includes the costs of direct physical damage, revenue and other income
losses and additional costs (Deopersad et al., 2020).
The assessment suggests that 29,472 persons were affected by the hurricane due to
damages to their homes and assets (Deopersad et al., 2020). Over 75 percent of the dwellings were
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affected on Abaco, and 57 percent of homes were severely damaged (Deopersad et al., 2020).
Damages to the housing sector on both the Abaco islands and Grand Bahama are estimated at
$1.48 billion, nearly 90 percent of which are on Abaco (Deopersad et al., 2020). Nine thousand
houses were assessed as damaged or destroyed, and 2,894 homes have been rendered uninhabitable
by the hurricane (Deopersad et al., 2020). Losses in the housing sector were estimated to be $65
million are attributed to the interruption of accommodation and rental services due to homes being
uninhabitable (Deopersad et al., 2020). Nearly 60 percent of residents and businesses on Abaco
were uninsured, which has created challenges for rebuilding (Deopersad et al., 2020; Hartnell,
2021). The most impacted areas, the shantytowns, were primarily inhabited by vulnerable,
undocumented migrant populations (Smith, 2019). Damages to the shantytowns are not accounted
for in the estimates of losses and damages.
The infrastructure, roads, airports, ports, telecommunications, power and water, and
sanitation were damaged significantly during the storm. In Grand Bahama, the aquifer was
contaminated with saltwater due to the high storm surge and extensive flooding (Mercy Corps,
2019). A year after the storm, the aquifers were still being restored. The majority of the additional
costs were attributed to the cleaning of an oil spill on Grand Bahama, which occurred due to the
hurricane (Deopersad et al., 2020). Telecommunications returned quickly after the storm.
Restoring power was slower.
The damages of the hurricane harmed the economy of the affected islands and the economy
of the Bahamas. The Abacos and Grand Bahama were two of the most significant contributors to
the Bahamian GDP. Grand Bahama represented 14% of the 2019 GDP, and the Abacos represented
4.5% before Hurricane Dorian (McKenzie, 2020). The damage to the tourist sector was estimated
at $530 million, and losses were forecasted at $325 million. The Abacos suffered 87 percent of the
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total damages and 70 percent of total losses (Deopersad et al., 2020). Ninety-one percent of the
estimated $2.5 billion in damages was in the private sector (Deopersad et al., 2020).
The damage caused by high winds and storm surge was exacerbated by poor construction
practices and the high exposure to hazards of communities and infrastructure (Deopersad et al.,
2020). There were 74 confirmed deaths as a result of Hurricane Dorian (Bahamas Information
Services, 2020) though there is speculation that the death toll is much higher when undocumented
migrants living in the shantytowns of Abaco are included (Bethell-Bennett & Fürst, 2021; Charles,
2020). A report on shantytowns in Abaco from 2018 reported that approximately 3,581 people
were living in shantytowns across Great Abaco, the three most populated being: The Mudd
(51.4%), The Pea (19%) and The Farm (15.2%) (Shanty Town Task Force, 2018, Figure 3-8).

Figure 3-8 Map showing settlements in Central Abaco and Elbow Cay. Shantytowns are identified by red dots.

People with Haitian citizenship made up 26% of the population in Abaco during the 2010
census (Department of Statistics, 2012a). Based on the Abaco census data, 32% of the population
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(2500) living in South Abaco were living in the Mudd or the Pea in 2010 (Department of Statistics,
2012a). To date, 282 people remain missing (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, 2021).
As a result of the hurricane, an estimated 9,840 people became newly displaced in the
Bahamas (Marazita, 2020). Estimates from other organizations suggest that the hurricane
displaced up to 15,000 people (CCCM, 2019). Calculating the exact number of displaced people
has been challenging because many individuals relied on private social networks for evacuation
and accommodation after the storm (IOM, 2019d; Marazita, 2020). As a result, estimates of
displaced persons using the information provided through public services and NGOs do not
necessarily reflect the entire displaced population.

3.2.2 Hurricane Response
Following the hurricane, the United Nation (U.N.) estimated that 70,000 people needed
urgent assistance on the Abacos and Grand Bahama (Humanitarian Aid, 2019). NEMA was
responsible for handling the immediate response to the hurricane, in coordination with the
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), a regional inter-governmental
agency for disaster management in the Caribbean. In response to Dorian, the Regional Response
Mechanism (RRM) was activated by CDEMA, mobilizing participating states, national, regional
and international stakeholders to deliver timely and coordinated relief (CDEMA, 2016).
Once it was safe to travel, NEMA provided evacuation flights free to Abaco and Grand
Bahama residents to go to New Providence after the hurricane (Russell, 2019). Following the
evacuation, the government was responsible for accommodating thousands of displaced persons
in shelters across Nassau, New Providence (ECLAC et al., 2019). On September 14, 2019, the
IOM reported that 1,902 people were housed in government approved shelters in Nassau, 71
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people were housed in shelters in Grand Bahama and three people were being sheltered on Abaco
(IOM, 2019a). The number of people at the shelters remained consistent throughout September,
with some shelters running over capacity and offering tents to individuals and families in need
(CDEMA & NEMA, 2019). On October 18, 2019, the IOM reported that 1,726 people were
receiving housing support on New Providence Island, nearly half of whom were in housing
provided by the Bahamas Disaster Housing Assistance, a Bahamas-based non-profit organization
(IOM, 2019b).
NEMA and CDEMA led the response from Nassau, coordinating with humanitarian
organizations and supported by U.N. agencies (OCHA, 2019). Support from the U.N. and
International NGOs arrived within a week of the storm to support search and rescue efforts,
provide food, water, and necessities, and remove debris (CDEMA, 2019b). ESFs were activated
with leadership delegated by the pre-determined lead government agencies in coordination with
the capacities of international organizations. For example, the IOM worked with the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to support the Ministry of Social Services and
Urban Renewal with shelter coordination (OCHA, 2019). The U.S. Coast Guard was among the
first to respond, assisting with evacuations after the storm and supporting search and rescue
operations (OCHA, 2019). The Netherlands and Jamaica sent troops to support the response
efforts, and the U.K. delivered water and shelter kits to northern Abaco (OCHA, 2019). Figure 48 provides a breakdown of the response types provided after the hurricane. Within a month, more
than 100 organizations were present in the Bahamas (OCHA, 2019). The participating states of
CDEMA contributed financially and with personnel quickly after the storm (CDEMA, 2019a).
Months after the storm, the humanitarian sector continued to provide food, water and necessities
to people returning to Abaco and took a leading role in the cleanup and recovery efforts.
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Figure 3-9 Response presence by type (OCHA, 2019, p.5)

Although not represented in Figure 3-9, civil society had an essential role in the immediate
response efforts. Many local individuals and organizations responded to the crisis, including nonprofits, churches, travel and cruise companies, and private groups. There was a strong group of
Bahamian volunteers, self-named the Core Group, that quickly responded to the impacts of
Hurricane Dorian. Later rebranded as the Bahamas Strong Alliance, the Core Group was integral
to the hurricane response (Thomas et al., 2021). The volunteers organized and managed an
evacuation centre, processing over 6,000 evacuees from Abaco and Grand Bahama. In addition,
they provided food, shelter and medical attention to evacuees and assisted with the short-term
housing needs of the displaced population (Thomas et al., 2021). Outside of Nassau, volunteer
groups emerged to address the needs of survivors in the affected settlements and in Family Islands
that received evacuees. In addition, social media was used to share information about the missing
and organize response efforts across the Bahamas islands.
The damages of the hurricane prompted the longer-term displacement of many residents
from the Abacos and Grand Bahama. After the initial response, the need to find longer-term

83

accommodations for the displaced population emerged. Bahamian non-profits led the housing
initiatives, finding and securing long-term housing for the displaced population. In Nassau, the
Bahamas Disaster Housing Association was created in response to Hurricane Dorian and reported
assisting 750 families (2250 people) with rental assistance (IOM, 2020). The One Eleuthera
Foundation provided rental assistance to individuals and households willing to move to Eleuthera
and Spanish Wells. Social services continued to assist Bahamians displaced from the Abacos and
Grand Bahama six months after the storm (Smith, 2020).

3.2.3 Hurricane Recovery
Though progress is being made, recovery has been slow in the Abacos and Grand Bahama.
After the hurricane, the government created a new ministry, the Disaster Reconstruction Authority,
to oversee the rebuilding of the Abacos and Grand Bahama. A year after the storm, the Disaster
Reconstruction Authority had established seven priorities according to the needs of the residents
of Abaco and Grand Bahama (Disaster Reconstruction Authority, 2020b). In order to respond to
these needs, 14 critical projects were established to focus on temporary and semi-permanent
housing, debris removal and management, and planning for schools (Disaster Reconstruction
Authority, 2020b). As of August 2020, 3,166 of the 4,355 homeowners registered for Small Home
Repair Assistance had been approved (Disaster Reconstruction Authority, 2020b). Homeowners
in Abaco represented 30% of people who had applied for the program (Disaster Reconstruction
Authority, 2020b). In addition, 210 temporary domes had been erected in Abaco (170) and Grand
Bahama (40) (Disaster Reconstruction Authority, 2020b).
Two years after the hurricane, Abaco was still 'very much in the reconstruction phase'
(MacLaughlin, 2021). Many houses remained without roofs, boats and larger debris had not been
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moved after being washed ashore, and many buildings remained abandoned (Fernandez, 2021).
The NGOs continued to help repair homes, particularly for people who did not have insurance or
have the funds to pay for repairs (MacLaughlin, 2021). In April 2021, Katherine Smith, executive
director of the DRA, reported that more than 3,700 homes across Grand Bahama and Abaco still
needed repairs (Maycock, 2021). Plans were underway to build 60 homes to house Hurricane
Dorian victims as of June of 2021 (Smith, 2021). Progress has been made, which has been
demonstrated by the reopening of several hotels and restaurants and dive and fishing sites (Nagle
Myers, 2021).
In the first year after the hurricane, progress had been made in restoring services such as
power, water and telecommunications, though some pockets remained disconnected because of
unique circumstances (Disaster Reconstruction Authority, 2020b). In October 2021, it was
estimated that 64% of Bahamas Power and Light customers in Abaco had their electricity restored
(McKenzie, 2021).
In some settlements, private interests have driven recovery, led by wealthy residents and
second homeowners. For example, private donations have been helpful in funding debris removal,
home restoration, roof repairs and collaborative community projects on Elbow Cay through the
Elbow Cay Recovery Association. Hopetown United was also created in response to Hurricane
Dorian and has raised $8 million to support the recovery of Elbow Cay (Hartnell, 2021). While the
cays have had significant donations from their community, they feel neglected by the government
and that it should not be the responsibility of wealthier residents to fund the island’s recovery
(Hartnell, 2021).
The Covid-19 pandemic has introduced significant challenges to the islands' recovery after
Hurricane Dorian. In addition, national capacity to respond to the pandemic and support recovery
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on the islands is stymied by contractions in tourism and the economy. In 2020, real GDP contracted
by 14.5% due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on tourism (World Bank, 2021). As a result
of the borders closing due to the pandemic, many NGOs supporting recovery and reconstruction
decided to leave the Bahamas. The reconstruction efforts were stalled and left in a 'holding pattern'
(McKenzie, 2020).
The return of displaced populations has been slow. Two years after the hurricane, many
people had returned to their pre-Dorian settlements, some living in rough conditions; some people
lived in tents beside their destroyed homes (Nagle Myers, 2021). It will take years for the islands
impacted by Hurricane Dorian to recover, and the 'new normal' may be different from life preDorian. However, there is much hope amongst the communities to rebuild better and stronger than
before.
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4. Methodology
4.1 Introduction
Most research examining disaster displacement focuses on general trends, using broad
surveys to connect the socioeconomic and demographic factors of displaced people and where
they go after an event (DeWaard et al., 2016; Fussell, 2015; Fussell et al., 2010; Ponserre &
Ginnetti, 2019). Studies on adaptive capacity and vulnerability examine general determinants and
factors that are anticipated to influence the capacity of a household to adapt rather than the actual
adaptation processes after an event (Cinner et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2010a, 2010b; Mortreux &
Barnett, 2017; Siders, 2019). These studies provide little information about how disasters impact
human mobility and how this influences household adaptive capacity (Ober, 2020). In order to
identify priorities for managing future disaster displacement, I use a primarily qualitative approach
to understand the relationship between post-hurricane mobility, displacement, and vulnerability in
small islands.
My research is exploratory and uses an inductive approach to formulate and answer
research questions that emerged throughout the research process (Creswell, 2014; Glaser, 2013). I
used semi-structured interviews to capture the experiences of Hurricane Dorian displaced
survivors to create a rich, descriptive narrative of households' vulnerability to hurricanes, their
capacity to recover and their adaptations to mitigate disaster risk in the future.
I began developing the research project in the spring of 2019, pre-Hurricane Dorian and
before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. In this chapter, I will first share how the research
design has evolved over the course of the project in response to these events. I will then present
the methods I used in the research to collect and analyze data. This is followed by a reflection on
my positionality in the research. Finally, I discuss limitations to the research.
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Figure 4-1 Context map showing the Bahamas (light green) and a closer view of the islands discussed in the research (dark green).

4.1.1 Initial visit
My research was motivated by observations made during visits to the Bahamas and
conversations with family and friends living in the Bahamas about their perceptions of climate
change risks. In March 2019, I travelled to island of Eleuthera (Figure 4-1) to have informal
conversations with key informants for advice on my research direction. During this visit, I spoke
with one Bahamian academic, two research organizations, one community development
organization, and one island administrator. In my initial conversations with friends and family, I
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asked about climate change and about concerns of future impacts in the Bahamas. Most people
defaulted to sharing a hurricane story, and I was often asked to explain what I meant by climate
change and the other possible impacts. Informed by these conversations, I began to explore
opportunities to meet with key informants working in the Bahamas' disaster preparedness and
response realm. My network connected me to island administrators that acted as disaster response
teams on the island, one of who connected me to the director of the National Emergency
Management Agency (NEMA). I arranged a meeting at NEMA and was able to ask questions
about the preparedness and response activities of the organization. The process of response
deployment and resources was explained, and I was provided resources that were distributed for
hurricane preparedness throughout the Bahamas.
I met with two research institutions on the island to gather information about the type of
work they were involved in and whether local communities engaged in the organization's research
activities. In addition, I met with the One Eleuthera Foundation (OEF), a community development
non-profit organization, to discuss their vision for climate change adaptation on the island. The
OEF seeks to build sustainable communities across the island and provides a variety of services
across the island of Eleuthera, including a community bank, fire stations in the north and south of
the island, and a hotel, which also serves as the main campus for the Centre for Training and
Innovation (CTI). In addition, they are affiliated with many partner organizations across the island,
such as the Bahamas Methodist Habitat (BMH), a disaster response organization and emergency
shelter in North Eleuthera. The CEO of OEF, who had worked in international disaster response
for many years, shared that part of his future vision for Eleuthera was to offer opportunities to
build capacity and skills to create a Bahamas-based disaster response team. He envisioned CTI
expanding in the future to promote adaptation and disaster response skills in-country to ensure that
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funds donated post-disaster would support local workers and remain within the Bahamas'
economy. Based on the information gathered on this trip, I developed a research proposal that
emphasized building community adaptive capacity to prepare for and respond to the impacts of
climate change.
4.1.2 Hurricane Dorian, 2019
In September 2019, Hurricane Dorian made landfall in the Bahamas, devastating most of
the islands of the Abacos and Grand Bahama (Figure 4-1) and highlighting limitations to
household, community and national capacity to cope and adapt to the impacts of a hurricane of
Dorian’s intensity and magnitude. In response to the devastation and displacement of Dorian a
path to a much more impactful and socially relevant research project was clear. I adapted my
research to examine what the hurricane revealed about household adaptive capacity, what factors
influenced household mobility decision-making during displacement, how mobility affected future
vulnerability to hurricanes, and how the experiences of survivors could be used to inform future
disaster risk management in the Bahamas.
Hurricane Dorian made landfall on the islands of the Abacos on September 1, 2019 as a
category 5 storm with sustained winds of 185mph and storm surge up to 23 feet. On August 30th,
2019, I began receiving updates about Hurricane Dorian through a WhatsApp group chat with
friends on Eleuthera, a few of whom had family members on Grand Bahama. After the storm they
shared the locations of their family’s homes on maps hoping that someone from the group would
have information about the status of the neighborhoods where their family was during the storm.
Images and videos of the impacts of the storm were shared across the group as well messages that
had been posted in search of missing people.
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This group of friends on Eleuthera were active in mobilizing evacuations after the storm.
At the time of the storm, a friend with experience in project management was visiting Eleuthera
from Nassau. He developed a procedure to evacuate and register friends and family from Abaco
to Eleuthera in coordination with local government. Many people from Harbour Island and
Eleuthera volunteered at Three Island Dock to welcome evacuees as they arrived. I continued to
receive updates via the WhatsApp group and through conversations with my cousin, who lives and
works on Harbour Island, a small island off of Eleuthera.
After the hurricane, thousands of people were displaced. When I arrived in the Bahamas in
October of 2019 to begin volunteering with the One Eleuthera Foundation, I became aware of the
challenges being faced by the hurricane displaced population as they arrived in an unfamiliar place.
In response to the extensive displacement induced by the hurricane, I reoriented my research focus
from a prospective examination of household vulnerability and adaptive capacity to an empirical
examination of the survivor’s experiences of coping and adapting during hurricane displacement
and recovery.
4.1.3 Covid-19 Pandemic, 2020
In March 2020, the Government of Canada recommended that all Canadian nationals return
to Canada in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. My unexpected departure from the Bahamas
came before I had begun conducting interviews. Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, I had planned
to do face-to-face interviews with hurricane-displaced individuals on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells
between April and June 2020. I had also met with Haitian pastors on Eleuthera who were willing
to support focus groups with hurricane displaced Haitians on Eleuthera. Because I returned home
early, I had to adapt my research design to conduct interviews over the phone and over Zoom. This
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limited my ability to engage with the Haitian community and my potential interviewees to those
who were willing and able to do phone interviews.
One benefit of the change in research design to remote interviews was that I was able to
conduct interviews with hurricane survivors who had been displaced to locations other than
Eleuthera and with people who remained or had returned to their home islands after the storm. In
a few cases, interviews were conducted via text message over several days because of intermittent
power and internet availability in Abaco.
The impacts of the pandemic on interviewees were evident in the interviews; some
interviewees said that the impact of the pandemic was more challenging than the impacts of the
hurricane. Though the research was initially focused on the impacts of hurricanes on vulnerability
and mobility, the pandemic introduced additional stresses to livelihoods that negatively influenced
household capacities to cope and adapt after the hurricane. In addition, the restrictions introduced
in response to the pandemic influenced the capacity of the government, non-profit organizations
and the private sector to support the displaced population and Hurricane Dorian recovery while
transitioning to programs to support food programs across the Bahamas. As a result, the impacts
of the pandemic have been integrated into the research to examine how additional stresses postevent can create and amplify household vulnerability.
4.2 Methods
In this section, I describe the methods used to collect and analyze data. Figure 3-2 illustrates
how the different methods of data collection contributed to meeting my research objectives. The
research was approved by the Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Board (#6468). Because
of the sensitive nature of doing research with displaced populations, I relied on advice from
colleagues in the Bahamas to ensure that my research met local ethical standards.
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Figure 4-2 Diagram of how data collected during the research contributed to meeting research objectives.

4.2.1 Interviews
I began interviews in May 2020 and over the following seven months, I conducted 40
interviews with Hurricane Dorian survivors (Table 4-1; Appendix A) and 13 interviews with
disaster response organizations and community leaders (Table 4-2). My research used a
convenience sample and snowball sampling. A convenience sample is a non-probability sampling
method that relies on available subjects (Berg, 2009). A convenience sample was appropriate in
this case because, during my time in the Bahamas, I met many displaced individuals interested in
participating in the research. My research also used snowball sampling or chain referral sampling
(Berg, 2009). Because of the potentially sensitive nature of the comments provided, I have not
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explicitly named the organizations, churches and community leaders, but coded organizations O1O9, churches C1-C4, and local government as LG1.
Table 4-1 Summary of interview respondents

Characteristic
Gender
Male
Female
Age
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
Race
Black
White
Mixed
Marital Status
Married, engaged, dating
Single, separated,
divorced, widowed
Children in home
Home Island
Abaco
Cays
Grand Bahama
Pre-Dorian Housing
Rent
Own
Country of Birth
Bahamas
USA
Haiti
Citizenship
Bahamian only
Dual citizenship
American
Haitian

No. of
Interviewees
11
29

I relied on word of mouth and my online
recruitment poster to attract participants. Of the
interviews focused on disaster response, five of

3
12
15
3
5

the interviewees had also survived Hurricane

22
16
2

experience

26
14

organizations' roles during the aftermath of the

23
28
5
7
13
27
34
5
1
28
5
2
5

Dorian. These interviews followed a slightly
different format to capture both the lived
of

the

hurricane

from

the

interviewee's standpoint as a survivor and their

hurricane.
Semi-structured phone interviews were
the primary method of data collection and were
appropriate for this research for several reasons.
First, I was interested in understanding the
experiences

of

displaced

individuals

and

households from their perspectives. Responding
to the calls for a more in-depth description of the
experiences of displaced populations (McLeman
& Hunter, 2010; Myers et al., 2008; Sadri et al.,

2018), I used an indicative qualitative approach to data collection. I conducted semi-structured
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interviews which allowed the participant to speak about their experience in their own time using
their own words (Creswell, 2014). The flexible structure of the interview also allowed me to
reorder questions or ask for more details (Berg, 2009). Second, gathering information from a
displaced population is challenging because they are often moving regularly. Phone interviews
made participation in the research accessible as displaced persons could contact me from wherever
they were located at a given time. Third, while I initially thought I would be able to do face-toface interviews with the displaced population living on Eleuthera, the logistics of doing interviews
during the pandemic meant that phone/virtual interviews were the safest and most appropriate
research method to be done from a distance. While the pandemic introduced challenges to
accessing specific segments of the displaced population, particularly the Haitian individuals,
conducting interviews over the phone allowed for a broader geographic sample population.
Table 4-2 Characteristics of interviewed disaster response organizations and civil society groups.

Interviewee
O1
O2
O3
O4
O5

Emergence
Hurricane Joaquin
Hurricane Irma
Hurricane Andrew
Hurricane Dorian
Hurricane Dorian

Type
NPO
NPO
NPO
NPO
NPO

O6

Location
Nassau
Nassau
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Nassau,
Abaco
Eleuthera

Hurricane Dorian

O7
O8

Nassau
Abaco

Hurricane Dorian
Hurricane Dorian

O9

N/A

C1
C2
C3
C4

International,
Abaco
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Abaco
Abaco

Individuals,
NPO
NPO
Individual,
NPO
NGO

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Church
Church
Church
Church

LG1

Abaco

N/A

Local
government

Hurricane Dorian priorities
Distribution, donations
Distribution, donations
Shelter
Shelter, housing, distribution
Evacuation, training, debris
removal
Distribution, donations
Housing
Distribution, donations, shelter
Health
Donations
Shelter, housing
Coordination, hurricane shelter
Hurricane shelter, spiritual
support
Coordination (repairs), debris
removal
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Interviews with Hurricane Dorian survivors
I shared research recruitment material over WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram through
the network I established during my time on Eleuthera. Interviewees whom I had met on Eleuthera
shared information about the research project with their contacts, either through word of mouth,
WhatsApp or by sharing the recruitment poster on their Facebook pages, which led to more
participants contacting me for an interview. The referrals of interviewees to other survivors were
essential because I could not be in the Bahamas to introduce myself to new participants.
The criteria to participate in the interviews had to be over the age of 18 and have been
displaced from their home. Displaced households who had evacuated and relocated to islands other
than Eleuthera in the Bahamas, internationally, or remained in Abaco or Grand Bahama after the
storm also contacted me to be part of the research. As a result, the focus of the research shifted
from focusing specifically on the displaced population on Eleuthera to individuals and households
who travelled to other locations after the hurricane, providing a rich dataset to explore the factors
of post-disaster mobility and decision-making.
Research participants contacted me through WhatsApp to arrange a time for the interview.
I used WhatsApp to send participants the information/consent letter to review and then asked for
oral confirmation during the interview. After obtaining oral consent at the start of the interview, I
asked interviewees to provide demographic information about themselves and their households,
including age, race, marital status, number of children in household, pre-Dorian settlement and
pre-Dorian housing tenure (rental, own, generational, etc.). I then asked them to describe what life
was like before the storm by describing a typical week. This question was intended to make the
participant feel more comfortable before discussing the hurricane and provide a benchmark of
what was considered “normal” prior to the storm. Learning about interviewees’ “normal” life
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activities also provided me with insight into the social, financial, physical resources that were part
of everyday life before the hurricane.
Next, I asked interviewees about the hurricane: how they prepared, where they got
information about the storm, and what they knew about it prior to landfall. When it came to sharing
their storm experience, I told the interviewee they could share as much or as little as they wanted
to about the actual event. Most participants provided a detailed account of the hurricane including
decisions they made to limit their household’s exposure to the storm and the social and physical
resources they relied upon.
Then I asked participants about what happened immediately after the storm, including
where they went, for how long and with whom. I then asked about their evacuation experience and
mobility after the storm. During discussions about their displacement, I asked specific questions
about where they went, whom they stayed with, how they travelled and how long they spent in
each location throughout their displacement. Questions about post-hurricane mobility were
developed to capture the factors that influenced decision-making and highlight the resources and
skills used to cope and adapt at different stages after the storm. I then asked about their current
living situation and location, how they felt they were coping (from 1-10) and how they envisioned
the 'new normal' for their household. The timing of the interviews during the pandemic, led to
many interviewees discussing the challenges they had experienced because of the government
restrictions to mobility, through lockdowns and limitations to international and inter-island travel.
In describing a new normal, many interviewees talked about wearing masks and social distancing,
reflecting their focus on the pandemic challenges rather than hurricane recovery.
In the final portion of the interview, I asked interviewees if they had any advice for
government, non-profits or other people threatened by hurricanes. I then provided time for
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interviewees to make any additional comments or ask me any questions about myself or the
research. As we completed the interview, I recorded phone carrier information for compensation
which I provided as a $5 top-up to their cell phone account. The interview consent form and
interview guide for displaced interviewees can be found in appendix E and F.
Interviews were recorded and lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours, depending on how
much the interviewee wanted to share. I completed interviews with displaced individuals in
November 2020. The interview period spanned seven months, from May 2020 to November 2020.
Conducting the interviews over this period contributed to differences in people's post-disaster
circumstances, notably because the ongoing impacts of the pandemic introduced additional
challenges. Since the interviews, I have contacted participants on two occasions; I sent a few
follow-up questions 18 months after the storm and sent a message on the second anniversary of
the hurricane. Most interviewees responded to my messages, some people providing more detail
about their current situations than others.

Interviews with Hurricane Dorian disaster response organizations
To recruit participants from disaster response organizations, I relied on my contacts on
Eleuthera to connect me with other organizations that were active in the Hurricane Dorian
response. I was given the contact information for a variety of response organizations whom I
contacted with information about my research. Because I relied on snowball sampling, limited
contacts in international NGOs, CBOs, and government agencies, meant that I did not interview
representatives from these sectors. In addition to the interviews, I had many informal conversations
with representatives from disaster response organizations during my time on Eleuthera. I
conducted 13 formal interviews with individuals who worked with their organizations, churches,

98

or local government to respond to the hurricane. Eight interviews were with representatives from
Bahamian-run organizations, one interview was with a representative from an international
organization who had worked in Abaco and the cays after the hurricane, three interviews were
conducted with pastors of churches who provided support during and after the hurricane, and one
interview was with a representative from local government in Abaco.
I began the interviews with disaster organizations by asking them to describe the goals and
history of the organization. I then asked the interviewee to provide details about the organization's
services and support to evacuees and displaced individuals. Next, I asked if they had observed any
changes in the needs of the displaced populations with whom they had worked since the hurricane.
The responses usually led to observations about how the pandemic had affected the displaced
population and the challenges in providing support. I then asked interviewees to comment on how
they measured their success in their response to Hurricane Dorian and what they felt their
organization did well. I followed this question by asking what lessons the organization had learned
and how this influenced their plans to engage in disaster response in the future. Finally, I asked
interviewees if they had any additional comments or any questions for me about the research. The
interview consent form and interview guide for organizations can be found in appendix G and H.
I completed most of the interviews with disaster response organizations in November 2020.
I did one additional interview in November 2021.

4.2.2 Secondary data
The One Eleuthera Foundation (OEF) provided me with anonymized data collected from
initial intake forms (2019) and later from follow-up interviews (2021). The dataset included
information gathered from the OEF evacuee intake forms (Appendix B) and Red Cross beneficiary
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forms (Appendix C). Table 4-3 summarizes the population captured in these forms. In May-June
2021, OEF, in collaboration with the University of the Bahamas, conducted a follow-up
questionnaire (Appendix D) with the same group of displaced households documented in the
intake forms. Of the 213 households who evacuated to Eleuthera after the hurricane, 113
households participated in the follow-up questionnaire. The initial intake forms and the follow-up
questionnaire make up the secondary data that I have analyzed in my research.
Table 4-3 Summary of displaced population from OEF intake forms (see full report in appendix I)

Spanish Wells
Eleuthera
271 people
331 people
113 households
101 households
71* people under 18
138* people under 18
20** people over 65
2** people over 65
*This number includes dependents documented on the forms whose ages were not specified
**This number is based on the individuals who filled out the form. They often did not fill in age
for their spouse.
I analyzed the OEF datasets by compiling intake responses into more focused excel
spreadsheets, which combined sociodemographic details of the households with: living
arrangements and employment at the time of form completion, assistance received and needs
identification, and intent to return and future plans/goals. I then searched for consistencies across
the spreadsheets to identify relationships between sociodemographic factors and individual
responses. I created another spreadsheet where I combined intake information and select followup responses. By comparing the responses on the intake form to the follow-up interviews, I
analyzed how circumstances had changed throughout displacement and how this had affected
decisions to return to home islands or remain on Eleuthera.
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4.2.3 Rapid ethnography/In-depth observations
Conventional ethnography is a qualitative method used to describe a specific society or
culture through the participants’ own eyes, without outside assumptions in order to understand
participants’ ways of living. Rapid ethnography differs from conventional ethnography as the
researcher has some familiarity with the issues and context, which allows them to gain a reasonable
understanding of the research participants and their activities in a short period of time in the field
(Millen, 2000). Although my time in the field was cut short by the pandemic, I was able to gather
important insight through observations as a volunteer with OEF and while living on Eleuthera
through informal conversations with displaced individuals and disaster response organizations and
volunteers to better understand the circumstances of displacement on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells.
In October 2019, I travelled to Eleuthera, where I stayed until mid-December, volunteering
with the One Eleuthera Foundation (OEF) as a researcher-in-residence. The organization
introduced a new branch, the Hurricane Dorian Response team, in the storm's immediate aftermath.
In the months after the hurricane, OEF provided transportation for households interested in
relocating to Eleuthera and began organizing rental assistance to support them in re-establishing
themselves in a new location. It was the first time OEF stepped into disaster response and
supported longer-term household recovery. In my role, I organized the data and reported on the
number of people supported through OEF assistance, what support they used and how this
information could inform future planning for hurricane displacement assistance. The reports were
used to inform board members and incorporated into funding proposals which led to the program's
extension until March 2020. I observed board members' reactions to the Hurricane Dorian response
efforts, their arguments to support or stop the program, and their perceptions of future hurricane
risks. During meetings, I observed the challenges posed as an organization without a mandate to
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provide disaster relief navigated its way through supporting hundreds of evacuees and displaced
households.
During this first phase of the project, I lived in a small apartment above the fire
station/distribution centre, which meant I had almost daily contact with displaced individuals
accessing resources. I frequently spent time sorting donations and stocking the pantry with
displaced individuals, OEF volunteers, and employees in the donation centre. During this time, I
learned more about the displaced individuals' hopes for the future, the challenges they faced in
everyday life on Eleuthera, and the gratitude they had for having survived the storm. Over time, I
observed shifts in the demeanor of the displaced individuals I spent time with as they became more
settled in Eleuthera.
I would often accompany the head of the response team to the shelters to visit the displaced
households and attend community-building functions. Working with this woman, I observed how
her empathy and kindness to the displaced families extended beyond her position's responsibilities
and often beyond her working hours. Many of the interviewees who had received assistance from
OEF noted the effort she made to make evacuees feel at home in Eleuthera. On my trips to Spanish
Wells, I observed the same loyalty, compassion and selflessness in the woman running the
donation centre and support on that island.
I became part of the community in Tarpum Bay, where I lived for most of my time in the
Bahamas. As part of the community, I would often run into displaced individuals in town, at the
grocery store, the laundromat or the fish dock, which created opportunities for more informal
conversations. It also gave me a sense of how communities on Eleuthera were adapting to the
influx of displaced households.
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Throughout my time in the Bahamas, I kept fieldnotes in a research diary to document my
experiences volunteering with OEF and my general observations of living on Eleuthera. I have
used my fieldnotes documenting my observations to supplement my analysis of interviews and
secondary data. Being immersed in the Bahamas and volunteering with an organization supporting
displaced hurricane survivors provided me with insight into the inner workings of OEF and
allowed me to understand better the challenges faced by the hurricane displaced population on
Eleuthera. I have used these entries to remind me what I took away from different scenarios I
observed and help me put some of my findings into context. To reduce the potential for bias,
fieldnotes have not been a primary source of data and instead I have used them as reference while
I have analyzed secondary and interview data.
4.2.4 Grounded theory analysis
Grounded theory is a well-established systematic approach to research that allows the
researcher to explore new concepts and theories as they emerge from the data (Charmaz, 2006). In
my research, rather than testing a theory, I investigated how people experienced the hurricane, the
aftermath and immediate and long-term displacement. I began the research with an area for
exploration: the experiences of displaced people after the hurricane and their ability to cope and
adapt to displacement. I anticipated that as I learned more about the experiences of survivors my
questions would evolve and more questions would arise (Glaser, 2013).
The initial focus of the research, on the relationship of human mobility to vulnerability
during displacement, serves to 'identify, but not make assumptions about, the phenomenon of
interest' (Glaser, 2013, p.72). From this standpoint, I developed open-ended questions as new
interests emerged from the data, narrowing the focus as the research progressed (Glaser, 2013). I
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conducted interviews, which I then coded and categorized to comparatively analyze, identifying
consistencies and differences in experiences of displacement.
Despite being familiar with the literature, I remained open to what I was seeing and hearing
during the research (Charmaz, 2006). True to a grounded theory methodology, rather than defining
categories prior to the research, I identified the themes and ideas that emerged from interviews
with survivors and then returned to the literature to determine how these findings related to existing
studies (Glaser, 2013). As I transcribed the recorded interviews, I began coding each transcript by
identifying meaningful words and ideas presented in the interviews. To code the interviews with
displaced individuals, I read through ten transcripts and wrote down any code that seemed
significant, resulting in over one hundred codes. I reviewed these codes and began to categorize
them into different themes. I determined that the broad themes that emerged from the data were
related to the hurricane experience, adaptive capacity, hurricane preparedness, post-disaster
assistance, the Covid-19 pandemic and immigration. I returned to the transcripts and coded all the
displaced interviewees’ transcripts using these broad categories. I then populated documents with
the segments of the transcripts coded according to the categories. I read through this document and
re-coded the data according to themes that emerged explicitly to the category. In some cases, the
categories overlapped, and the relationships between the themes were analyzed. I replicated the
same process for the interviews with disaster response organizations.
Throughout my analysis of the interviews, I wrote memos and short vignettes about the
interviewees describing their experiences to remember unique household experiences and
characteristics. This iterative process of analyzing the data and referencing the literature was
ongoing throughout the research and ultimately led to the refinement of the research questions,
which I address through this dissertation.
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My research strays from grounded theory in that it does not generate a theory based on the
findings. Therefore, although my research engages with distinct characteristics of grounded theory,
it is not truly reflective of the methodology. Instead, I have developed a conceptual framework to
illustrate the relationship between household adaptive capacity and post-hurricane mobility
decision-making and the implications on household adaptive capacity to future events.
Figure 4-3 illustrates the iterative process of working through the data to orient and develop
interview questions based on the findings. In-depth observations from rapid ethnography and
secondary data informed the development of the research problem prior to the start of interviews
and continued throughout the research. I reflected on my experiences as a volunteer through my
fieldnotes and used secondary data to analyze the relationships between themes and categories that
emerged from the interviews. As I uncovered new ideas in the interviews, I returned to the
literature (indicated by dashed lines) to examine how these concepts had been observed in similar
studies or how they were discussed in different research communities. Using this practice, I was
able to identify gaps in the existing literature that my research addressed. Using grounded theory
analysis helped me to understand the significance of different resources and decision-making
factors that participants related to their experiences of displacement.
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Figure 4-3 Diagram of my research process Dashed lines indicate action was ongoing throughout the research
process.

4.3 Situating the researcher: positionality and reflexivity
I am a white female Canadian researcher who has not lived permanently in the Bahamas
or experienced a hurricane. Most of my time in the Bahamas has been on Eleuthera and Harbour
Island, staying with wealthy family members who live and work on the islands. During my visits,
I have become familiar with the islands and have developed friendships through my cousins' social
networks. Most of these friends have earned graduate degrees in Canada and the US and run
successful businesses and non-profits in the Bahamas. My perception of the Bahamas is informed
by the stories and anecdotes from these friends and family. Despite the critical insight that I capture
through conversations and observations, I recognize that I am an outsider to this place, and I am
aware that there are nuances that I do not perceive or understand.
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As a researcher living in Canada while conducting interviews with displaced respondents,
I continually reflected on how my positionality influenced my research and interactions with the
displaced individuals in the study. During my time on Eleuthera, I built strong relationships with
the OEF Hurricane Dorian Response coordinators. These relationships helped me build rapport
with interviewees over the phone by reflecting on the kindness, empathy, and support that these
coordinators provided to interviewees throughout their time on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells. In
the Bahamas, it is common to begin conversations by identifying a social link, usually through
knowing a family member or mutual friend. If the interviewee had been referred to me by someone
I knew or had interviewed, the interview would begin with a brief conversation establishing the
connection. I also answered questions about my life when asked.
I feel privileged that interviewees shared their stories with me and feel connected to these
individuals and households. Knowing the trauma and challenges these individuals have faced, I
maintain contact with interviewees by sending a personal message on the anniversaries of
Hurricane Dorian annually to let them know I am thinking of them. There is no expectation for a
response from past interviewees, but many have responded with gratitude for the consideration or
an update about how life has changed since we last spoke. In part, I feel a responsibility to maintain
a relationship with people who have shared their stories with me, but for the most part, I am
genuinely interested in letting them know that they are still on my mind.
I know that I cannot fully understand the complexities of the social and cultural interactions
that impact people's lives in the Bahamas. I recognize that I bring certain assumptions and biases
to the research based on my own experiences and understanding of the world. Throughout the
research, I have practiced reflexivity, taking time with my observations, data, and findings to
examine how my perceptions frame my interpretation of the research.
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4.4 Limitations
During my time on Eleuthera, I built relationships with a few displaced individuals of
Haitian descent. I spoke with two Haitian pastors on Harbour Island and one in Blackwood, a
shantytown in North Eleuthera, who provided me with important insight about the most
appropriate method to engage the hurricane displaced Haitian population in the research. They
suggested that community meetings would be the most culturally appropriate and offered to
support these focus group meetings. Unfortunately, I could not conduct these focus groups before
I had to return to Canada due to the pandemic, and it was not feasible to hold the meetings
remotely. As a result, my engagement with the hurricane displaced Haitian population was limited.
The pandemic introduced unanticipated limitations to the research. Despite having adapted
my research design to continue the research, the time that I had planned to spend building
relationships with the displaced population on Eleuthera was cut short. I feel that if I had had more
time to spend with the people I interviewed, my understanding of their experiences would have
been richer.
There were also limitations to the data I was able to access. A few of the interviewed
disaster organizations sent me reports to include my research of their supports and their collected
data during the response. Unfortunately, though some organizations offered me access to their
anonymized datasets, the information had been gathered manually, and I could not travel to the
Bahamas to access it.
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5. ‘A place to catch yourself’: Who went where and why after Hurricane Dorian
5.1 Introduction
Table 5-1 Population estimates in Abaco, November 5, 2019 (adapted from IOM, DTM Round 3, 2019, p.7)

Days

after

Hurricane

Dorian,

NEMA estimated that 2,043 evacuees
from Grand Bahama and the Abacos
arrived at the shelters in New Providence
Island (Marazita, 2020). Nassau, the

Category
Population Pre-Dorian 2010
Population Post-Dorian Sept. 19, 2019
Population Post-Dorian Nov. 11, 2019
Estimated Remainees
Estimated Returnees
Difference Pre/Post Dorian (including
displaced population, migrants abroad,
missing persons, etc.)

Persons
13,831
2,562
5,704
2,562
3,142
8.127

capital, is located on New Providence Island; the island is 214 km south of Grand Bahama and
147 km south of the Abacos. On New Providence Island, local churches, non-profit organizations
(NPOs) and international NGOs worked together to provide accommodations and distribute
donations to the displaced population. Three months after the hurricane, as shelters on New
Providence Island began closing their doors, 497 displaced individuals remained at the formal
shelters (Marazita, 2020). Table 5-1 summarizes the IOM data on how the population changed in
Abaco in the three months after Hurricane Dorian. Eight months after the hurricane, the shelters
on New Providence Island still had approximately 240 persons in residence (IOM, 2020). Most of
the people who remained in the shelters for an extended period were of Haitian descent (Marazita,
2020).
Although many evacuees went to New Providence Island, survivors also remained on their
affected islands or travelled to surrounding ‘family islands’ to stay with extended family, in
shelters or rental accommodations (IOM, 2019c). While it is challenging to find the exact numbers
of how many people stayed after the storm or arranged private evacuation and shelter, an estimated
3,142 evacuees from Abaco had returned within two months of the hurricane (IOM, 2019c).
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After the hurricane, the U.S. was the leading destination for cross-border displacement
because of its proximity and family ties (Marazita, 2020). Many evacuees who had an opportunity
to travel to the U.S. or Canada left the country. In addition, some American high schools and
colleges offered scholarships and accommodations to displaced students (Holcombe & Johnson,
2019; U.S. Institute Awards Grants to 42 Bahamian College Students Affected by Hurricane
Dorian, 2019). It is estimated that between 600 and 700 displaced people went to the U.S. after
the hurricane (IOM, 2020).
Post-hurricane mobility studies have provided insight into the temporal and spatial
dimensions of displacement, highlighting broad generalizations of characteristics observed
amongst displaced populations (DeWaard et al., 2016; Fussell, 2015; Fussell et al., 2010).
However, few studies have examined the factors influencing household decision-making
throughout displacement. This chapter explores displacement not as a single event but as a
progression, providing important insights about the impacts of displacement over time.
This chapter responds to research question number one: After evacuation, where did
Hurricane Dorian survivors go, and what factors influenced their decision-making? This question
is answered by comparing responses from a questionnaire and follow-up interviews collected by
the One Eleuthera Foundation (OEF) at two different points of time and is supported by narratives
captured through interviews I conducted with hurricane survivors. Section 5.2 provides an
overview of the displaced population after the hurricane using data collected from the first OEF
questionnaire and a Red Cross beneficiary form which were completed by displaced households
upon, or shortly after, initial arrival to Eleuthera. Section 5.3 summarizes the responses from the
follow-up questionnaire which was conducted over the phone in June 2021 with the same group
of displaced households introduced in section 5.2. Section 5.4 presents common factors that
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influenced household mobility decision-making in the months after the hurricane, which I
identified through an analysis of the interviews I conducted with hurricane displaced individuals.
Finally, Section 5.5 summarizes the key findings related to mobility after Hurricane Dorian.
5.2 Disaster displacement: OEF intake form analysis (2019-2020)
In this section, I present an analysis of the data collected by OEF after Hurricane Dorian.
Between September 2019 and February 2020, displaced individuals on Eleuthera, Spanish Wells
and Harbour Island1 were asked to complete intake forms (Appendix B) when they accessed the
OEF’s assistance services. In addition, the Red Cross distributed a beneficiary form (Appendix C)
to collect information about the displaced population on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells. Figure 5-1
shows Spanish Wells and Harbour Island in relation to the main island of Eleuthera.
During my time as a volunteer with the OEF Hurricane Dorian Response team, I
summarized the data collected from both forms in a report for OEF board members (Appendix I).
The analysis of this data provides an overview of who evacuated or moved to Eleuthera and
Spanish Wells after the hurricane, their living conditions during displacement and the types of
assistance that they required and were provided. There were slight differences between the
questions asked on OEF intake form and the Red Cross beneficiary. The Red Cross form included
information about 43 displaced households on Spanish Wells (43 households) who were not
included in the OEF database. Unless otherwise noted, the findings presented in this section are
pooled from both the OEF and Red Cross forms.

1

For the remainder of this section, information provided by the two respondents living on Harbour Island are
incorporated into the responses from people living on Eleuthera given Harbour Island’s strong connections to
Eleuthera than to Spanish Wells.
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Harbour
Island
Spanish
Wells

Eleuthera

Figure 5-1 Map illustrating the locations of Spanish Wells and Harbour Island in

5.2.1 Who was displaced on Spanish Wells and Eleuthera?
The information collected provides a snapshot of the displaced population on Eleuthera
and Spanish Wells, a small island at the northern tip of Eleuthera, after the hurricane. A total of
602 individuals and 214 households were recorded by OEF as being hurricane displaced on the
islands. Table 5-2 provides a breakdown of the evacuee population by gender and Table 5-3
provides a summary of the evacuee population by age. The distribution of evacuees by sex was
consistent between Spanish Wells and Eleuthera. The distribution of evacuees by age was uneven;
there were more children on Eleuthera and a larger senior population on Spanish Wells. The
introduction of more children to the islands put additional stress on the education infrastructure.
For example, on Spanish Wells, some students were taught outdoors because of a lack of classroom
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space and a lunch program for displaced children was organized using donations from the
distribution centre.
Table 5-2 Displaced population by self-identified gender.

Female
Male
Blanks
Total

Spanish Wells
133 (50%)
108 (40%)
30 (10%)
271

Eleuthera
172 (52%)
137 (41%)
22 (9%)
331

Total
305 (51%)
245 (41%)
52 (8%)
602

Eleuthera
150 (45%)
64 (20%)
41 (12%)
43 (13%)
14 (4%)
6 (2%)
13 (4%)

Total
225 (37%)
95 (16%)
68 (12%)
69 (11%)
36 (6%)
34 (6%)
75 (12%)

Table 5-3 Displaced population by age group.

Under 18
18-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61+
Blanks*

Spanish Wells
75 (28%)
31 (11%)
27 (10%)
26 (10%)
22 (8%)
28 (10%)
62 (23%)

*Blanks are likely due to person filling out form not filling in age of partner.

Household size ranged from individuals to households of seven people or more, though
most households ranged from single-person households to families of four people (Table 5-4).
Smaller households tended to reside on Spanish Wells after the hurricane, while larger families
were found on Eleuthera. In addition, the majority of single-parent female-headed households were
on Eleuthera (40, 19%).
Table 5-4 Displaced households by household size.

Number of people in
household
1
2
3
4
5
6
7+

Spanish Wells

Eleuthera

Total

36 (32%)
29 (26%)
23 (20%)
19 (17%)
3 (2%)
2 (2%)
1 (1%)

26 (25%)
18 (18%)
17 (17%)
22 (22%)
10 (10%)
6 (6%)
2 (2%)

62 (29%)
47 (22%)
40 (19%)
41 (19%)
13 (6%)
8 (4%)
3 (1%)
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Most individuals who were displaced on Spanish Wells had come from Marsh Harbour and
the Cays, while most of the displaced households on Eleuthera were from other settlements across
Abaco (Table 5-5). The majority of displaced people who came to Eleuthera from settlements
other than Marsh Harbour lived in South Eleuthera in the months after the hurricane. It was
suggested that the reason that displaced households from Marsh Harbour and the Cays went to
Spanish Wells was because of existing ties to family and friends who lived on the island.
Table 5-5 Displacement home settlement and location recorded on intake form.

Marsh
Harbour
Spanish Wells 58
South
5
Eleuthera
Central
1
Eleuthera
North
7
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
2
Blank/unclear 2
Abaco
2
Nassau
2
Other
0
Bahamas
USA/Canada 1
Total
81
households

Cays
25
7

Abaco
(Other)
7
33

Grand
Bahama
0
2

Blank/unclear Total
households
1
91
5
52

0

5

0

0

6

1

14

2

0

25

0
1
4
1
0

0
2
1
9
1

0
1
0
0
0

2
2
3
1
0

4
8
10
13
1

3
42

1
71

0
5

0
15

5
214

Spanish Wells includes Spanish Wells and Russell Island. South Eleuthera includes Wemyss Bight, Green Castle,
Tarpum Bay, Rock Sound, Deep Creek. Central Eleuthera includes Palmetto Point, Savannah Sound. North Eleuthera
includes Governour’s Harbour, James Cistern, Rainbow Bay, Gregorytown, Blackwood, Lower Bogue, Harbour
Island, Current Island.
Marsh Harbour includes the locality of Marsh Harbour. The Cays include Guana Cay, Elbow Cay, Man-o-War Cay,
Treasure Cay, and Green Turtle Cay. Abaco (other) includes Spring City, Murphy Town, Dundas Town, Cherokee
Sound, Casuarina Point, Central Pines, and Bahama Palms. Grand Bahama includes all settlements on Grand
Bahama.
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5.2.2 Where did displaced populations live?
Over half of the registered displaced population (331) relocated to Eleuthera, while the
remainder (271) moved to Spanish Wells. The distribution of the displaced population can be seen
in Figure 5-2. Although a similar number of displaced households went to Spanish Wells and
Eleuthera, the population was more concentrated on the small island of Spanish Wells while
displaced households on Eleuthera were dispersed across the length of the 177-km island.

Figure 5-2 Proportional representation of household populations in settlements across Eleuthera
and Spanish Wells.
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Table 5-6 Living situation as reported on intake forms.

Rental
Spanish
Wells
Eleuthera
Total

Friends/
Family
18

Own
home
13

Unclear/
Blank
15

Other

Total

60

Camp/
Shelter
0

6

112

30
90

22
22

21
38

0
6

23
38

6
12

102
214

Table 5-6 shows the living situations reported by displaced households on their intake
forms. All displaced households living in shelters had found rentals as of January 1, 2020. The
remainder had moved in with other family members or friends.
The estimates of rental costs are based on the rental assistance provided by the One
Eleuthera Foundation to displaced households on. Spanish Wells and Eleuthera. It is estimated that
the average cost of rent was approximately $2000/month on Spanish Wells. Six individuals on
Spanish Wells explicitly documented their rental costs on their forms, which ranged from $5002300/month. Based on the distribution of funds to 29 households on Eleuthera, it is estimated that
average rental costs were approximately $640/month on Eleuthera.

5.2.3 What types of assistance did the displaced population require?
Just over half of the respondents reported that they had received some sort of assistance
following Hurricane Dorian, 30% left the answer blank and 15% responded that they had not
received, any assistance. Most displaced households received support in the form of food, clothing,
housing and grocery vouchers. Of the respondents who reported receiving assistance, the majority
of people said they received assistance from the receiving community, followed by the Red Cross,
the One Eleuthera Foundation and Social Services. Other sources of support came from churches,
private donations, and independent grocery stores.
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The One Eleuthera Foundation questionnaire asked explicitly about present needs whereas
the Red Cross sheet provided a space for additional comments where some displaced individuals
made requests. Table 5-7 presents the responses provided in the two islands.
Table 5-7 Requests for assistance

Spanish Wells
Food
34
Housing
13
Rental assistance
39
Job
17
Clothing
3
Utilities Assistance
23
Transportation
18
Financial
9
Renovation assistance 12

Eleuthera
55
57
29
41
37
6
10
8
4

Total
89
70
68
58
40
29
28
17
16

The most common requests for assistance overall were for food, housing, and rental
assistance, however there were differences in which types of assistance were requested on
Eleuthera and Spanish Wells. On Eleuthera, request for support in finding housing and
employment were significantly higher than on Spanish Wells, whereas on Spanish Wells rental
and utilities assistance were more requested. This suggests that people on Spanish Wells were able
to secure housing through other avenues. In addition, there were more requests for food and
clothing on Eleuthera and more requests for renovation assistance on Spanish Wells, which
represents the different priorities of different households.

5.2.4 Did the displaced population intend to return to their home settlements?
When asked about their intent to return to their home settlement nearly 73% of respondents
from Spanish Wells said they intended to return to their home settlements and 6% responded they
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did not intend to return (Figure 5-3). On Eleuthera, only 36% said ‘yes, they intended to return’,
where 25% responded no (Figure 5-4).

SPANISH WELLS
Yes

No

Maybe

11%

Eventually

Blank

1%

9%
6%

73%

Figure 5-3 Responses to question intent to return to home settlements from evacuees on Spanish Wells (OEF intake form only)

ELEUTHERA
Yes

No

Maybe

Eventually

Blank

18%
36%

6%

15%

25%

Figure 5-4 Responses to question about intent to return to home settlements from evacuees on Eleuthera (OEF intake form only)

5.3 Disaster displacement: OEF evacuee follow-up survey results (2021)
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In May and June of 2021, the 214 households registered with the OEF Hurricane Dorian
Response program documented in section 5.2 were asked to participate in an OEF follow-up study
led by Dr. Adelle Thomas. Of the 214 households, 113 households responded to the follow-up
interview. This section provides an analysis of the responses collected from these 113 households.
The final report can be found in Appendix J.
The follow-up study gathered information about where people were living, their housing
type and tenure, whom they were living with and reasons for their decisions to return to their home
islands or continue living on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells. The study also asked questions about
general well-being, current needs and experiences with OEF. The questionnaire was administered
via telephone by students from the University of the Bahamas and volunteers at OEF.

5.3.1 Decision-making
Of households that responded to the 2021 interview request, 63 had lived or were living on
Eleuthera, 48 in Spanish Wells, and 2 on Harbour Island immediately after the hurricane. Most of
the respondents (74) had left Eleuthera and Spanish Wells in the 18 months since the hurricane
while 39 had remained. Of the 39 respondents who had not returned to their home islands, 26 were
living in settlements across Eleuthera, 11 were on Spanish Wells, and two were on Harbour Island.
Of the survey respondents, 74 (65%) households had returned to their home islands or
relocated elsewhere. Most displaced people who left Eleuthera and Spanish Wells went back to
Abaco and Grand Bahama; only one respondent reported going to another Family Island. Over
half of the households who left Eleuthera moved in 2020 (51).
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Of the 48 respondents who had lived on Spanish Wells during displacement, 37 had left by
2021. The factors influencing the decision to return can be seen in Figure 5-5.
FA C TO R S I N F L U E N C I N G E VA C U E E D E C I S I O N
TO L E AV E E L E U T H E R A / S PA N I S H W E L L S
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Figure 5-5 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about factors influencing decision to leave Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.

Most of the respondents who left Spanish Wells people said they returned home to repair
or rebuild (20; 54%) and because it was time to go home (12; 32%). Four (11%) of the respondents
who left Spanish Wells had returned to their home settlement explicitly said they were returning
to find work or to return to work, and four (11%) said they returned because they could not afford
to stay on Spanish Wells.
Of the 65 survey respondents who had lived on Eleuthera during displacement, 37 (57%)
reported returning home. Twenty-two (60%) of the 37 respondents who left Eleuthera said they
were returning home to find work. Twelve respondents (32%) who left Eleuthera said they returned
home because it was too expensive to stay on Eleuthera.
Of the 39 households who still remained on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells in 2021, 26 (66%)
indicated that they planned to stay on Eleuthera or Spanish Wells permanently, five (13%) said
they did not plan to stay permanently, and the remainder did not respond. Most of respondents
who said they did not plan to move elsewhere were living on Eleuthera (23). The reasons people
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said they planned to stay on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells are illustrated in Figure 5-6. In six cases,
respondents were from Eleuthera and enjoyed being back after spending time away. Four
respondents said they were staying on Eleuthera or Spanish Wells because they had no choice or
reason to return to their home island.
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Figure 5-6 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about factors influencing evacuee decision to remain on
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.

Respondents who had returned to their home islands after being displaced on Eleuthera or
Spanish Wells were asked whether they were considering returning to Eleuthera. Of the 74 survey
respondents who had returned to their home island from Eleuthera and Spanish Wells, 29 (40%)
said they would consider returning to Eleuthera. Reasons provided were related to employment in
Eleuthera, reconnecting with family and preferring the communities in Eleuthera to those in Abaco
after the hurricane.
Eleven of the households still living on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells had at least one
member of their household relocate elsewhere permanently. These family members who had
relocated included adults leaving to find employment or children who left Spanish Wells and
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Eleuthera to live with other family members to attend school. Four households living on Eleuthera
had family members join them on Eleuthera, most of whom were children.

5.3.2 Housing
Of the 39 survey respondents who stayed on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells, most were living
in rental accommodations (Figure 5-7). Three survey respondents who remained on Eleuthera and
Spanish Wells said they owned their homes and four households had plans to build homes on
Eleuthera. More respondents who left Eleuthera and Spanish Wells had owned their homes before
the hurricane than people who stayed. Of the households who left Spanish Wells, 30 (81%) owned
their own homes before the hurricane, though only 21respondents said they were living in the same
house they had lived in pre-Dorian. Before Hurricane Dorian, 13 (35%) respondents who left
Eleuthera had owned their homes on Grand Bahama or Abaco, seven of whom returned to these
homes. More respondents who stayed on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells were renting after the storm
than people who left; instead, respondents who left were living in their own homes or with family
(Figure 5-8).
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Figure 5-7 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about housing before and after Dorian for people who remained on
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.
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Figure 5-8 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about housing before and after Dorian for people who left
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.

5.3.3 Assistance
Respondents who remained on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells were asked if they needed
rental and utilities assistance. The majority (74%) of the 39 respondents who remained on
Eleuthera and Spanish Wells said they needed rental assistance (29), 23 of whom also requested
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utility assistance. Request for rental assistance ranged between $300 to $1,000 monthly. Utilities
assistance was mainly for electricity and ranged between $60-$350 per month.
Information about assistance needs was not collected from respondents who had left
Spanish Wells and Eleuthera.

5.3.4 Employment
Most of the survey respondents reported they had found employment whether they had left
Eleuthera or Spanish Wells (41) or were still living on Eleuthera or Spanish Wells (24). Of the
households who remained on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells at the time of the survey, 23% had more
than one person working (9) (Figure 5-9). Of the households who left Eleuthera and Spanish Wells,
47% had more than one person working in the household (35) (Figure 5-10). Whether respondents
left or stayed on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells, approximately 20% of the households did not have
anyone employed.
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Figure 5-9 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about household employment for households who remained on
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.
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Figure 5-10 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about household employment for households who left
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.

5.3.5 Quality of life
All survey respondents were asked to comment on their quality of life at the time of the
survey and how this compared to their quality of life before Hurricane Dorian. Respondents were
provided with the options of ‘extremely poor’, ‘poor’, ‘neither poor nor good’, ‘good’ and
‘extremely good’ to rate their quality of life at the point of the survey. Figure 5-11 illustrates these
responses. Most respondents, whether they left (28; 38%) or remained on Eleuthera and Spanish
Wells (18; 46%), rated their life as ‘good’, followed by ‘neither poor nor good’. More respondents
who left Eleuthera or Spanish Wells rated their life as ‘poor’ (15; 21%). than those who had
remained (3; 8%), while more respondents who remained on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells rated
their quality of life as ‘extremely poor’ (5; 13%) than those who left (3; 4%).
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Figure 5-11 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about current overall quality of life for evacuees who remained and left
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.

When comparing their current quality of life to life before Hurricane Dorian, all
respondents were given the options of ‘much worse’, ‘worse’, ‘about the same’, ‘better’, and
‘much better’. Figure 5-12 illustrates these responses. Whether respondents left Eleuthera and
Spanish Wells or remained, just over a quarter of respondents rated their quality of life as ‘worse’,
followed by ‘much worse’ than before the hurricane. More respondents who remained on
Eleuthera and Spanish Wells (12; 30%) said that life was ‘about the same’ as before the hurricane
than those who returned (8; 11%). However, more respondents who left Eleuthera and Spanish
Wells said their life was ‘better’ than before the storm (9; 12%) than those who remained (2; 5%).
Respondents who left echoed similar needs to those who remained on Eleuthera and
Spanish Wells: employment, assistance with repairs in Abaco, medical assistance, small business
start-up assistance and owning a home. They suggested that these were how their quality of life
could be improved.
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Figure 5-12 Responses from 2021 follow-up questionnaire about current quality of life compared to before Hurricane Dorian for
evacuees who remained and left Eleuthera/Spanish Wells

Figure 5-13 diagrams the movement of people during displacement starting from their
home islands through to location at the time of the 2021 survey. This diagram also presents
information about respondents’ considerations for future mobility. The left-hand side shows where
evacuees who completed the OEF intake form and the Red Cross beneficiary form said they lived
prior to Hurricane Dorian. Following the lines from the point of evacuation to the ‘Location
(2019)’ indicated where evacuees were living at the time that they completed the OEF intake form
or Red Cross beneficiary form. The OEF 2021 follow-up questionnaire was administered to the
same population that completed the OEF intake forms, in which evacuees were asked to indicate
whether they had remained on Eleuthera or Spanish Wells or had returned to their home
settlement., shown under ‘Location (2021)’. The far-right side of the diagram illustrates the
number of respondents who intended to remain or return to Eleuthera or Spanish Wells in the
future. I have included a box with the interviewee codes connected to the different mobility
outcomes illustrated in the diagram to indicate survey respondents who also participated in my
research interviews.
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Figure 5-13 Illustration representing how 2019 and 2021 survey respondents have moved throughout their displacement from
point of evacuation through to considerations for future mobility. Survey respondents who participated in interviewees are
indicated by codes connected to the different mobility responses.
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5.4 Remain, resettle or return?: Factors of decision-making post-Hurricane Dorian
This section details the results of the interviews that I conducted with 40 Hurricane Dorian
displaced individuals regarding their experiences of displacement and their decisions to remain on
their home island, resettle in a new place or return to their home island since relocating after the
hurricane. Sixteen of the interviewees had received assistance from OEF and are represented in
the data presented in the survey analysis in section 5.2 and 5.3 (Figure 5-13). I also did interviews
with people who had not received assistance from OEF (24) and had not experienced displacement
on Eleuthera and Spanish Wells (21). At the time of the interviews, participants were located in
Abaco, Grand Bahama, Eleuthera, the U.S., Canada and Nassau. Most of the interviewees were
introduced to my research through friends or interviewees who I had met on Eleuthera. The
interviewees had been living on Abaco (28), Elbow Cay (5) or Grand Bahama (7) before the
hurricane.
The analysis of the interview data revealed seven dominant factors that contributed to
decision-making during displacement. These included (1) access to housing, (2) employment and
livelihood opportunities, (3) financial resources, (4) homeownership, (5) community, (6) family
structure, and (7) legal mobility.

5.4.1 Access to housing
After evacuation, interviewees were provided short-term accommodations with family and
friends and at shelters, hotels and rental housing. Thousands of people were evacuated to Nassau,
putting immense pressure on an already stressed rental market. Most interviewees who stayed with
family or friends did not stay longer than a month (13), though seven remained long-term (more
than six months). As shelters and hotels closed their doors in the months after the storm and short-
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term rental agreements expired, interviewees decided where to live primarily based on where
housing was available and accessible.
Available and affordable housing was a priority that influenced interviewee decisions about
where to establish themselves. Rental assistance programs were created by existing and emerging
non-profit organizations in Nassau and Eleuthera to support displaced hurricane survivors. In
programs in both Nassau and Eleuthera, the organizations identified appropriate housing for
displaced individuals and households and provided a minimum of two months’ rent (Eleuthera)
and up to six months’ rent (Nassau). Participation in these programs allowed interviewees to
establish themselves in these communities, which positively influenced their decision to stay.
However, of the interviewees who evacuated initially to Nassau (21), most (17) said they had not
wanted to stay in Nassau because of the city's crime, violence, and fast pace.
Across the Bahamas, the costs-of-living vary across settlements and islands; some places
are more expensive than others. For example, in Spanish Wells rental costs were nearly double the
rent for a similar house in South Eleuthera. In addition, interviewees said they faced challenges
finding housing close to places offering employment. On Eleuthera there are few transportation
options between settlements for people without a personal vehicle. A15, a woman who had grown
up on Eleuthera and had returned after the hurricane destroyed her home and business in Abaco
found work on Harbour Island but struggled to find housing. She said,
So, I ended up being hired right there and then. And they called me and said I got a job,
but now the thing about it was when I got down there, I didn't have no place to stay. We
looked around, looked around, looked around and the chef, he told me, one thing about it,
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is that you might get a job, but you don’t have any apartments and stuff over here.
Everything is taken and everybody who works over here lives on Eleuthera.2
Interviewees who had options for housing on their home islands, either with family,
friends, rentals or living in their damaged homes, returned home to begin repairs quickly after the
hurricane. In many cases, families would separate; the husband would return, and the wife and
children would relocate elsewhere so the children could return to school (14).
By March 2020, many displaced households were fairly independent, according to one
disaster response worker on Eleuthera (O4); she estimated that 80% of the displaced population
was employed and were paying their own rent. It was at this point that the Covid-19 pandemic and
the subsequent restrictions introduced new challenges for evacuee households. The loss of
employment introduced by the Covid-19 pandemic added stresses to the livelihoods of
interviewees, including their ability to pay rent. Two interviewees returned to Abaco after being
evicted from their rental homes on Eleuthera in the first six months of the pandemic. They felt they
would have more security and safety in a familiar environment and feared being homeless in an
unknown place.

5.4.2 Employment and livelihoods
After the storm, interviewees felt helpless; many had lost everything, including their
homes, vehicles, clothes, photos, and personal items they had collected throughout their lifetimes.
Though not everything could be replaced, having employment provided interviewees with a sense
of progress towards rebuilding their lives.

2

Quotes are taken directly from the interview transcripts.
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Nine interviewees were offered employment, influencing their decisions about where to
live. For interviewees who worked for the government, such as teachers, or national companies,
transfers to another island were available, and they could begin working shortly after the storm.
For example, A4, who had evacuated to Spanish Wells after the hurricane shared their experience
in deciding to move to Nassau for employment.
So, I was trying to make a go of it on Spanish Wells, but so were so many other people from
Abaco. And I had found a small job, you know and whatnot, but it wasn't something that
you could see long-term supporting a family. So, you know when the opportunities in
Nassau presented themselves- even though Spanish Wells would have been my first choice
for my family's sake- the job itself and the place we found to live, was just too good to pass
up. So, we kind of committed to that on Thursday and by that weekend we had packed up
everything we had, which wasn't much, and we headed down.
In other cases, interviewees were offered job opportunities based on their existing skillsets
and previous employment, prompting them to move to different locations. Interviewees who were
offered employment during displacement had specialized skills, such as school administration,
veterinary, culinary, and business marketing. Immediately after the storm, some businesses offered
employment opportunities to evacuees to expand their services, but also as an act of support for
the hurricane-affected population.
Sixteen interviewees said they relied on their entrepreneurial skills to develop businesses
during displacement. Before the hurricane, there were many self-employed people and small
business owners in Abaco and Grand Bahama. Twelve of the interviewees had run businesses
before the hurricane and talked about the challenges in re-establishing themselves in a new place
and, if they had returned to their home islands, at home. In addition, interviewees who had created
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businesses after the hurricane identified the need to be entrepreneurial after the storm to become
more independent. One woman, A3, who was pregnant at the time of the storm, returned to Abaco
weeks after the storm and started her own business as an informal rideshare driver. She reflected
in a follow-up interview about this experience.
Hurricane Dorian did a lot of damage in many ways, but it helped myself and other people
to become entrepreneurs quickly, adapt and push forward.
Interviewees, particularly women, introduced their entrepreneurial skills to the places
where they relocated. A8, who had trouble finding work on Spanish Wells during displacement,
used her savings and access to credit to open a shop. In addition to supporting herself, she was also
able to employ another displaced individual and planned to open a similar shop when she returned
to Abaco.
Other displaced women opened businesses in their homes such as spas, takeaway
restaurants and offered babysitting out of their homes. A17, a single parent to five children who
had relocated to Eleuthera, said she decided to return home when most of her clients, friends who
had also relocated from Abaco, began leaving.
Employment opportunities were a significant factor in where people decided to move after
the storm but were not considered independently of the other factors identified throughout this
section.

5.4.3 Family Structure
The size and structure of households influenced interviewees' mobility decisions after the
hurricane. Most commonly, families with children prioritized enrolling their children in school,
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prompting them to leave the hurricane-affected islands. For example, A1 explained why he and
his family had gone to Spanish Wells after the hurricane.
I left for five weeks because I had to get my son into school. We had to get a student visa,
and there was nothing we could do from Abaco because there were no banks. You know
there was no embassy to get their approval. So, we, we basically lived in Spanish Wells for
five weeks and when my wife and sister-in-law went to Texas, me and my brother-in-law
and father-in-law went back to Abaco and I've been there ever since.
It was common for families to be separated for some period after the storm (18),
particularly if the household had school-age children (10). In one case (A29), the child stayed with
family while the parents returned to rebuild their home. In other cases, mothers would move with
their children to enroll them in school while their husbands returned to rebuild their homes. In
three households, children had been provided scholarships to private schools in Nassau, Eleuthera
or the U.S.
Having family to help with children allowed parents to return home to start repairs, find
employment in new locations, and provided a sense of comfort to interviewees. However, four
interviewees became caretakers for elderly parents who had been displaced after the hurricane. For
interviewees who had taken care of their parents prior to the storm, the hurricane created additional
challenges to caring for them. For example, A22, whose mother was disabled due to a stroke and
seizures had to travel to Nassau for doctor's appointments because there was no doctor in the clinic
where she had relocated. A7 took her mom with her to Eleuthera when she relocated. She expressed
the challenges of caring for her mom, who has dementia, influenced her decision to move to
Eleuthera.
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At that time, I had my Mommy 'cause I was not gonna leave her. Because she was staying
with a friend. But I realized that she wouldn't be able to stay in Nassau. Because at that
time we didn't really understand about her dementia. You know, we didn't really quite
understand what dementia was and how it was taking place in her life. You know we just
didn't know. And then the storm, I think it triggered off, you know more and made her
agitated even more so. But I was able to bring her. I said If I left her, she would have just
been roaming the streets in Nassau like, you know, a person with no family. So, I say, you
know what, I have to bring her with me. I didn't realize, I didn't know what I was taking
on.
The interviewees revealed some consistencies on who returned to repair their homes
according to family structure. The single-parent households that travelled to the U.S. were more
likely to travel regularly to rebuild their homes while their children stayed with relatives in the
U.S. In two-parent households, it was more common for the husband to remain or return to rebuild
until the house could accommodate the family, travelling once or twice to be with their family in
the U.S. Single-parent households that remained in the Bahamas tended to travel as a family.

5.4.4 The security of the community
Where interviewees went after the evacuation was influenced mainly by their social
networks. Many interviewees (25) stayed with family and friends for a short period after
evacuation, which allowed them time to emotionally recover from the storm's trauma and make
plans for the future. Interviewees who went to the shelters after evacuation felt a lack of community
which contributed to a feeling of fear and insecurity. All the interviewees who had spent time in a
shelter in Nassau (4) moved to Eleuthera through the OEF Hurricane Dorian Response program.
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These women had learned about the opportunity to come to Eleuthera through one another and,
though they had each made their own decisions to come to Eleuthera, were more comfortable
moving knowing that they had existing social connections when they arrived.
Once interviewees had decided on where to move, the way a community received them
influenced their decision whether to remain in that place or to subsequently move elsewhere. A20,
a mother of six children who relocated to Eleuthera said part of her family's reason for staying was
the love that had been shown to her children. This sentiment was echoed by A16 who had
evacuated and remained on Spanish Wells after the hurricane:
The community. The people. Just their support. Their way of making you feel like, you know
it's going to get better. It's not, it's not over, you know. Life will get better. You know,
they’re here to support. They’re here to help, you know, it's, it's a very close-knit
community, and I like that. And being a single mother and having a very young child. I like
the fact that, you know, it's close knit. It's… I don't have to worry about crime or anything
like that. And it's, I'm comfortable here. After being through all I've gone through, it's a
sense of comfort, a sense of peace and calm here.
Not feeling welcome or supported prompted a feeling of insecurity amongst interviewees
who had relocated to new places. On Eleuthera, interviewees whom OEF had supported were
grateful for the care and consideration that the workers had provided to themselves and their
families. They highlighted how important it was to have someone from OEF check in on you to
make sure that you were doing okay and to drop off donated items that they thought the household
might like. However, some interviewees did not feel this kindness from the communities in which
they were living. A7, a mother of 4 children who was also caring for her mother who had dementia,
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said that though she was thankful for the support from OEF, she thought the community would be
more welcoming.
You feel like you're on Island. 'Cause I thought for me personally, I thought because of the
situation that persons would be more welcoming. Seeing that, we, you know, we have to
adjust and stuff like that. But I, I don't think so... I mean we basically have to find our way
ourselves. We have to navigate and find your place and find your way. But it's not that
people are going, I don't think people are going out of their way to make you adjust, make
you comfortable.
Receiving communities' lack of understanding and the amplified livelihood stresses
introduced by the pandemic influenced interviewees' decisions to return to Abaco. The interviews
highlighted how a lack of community affected interviewees' feelings of security, particularly
concerning housing. Interviewees who had lost their jobs and could not pay rent during the
pandemic lockdowns said they understood the positions of the landlords, who were also in need
of an income, but that they could not change their financial circumstances without employment.
As a result, evicted interviewees decided to move back to Abaco. A21, who lived with her five
adult sons, talked about how she wanted to return to Abaco but had no money to go back and
rebuild. She was not happy on Eleuthera but felt she had no choice. She explained that life was
more challenging on Eleuthera because she did not know anyone.
It's hard here in Eleuthera because you don't have too many people to say, hey, I need a
loaf of bread or I'd like some peanut butter, just to get by. You know, it's hard.
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5.4.5 Homeownership
After the hurricane, people who owned homes in the affected islands decided whether to
repair or rebuild their homes. The majority of the interview participants had owned their homes
before the hurricane (27), many of whom decided to repair or rebuild their homes (20). The point
at which a decision was made to rebuild the house varied across interviewees. Of the interviewees
who returned home to rebuild, most returned within a year of the storm to rebuild (12). Those who
returned after a more extended period cited delays in receiving insurance money to begin the
repairs. Three interviewees had been eligible to have mortgage payments deferred for six months,
two of whom relocated to Eleuthera and returned after a year to repair their homes.
Interviewees who decided not to repair or rebuild their homes referred to the amount of
damage done, the lack of funds, the trauma they had experienced during the storm which made
them not want to return, and expectations that storms would only get worse in the future. A26 in
Marsh Harbour said they had hoped to build a new home on higher ground to reduce their exposure
to future storms and flooding but had been denied assistance because it was not in the same place
as the pre-Dorian home. A retired woman from Grand Bahama, GB2, commented on the changing
impacts of hurricanes over the last decade and said she did not want to rebuild her home where it
was because the surge rose higher with every hurricane.
It is common in the Bahamas for people to build their homes incrementally over an
extended period, as they acquire additional funds for construction. This was the case for two
interviewees who had just moved into their homes a matter of months before the storm. Like many
homeowners, they did not have insurance. A8 explained the decision not to have insurance.
Insurance was extremely expensive. A wooden house. We did wood. I love the look of it.
The smell of it. The feel of it just feels homey. And I mean insurance for wooden, two-storey
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house would be $3000 a year. And we’d saved for five years to build it. So, a few years
down the road that would have been an option, but immediately it was not an option.
Another interviewee, A26, said they did not have insurance on their house and business
because they had used the money to invest in their children’s and grandchildren’s educations. Not
having insurance to pay for repairs to damaged homes influenced interviewee decisions not to
return to their home island in the short term.
Another common form of housing in the Bahamas is living in multi-generational homes
inherited from older or deceased family members. The hurricane highlighted the importance of
legal documentation that clearly defines property ownership. For example, A5, who had moved to
Harbour Island while her husband remained in Abaco to work said they had decided not to invest
in the multi-generational home where they had lived before the storm because they had no legal
documentation saying it belonged to them. Another man from Elbow Cay, A30, had owned
cottages on property left to him by his parents but had not been able to prove he owned them
because the documents had been stored with his lawyer in Marsh Harbour, whose office had been
destroyed.
There were also emotional factors that contributed to the decision not to rebuild their
homes. The trauma experienced during the storm was too much for some interviewees to consider
repairing their homes. However, interviewees who referred to the emotional reasons to not return
had found housing and employment opportunities elsewhere and had comfortably relocated to
different places, which may have also influenced their decision to not return.
Renters who returned to Abaco took longer to come back than did homeowners, most often
due to the lack of housing. A23, who remained after the storm, decided to rent out her home in
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Marsh Harbour to evacuees who wanted to come home. She explained that people needed a
temporary place to stay when they returned to make arrangements to return permanently.
You did what you did to make people come back. Once it got to where rent could cover the
mortgage, when it kicked back in, I left it. Because it's not about making the extra money
for the living right now, as long as I feel like needs are going to be met. It's more about
getting people back. You don’t get the same satisfaction [renting to NGOs] as you do by
letting that single widow with a disabled son come back to stay here for two weeks at an
affordable rate to her. That’s now living in her own home because she couldn't get any
assistance off of Abaco. She had to be back here to go fill in the forms at Samaritan's Purse
and the different places like that, in order to qualify for the assistance.
As houses were repaired, there continued to be housing shortages, and rents have reportedly
doubled from before the hurricane. This rise in rent has been attributed to an influx of construction
workers and NGOs who could pay higher rents combined with a housing shortage. People who
returned to Abaco after being displaced on Eleuthera were surprised by the high rental costs when
they arrived.

5.4.6 Financial resources and assistance
The interviews highlighted the benefits of having readily available financial resources after
the hurricane, from evacuation to recovery. Throughout the interviews, few people explicitly
discussed how they used their savings and assets, though all interviewees mentioned the costs of
living after the storm and the challenges the lack of money posed.
After the hurricane, free evacuation flights were offered from Abaco to Nassau, though
eight interviewees mentioned having charter flights for evacuation or flying once regular service
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was provided. Once people had evacuated the islands, people who had available funds could pay
for flights, visas and travel documents to travel to other destinations, such as the U.S. In some
cases, it was unclear if the interviewee or their friends or family paid for international travel,
however it was clear that having access to funds, personally or through social connections, directly
supported post-hurricane mobility. After evacuation, interviewees with savings could use their
finances to pay for accommodation, giving them the time they needed to make decisions about
their future plans.
For interviewees who were not staying with family, rent was a major expense. Rental
assistance programs assisted interviewees while churches or strangers sponsored others for
extended periods. Having assistance paying for housing influenced the interviewees' decisions to
relocate elsewhere temporarily. For example, four of the interviewees who came to Eleuthera after
being in the shelter in Nassau, said they decided to come because of the financial supports being
offered by OEF.
The importance of rental assistance was particularly apparent during the pandemic. When
the pandemic imposed further restrictions on employment in the Bahamas, people felt additional
stress on their financial resources, primarily if they had used their savings to recover from Dorian.
The interviews suggested that as evacuees became unable to pay their rent, they returned to their
home communities, many of whom had rented before the storm and had limited options for housing
they could afford. Without assistance, renters began returning home when they were evicted or
from fear of eviction. After a year of being displaced, A7 returned to Abaco and was paying
$150/month for a one-bedroom fixer-upper for her family of seven. She had owed her landlord
thousands of dollars in rent on Eleuthera before returning to Abaco. Although the apartment in
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Abaco had a leaky roof and no stove, she was glad not to be living in a tent like many others were
in Abaco.
In order to begin rebuilding to return home, homeowners needed to be able to buy materials
and pay for labour. While NGOs assisted in supplying materials and volunteer labour, local labour
was expensive and unreliable. A25, who was a landlord trying to rebuild her two apartment
buildings in Central Pines, explained her experience with hiring labourers.
Um, it's the labour that's really, really expensive. And it's like people prefer to go… on the
cay and work for the rich people than to work for the poor people. Or, for instance, when
a contractor comes to do some work for you, you're supposed to pay them half down and
the next half when they're completed. They take your half down, come and work for the day
and then don't come back.
Financial resources allowed interviewees who owned homes to travel between the islands
to assess the damages and begin repairs. Inter-island travel and international travel from the
Bahamas are expensive. In some cases, interviewees travelled between islands using their boats,
which required paying for fuel. Otherwise, interviewees who made frequent trips to rebuild took
flights, which required financial resources and the time to travel and do repairs.
Interviewees used their incomes and savings to replace lost items and to pay for daily
expenses. In The Bahamas, government schools require that students wear uniforms specific to the
school. Interviewees with children had to buy new uniforms in order for their children to attend
schools in their new locations, in addition to school supplies. In all cases, interviewees with
children had enrolled their children in school as quickly as possible after the hurricane, which
sometimes dictated where they would remain during displacement. In one case, A7, an interviewee
who lived in central Eleuthera said that she had been made aware of employment opportunities in
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North Eleuthera, but did not want to move again, in part because she would have to pay for new
uniforms for her four children.

5.4.7 Legal mobility
After the hurricane, interviewees who had a passport showing Bahamian nationality,
American or Canadian citizenship could move internationally. After the hurricane, fourteen
interviewees travelled to the U.S. to stay with friends and family while they recovered from the
trauma and five moved to the U.S. temporarily.
Bahamians who went to the U.S. were allowed to enter the country if they had a passport
indicating Bahamian nationality and a police certificate showing no criminal record. They were
allowed to stay for up to 6 months. There was much confusion about what documentation was
needed to enter the U.S. after the hurricane; some people were allowed entry, and others were
returned to Nassau to get visas. GB5, whose mother-in-law and wife had been airlifted to a hospital
in Florida, described the situation trying to enter the U.S.
At that point in time, there was no checking of documents. People were just leaving, you
know. At that point, um, I probably could have gone. Like a lot of people did, but I didn't
want to be in the States and then days later you realize you don't have proper document
and then you get deported, whatever. I didn't want to take that route. So, I stayed. And the
only way for me to get over [to the U.S.] is to fly into, into Nassau, and then from Nassau
into Florida. Like I said, you could, by air on what they call a police record. You know, the
Bahamas government gives you something that shows that your criminal record is clean.
Um, at this point, Donald Trump was starting to say, you know, We don't want people
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unless they have a visa. And I took a chance with it. And they allowed me to go through,
into Florida.
Interviewees who went to the U.S. were careful not to overstay their visas. Families who
travelled to the U.S. to enroll their children in school tried to keep them in the U.S. for the school
year. A25, a single mother of two children, returned to the Bahamas regularly while her children
stayed with her aunt in the U.S. She explained:
Yes, but so, even though the children were in school, every two weeks I came home. Doing
repair work and organizing materials getting here to the island, so that I could get the
building back up and running. I brought them [the children] back every five months, so
they didn't overstay.
Despite interviewees travelling to the U.S. during displacement, none of the interviewees
relocated permanently. GB3, a family who had owned a condo in Florida before the hurricane,
decided to relocate to Canada after it became clear that the U.S. administration would not make it
easy for Bahamians to immigrate to the U.S. The couple had considered moving to Canada in the
past; as a same-sex couple with a child, they had encountered discrimination in the Bahamas, and
felt the hurricane was a catalyst to bringing them to Canada. Within six weeks of the hurricane,
they sold their condo in Florida and moved into a house they bought in Canada. They lived off
their savings while waiting for their immigration status to be approved. They received
confirmation of their immigration status in March of 2021.
Seven interviewees had dual citizenship, as Bahamians and either Canadian, American, or
British citizens. The interviews revealed that having another citizenship did not necessarily
influence interviewees' decisions on where to relocate. A10 had dual citizenship and returned to
Canada after the hurricane where she has remained despite wanting to return to the Bahamas.
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Another dual-American citizen interviewee, A30, was engaged to an American woman and
regularly travelled between the U.S. and the Bahamas to manage a business he owned on Elbow
Cay.
Abaco had a large population of Haitian migrants before Hurricane Dorian. After the storm,
Haitians, particularly undocumented migrants, were limited in their mobility by fear of
deportation. A32, a Haitian pastor who evacuated after the storm but was well connected to the
Haitian community who remained suggested that approximately 10% of the Haitian population
did not evacuate due to fears of immigration and deportation. A23, who remained on Abaco after
the storm, said that 90% of the people that were left on the island were Haitians.

5.5 Summary of key findings
This chapter has explored where people went after Hurricane Dorian, how long they stayed,
and the factors that influenced these decisions. The interviews highlighted several factors that
displaced people considered in determining where to (re-)establish themselves. The interviews
made it clear that interviewees considered each of these factors in decision-making, though they
were not weighed independently of other factors. Housing and the labour market were key
variables on the decisions of displaced households about where to live after the hurricane. For
households with children, education as a primary consideration in decision-making.
Throughout displacement access to housing changed and was closely tied to employment
and financial security. While many households stayed in shelters or with family immediately after
the hurricane, the length of time of displacement led interviewees to have to identify alternative
options. For interviewees who had contacted OEF, the support provided by OEF allowed them to
re-establish themselves in Eleuthera, temporarily or permanently. The government was providing
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rental assistance after the storm but required that applicants to the program have proof of
employment. For interviewees, it was challenging to find employment in an unfamiliar place
without housing in order to be able to access housing. On Eleuthera, OEF’s assistance in finding
appropriate housing and in paying rent and utilities gave evacuees a sense of security while they
recovered from the trauma of the storm and found employment.
The labour market influenced interviewees’ decision on where to re-establish themselves
after the hurricane. The interviews suggest that having a particular skillset, being a government
employee or being associated with a larger corporation, created more opportunities for
employment during displacement. Sixteen interviewees relied on their entrepreneurial skillsets to
meet a need in the community where they were displaced.
Finding housing and employment in the same location was a challenge for people who
returned or remained on their home islands after the storm and for those who were displaced in
other locations. On Eleuthera, there was more employment in the northern part of the island,
though there was more housing in the south. Without reliable transportation evacuees faced
challenges in accessing the labour market and housing simultaneously. In places like Spanish
Wells, the cost of living and the lack of employment opportunities eventually led to interviewees
leaving the island.
Access to education was a primary concern for households with school age children. On
Abaco, when it became clear that a school was needed to incentivize people to stay and rebuild
and to return, A23 collaborated with teachers to create a school. Nearly all the interviewees with
children commented on the importance of getting them enrolled in school as quickly as possible
after the storm.
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Of the 20 interviewees who were repairing their homes, 13 experienced separations from
family during the repairs, particularly if there were school age children in the household. In
households with children, the children often stayed with extended family or friends in places where
they could attend school while one or both parents returned to the affected island to repair their
homes. This suggests the importance of social supports to care for children while households repair
and recover after the storm. Parents said they planned to return to their home islands in June 2020
so their children could complete the school year in their location of displacement. When education
shifted to virtual schooling, more households returned to their pre-Dorian islands.
Homeownership had a role in whether people returned to their pre-Dorian settlements and
how quickly they returned, though this decision was influenced by other factors. People who
owned homes tended to decide to return to their home islands. In five cases, homeowners decided
to demolish their homes and not return to their pre-Dorian islands. Repairing homes required
access to finances, especially households that did not have insurance. However, the return of
households with insurance was delayed; interviewees with insurance who evacuated after the
hurricane did not return for over a year after the storm. This was in part because mortgage
payments were deferred for up to a year and it became expensive to pay a mortgage and rent in
another location.
The high number of survey respondents and interviewees who were considering moving
back to Eleuthera after returning to their home settlement was surprising. Interviewees shared that
upon returning home they found that the costs of rentals had doubled and there were few homes
available. Additionally, the community demographics had shifted since the hurricane. Some
interviewees estimated that 50% of the population was new to Abaco, many of whom were male
construction workers. The challenge of finding housing and the changing demographics may have
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contributed to the high number of the OEF 2021 follow-up questionnaire respondents who said
they were considering returning to Eleuthera.
This chapter emphasizes the agency of displaced populations, highlighting how
interviewees made post-hurricane mobility decisions to prioritize the immediate needs of the
household. Though initial evacuation was scattered, displaced people made decisions about where
to go, weighing risks in each location and determining the best location for their household. In
some cases, options were limited, but interviewees emphasized that they had made choices about
where they would establish themselves. Once immediate priorities were met, interviewees were
able to consider future plans.
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6. ‘Dorian was one event; after Dorian is a whole other event’: Household vulnerability and
the process of disaster
6.1 Introduction
The strength of Hurricane Dorian surprised the people of the Bahamas, with many of the
interviewees claiming that the storm had many characteristics that they had not experienced in
previous storms, particularly its slow-moving nature and accompanying tornadoes. As a result,
adaptations informed by past hurricane experiences did not fully prepare interviewees for the
severity of the storm, leaving many households more exposed and with less capacity to cope and
adapt to the impacts than they had been in the past.
This chapter responds to research question number two: What did Hurricane Dorian reveal
about household hurricane vulnerability, and how have the impacts of the hurricane affected future
vulnerability to hurricanes? I answer this question by analyzing data I collected during interviews
with hurricane displaced households and with representatives of disaster response organizations
from the Bahamas to examine the successive impacts of the hurricane and the pandemic. My
research relies on a small sample of the population directly impacted by Hurricane Dorian,
specifically individuals and households who experienced displacement.
Recalling from Chapter 2 that vulnerability is generally seen as being a function of
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Smit and Wandel 2006), the data I collected that touch
most directly on vulnerability relate principally to adaptive capacity, particularly the different
resources and supports that households used to cope with and adapt to the impacts of the hurricane
and displacement, and how access to these resources changed over time. Although exposure and
sensitivity are discussed where data allow, the majority of this chapter focuses on intervieweeidentified determinants of adaptive capacity in the context of Hurricane Dorian-related
displacement (objective 3) and the compounding impacts of the pandemic on displaced
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households’ capacity to cope and adapt to future hurricanes (objective 4). As discussed in Chapter
2, adaptive capacity is defined for this chapter as the ‘ability of systems, institutions, humans and
other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to
consequences’ (IPCC, 2014, p.118).
I begin this chapter by introducing a proposed conceptual model I developed to examine
household vulnerability at different stages of “normal” life before the hurricane, in its aftermath,
and in the period following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Section 6.3 describes in greater
detail interviewees’ pre-Dorian hurricane vulnerability, by examining household exposure before
the storm and ways that people responded and adapted immediately after the storm. Section 6.4
assesses post-Dorian vulnerability through an examination of household exposure and adaptations
during their period of displacement. Section 6.5 examines the impacts that the Covid-19 pandemic
has had on the vulnerability of Hurricane Dorian survivors and the implications for their
vulnerability to future hurricanes. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings.

6.2 Conceptual model to assess household hurricane vulnerability over time
In order to assess household vulnerability at different stages of the disaster, I combined
two existing frameworks used in hazards and climate change adaptation research that were
introduced in Chapter 2: The Access model (Figure 2-4, Wisner et al. 2004) and the Smit and
Wandel’s (2006) community-based vulnerability assessment framework (Figure 2-12). The result
in its generic form is presented as Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1 Conceptual framework integrating simplified versions of Wisner et
al.’s Access Model (2004) and Smit and Wandel’s (2006) conceptual
framework for vulnerability assessment to highlight vulnerability assessment
stages in this chapter.

In Figure 6-1, the “normal” life concept taken from the Access model is shown in Box T1,
and represents conditions before a hazard event. The hazard (or ‘trigger event’) initiates a
‘transition to disaster’ that disrupts and changes “normal” life. The repeated cycles of livelihood
decisions during “normal” life are illustrated by stacked sheets labeled ‘t1’,’t2’, etc. to show the
iterative nature of “normal” life. What “normal” life actually becomes after the transition to
disaster is a function of exposure and adaptive capacity of the household prior to the event, and
this is labelled within the “normal” life box. “Normal” life is not static, but changes over time,
reflecting changes in peoples’ vulnerability and especially their ability to cope with and adapt to
future risks at times T2, T3 and so on. This changing vulnerability and adaptive capacity can be
identified using the community-based vulnerability assessment introduced by Smit and Wandel
(2006). Figure 6-2 shows the generic model as it applies to my study, which examines how
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household vulnerability to hurricanes in the Bahamas (T1) changed as a result of Hurricane Dorian
(T2) and was further modified by the Covid-19 pandemic (T3).

Figure 6-2 Extrapolated integrated model to illustrate points in the disaster process where vulnerability is assessed.

The remainder of this chapter uses data taken from my interviews with people displaced
by Hurricane Dorian to examine the strategies and resources used to cope and adapt at stages T1
through T3 of Figure 6-2, as a means of better understanding their changing vulnerability over
time and in the face of compounding hazards, and to identify key elements of their potential
vulnerability to future hurricanes. I have categorized the key determinants of household adaptive
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capacity using the assets-based approach to assessing adaptive capacity. During the analysis of the
interviews, key resources emerged leading to my decision to use an assets-based approach to
present the data. In my proposed conceptual model, vulnerability as a function of exposure and
adaptive capacity, are assessed at different stages of “normal” life during the disaster process
(represented in the model as T1, T2,… Tn). The proposed model shows “normal” life at different
stages in the disaster process to examine the dimensions of household exposure and adaptive
capacity that influence future hurricane vulnerability and how they change throughout the disaster.
The model suggests that compounding hazards impact household exposure and adaptive capacity
over time which influences household recovery to the initial event and increases vulnerability to
future events.
Future projections of increased intensity of hurricanes require empirical research to
examine the dimensions of household vulnerability to identify the factors that influence adaptive
capacity before and after a hurricane. The integrated framework allows the experiences of
interviewees to inform what resources were needed and how they changed throughout the process
of disaster, rather than being predetermined by the researcher (Smit & Wandel, 2006). Themes
identified in the shifts in household exposure
and adaptive capacity can be used to inform
climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management

strategies

through

capacity-

building to address adaptation needs.

6.3 Factors contributing to household
vulnerability pre-Dorian (T1)
Figure 6-3 Pre-Dorian vulnerability assessment (blue box).

153

Most interviewees said they were comfortable in their lives before the hurricane (Figure 63, T1). Most described life before the storm as going to work, having meals with their family at
home, and on the weekends spending time with extended family or travelling to different beaches
or restaurants across the islands. They reflected on how beautiful their home islands were and what
they loved about living there before Hurricane Dorian. Many interviewees talked about daily,
weekly, and monthly routines with extended family members. For example, A8, shared:
And then we actually have always been a part of our goddaughter’s life, so we had her
Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. So, it was picking her up from school on Friday and then
she’d be with us all weekend. We then would probably do dinner with her mom on the
weekends. Friday nights we did dinner with my parents. I mean we had family, so we
always seen them. And I mean, it's just day-to-day and normal schedules. My mom and I
would go shopping, my friends and I would go shopping. I'd always have you know
something to do. It’s a little different now.
Almost every interviewee had previously experienced a hurricane, and many had
experienced these storms in the homes where they were living during Hurricane Dorian. They had
relied on these past experiences to inform how they prepared for Hurricane Dorian. During the
interviews people shared how they had prepared for the hurricane, and some also reflected on not
being able to prepare for a storm of that magnitude with unfamiliar characteristics such as
tornadoes and a King Tide.
In this section, exposure to hurricanes at T1 in the model reflects a household’s physical
exposure to storm risk given the situation of their homes, adaptations they had to reduce exposure
after previous hurricanes, and specific steps they had taken once they were aware of Dorian’s
imminent approach.
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6.3.1 Exposure
The impacts of the hurricane varied across the settlements where the storm made landfall.
Four interviewees said they had received minimal damage from the storm, while 36 reported that
the homes where they had been living had been flattened or severely damaged. Over half of the
interviewees explicitly described having lost portions of their roof or the entire roof during the
storm. Houses that lost their roofs suffered water damages and required extensive repairs. A
quarter of interviewees said their homes had flooded during the hurricane.
Though the destruction was widespread, interviewees suggested that most of the deaths of
which they were aware occurred on the coast and in The Mudd, a shantytown in Marsh Harbour.
Housing in The Mudd was built haphazardly and often did not meet building codes (Shanty Town
Task Force, 2018). Interviewees attributed the deaths to the hurricane's storm surge, given the lowlying topography and proximity to the ocean. A15, who owned a takeaway restaurant on the
waterfront in Dundastown, explained that by the time many people on the coast realized the storm's
strength, it was too late to leave their homes beside the sea. As a result, she said many people were
washed away to sea in their homes.
A32, a pastor whose congregation was made up of residents from The Mudd explained that
the proximity to the port, where large 40-foot trailers were stored, caused the most damage and
death in the shantytown in addition to exposure to the waterfront. He said that it was not the
hurricane that broke people's houses; it was the trailers that were washed inland by the strength of
the water. He felt that had the government moved the trailers from the port before the storm, there
would not have been the extent of damage and death in The Mudd.
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6.3.2 Past adaptations to reduce hurricane exposure
It was clear from people's descriptions of their homes that they had adapted to previous
hurricanes when making decisions about building. A1 attributed the minimal damage to his
family's home to a suggestion made by the builder who situated the house in a particular way on
the property to avoid hurricane damage.
Many interviewees who owned their homes had taken hurricane impacts, particularly
flooding, into consideration in building their homes to reduce their exposure. Being on high ground
was particularly important to reduce exposure to flooding. Many people commented on their
home's elevation above sea level or high tide mark and high ceiling heights as reasons they felt
safe in their homes. Everyone was surprised about the depth of the water during Hurricane Dorian
flooding, though few people were surprised that they had experienced some flooding.
In some cases, interviewees who had experienced flooding previously in their homes talked
about changes they had made to reduce their exposure to flooding and hurricanes. GB2, who
experienced two storms in her home in Grand Bahama, explained how she had prepared her home
after Frances and Jeanne:
I had no cupboards down low. I built everything up high. My kitchen cabinets were, I moved
all of the last two drawers. If you can imagine in my cabinets. My oven was a wall oven.
My stove was countertop. I had my washers, I had some, some, some steps built. I don't
know what else to call them. But I had some pedestals built. And my washing machine and
dryer was up high. I took out all my tubs. I put in, this was after Frances and Jean. I took
out all the tubs. I put in shower stalls. I put in pedestal basins. And then when Dorian did
this and I’m like, OK, you could never be prepared for hurricane.
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A23 shared that after hurricane Floyd, she encouraged everyone building new homes in
her neighbourhood to build concrete homes because they remained standing after the storm. Her
family was one of the first families to build in the subdivision and had witnessed the impacts of
Floyd. Although most people ignored her advice to build with cement, many did heed her advice
to raise their homes after the flooding the neighbourhood had experienced during Floyd.
GB5, who ran an agrotourism farm, said that after the flooding they experienced during
Hurricane Matthew, he built a shelter for the animals five feet off the ground. Before Dorian, he
felt confident that the animals, which included horses, ducks, goats, chickens, peacocks and many
more, would be protected from hurricane flooding. He stacked hay bales in the shelter so that
animals could jump to higher ground in a worst-case scenario. During Dorian, the farmhand stayed
in his quarters, which were attached to the barn and had a ceiling height of 8 feet, because he did
not believe that the flooding would be as dangerous as it was. The farm had over 12 feet of water
flood the barn and animal shelters, and neither the farmhand nor the animals survived.

6.3.3 Pre-Dorian adaptations to reduce hurricane exposure
Once news of Dorian’s imminent arrival was learned, interviewees made decisions about
how to limit their exposure to the impacts of the storm. Some people went to stay with friends or
family who lived in stronger houses. Others went to stay with friends or family who lived on higher
ground. Approximately half of the interviewees decided to stay in their own homes for Hurricane
Dorian, while the other half stayed with family and friends, at their workplace or in empty rental
properties that they were permitted to use. Seventeen of the interviewees had to leave their initial
shelter during the storm because of damages caused during the passage of the first wall of the
storm.
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None of the interviewees went to a shelter before the hurricane, though many were forced
to shelters during the storm after their homes were compromised. Most people felt uncomfortable
going to shelters because they felt they were not safer than the alternative options. The lack of
maintenance and age of the shelters concerned many of the interviewees. The hurricane destroyed
nearly all the shelters and churches on Abaco, which left more people exposed as they searched
for shelter in the midst of the storm.
None of the interviewees left their islands before the hurricane to reduce their exposure to
the storm. On the cays, interviewees weighed the risk of the storm against the risk of not being
able to return to their homes for an extended time after the hurricane had passed. After previous
storms, though the damage to their homes had not been significant, damage to ports and docks
limited interviewees' ability to return home. There was a common sentiment across all interviewees
that in determining risks, exposure to the storm was weighed against exposure to looting and
damages after the storm if you could not return quickly. People felt obliged to defend their property
after the hurricane and therefore remained in their homes. A30 from Elbow Cay explained:
Initially, I stay because during a hurricane really the issues aren't the hurricane normally,
it's the aftermath. It's protecting your belongings, you know. That, my whole life was there.
So, I don't want not to be able to get onto the island for two or three days and have anybody
go into my home and take anything. That's, that's the thought process of most people that
are from there. Is that you, you're there to protect what's yours and, you know, and try to
salvage anything that you can if something major happens.
The inappropriate evacuation warnings, which came too late and were not initially
translated into Haitian Creole, and distrust of the government led many residents of the Mudd to
stay in their own homes. One community leader from Marsh Harbour, A1, who had friends in the
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Mudd during the hurricane, speculated that half the people did not evacuate the shantytowns before
the storm. He said the reason many people did not evacuate was because:
They didn’t believe that a storm of that magnitude. They thought it was a hoax to get the
people out because they government had been pushing to rectify the shantytown situation
and they believed that it was just a scare tactic.
In some cases, families separated before the storm. For example, GB4, an interviewee on
Grand Bahama went to stay with her elderly parents, while her husband remained at home to
manage any water that came in the house, as he had in previous storms. Another interviewee, A12,
on Elbow Cay took her children to a nearby resort during the eye of the storm after the roof caved
in on their home. Her husband stayed with his father and their pets for the remainder of the storm.

6.3.4 Household adaptive capacity during and immediately after the storm: key determinants
Interviewees’ adaptive capacity to cope with and adapt to Hurricane Dorian's impacts was
influenced by several categories of key factors that are described in more detail below.

Financial capital
Interviewees used existing financial capital to move to different islands or countries
temporarily or permanently, to rebuild their homes, to manage everyday expenses and to support
the response efforts on affected islands. Most interviewee families suggested before the hurricane
they were financially comfortable. Some commented that they were not rich but lived week to
week and that life was good. A few mentioned that they had disposable income before the storm,
particularly dual-income households.
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For people who evacuated after the hurricane, having access to money was a vital resource
to travel to other islands or outside of the Bahamas. Some households returned to assess the
damage to their homes and to salvage personal items, but for many, the costs of travelling interisland within the Bahamas and internationally were prohibitive once they left the island. In
addition, having savings meant people could afford to pay to stay in a hotel or rental
accommodation if they did not have family or friends to house them. This provided people time to
make plans and consider the next steps for their household's recovery without being concerned
about housing.
For those who remained on the affected islands, money had little value in accessing basic
needs but did have an essential influence on the longer-term rebuild process. A23, who ran a
distribution centre on Abaco after the hurricane, explained the situation after the storm:
Money didn't have a value. The week after Dorian, millionaires realized their money held
no value when they walked through the doors of my centre. It was paper. It took, took a
couple weeks for them to walk through my doors because a lot of them are proud. But by
week two they were walking through my door; may I have water? And do you have any
canned goods? And do you, do you? Money had no value.
A23 used all her savings, which she had saved to return to college, to distribute donations
arriving on the island. Although there were many donations, few people sent money to pay for the
gas for vehicles to distribute goods and the generators and water pumps needed to operate a soup
kitchen and shelter.
Approximately a quarter of the interviewees said they had some insurance on either their
home or vehicles that covered some of the hurricane damage. A19 and her household had just
moved to Abaco, selling everything they owned to buy their home. She had picked up the home
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insurance papers the day before the storm, which provided the funds to rebuild their home. For
interviewees who had older insurance policies, the amount they received was not enough to cover
rebuilding their homes to the same standard as before the storm.
For many, the cost of insurance had been too high to consider having their homes insured.
Most people with insurance were required to have it because they had mortgages on their homes.
Before the storm, interviewees had prioritized other expenses above insurance, such as education
and investment in businesses. A few interviewees had used their savings to build their homes,
some of whom had only lived in their homes for a few weeks or months. A12 said that despite
losing their home, she was grateful that they did not have to pay a mortgage on a home that the
storm had destroyed. Two of the interviewees who had mortgages could live and work on other
islands for the year after the storm, partly because their mortgage payments were deferred.
However, when the payments restarted, paying rent and a mortgage was too expensive, which
influenced their decision to return home.
Having additional properties to sell or to visit was a benefit for survivors of the storm. A1
commented that he felt that he was better off than most people who had survived the storm because
he had sold a piece of property before the storm, which helped the family financially. After the
hurricane, the interviewee returned to Marsh Harbour while his wife and son stayed with family
in the U.S. for the school year. GB3 owned a condo in Florida where they would regularly travel
to shop. When it became apparent that they would not be able to stay in the U.S. long-term as
Bahamians, they were able to sell the condo to buy a home in Canada, where they moved with
their young daughter. They could not work while waiting for their Canadian immigration
paperwork to be processed; they lived off their savings for over a year. Two interviewees said they
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owned land, one on Harbour Island and the other on Abaco, though neither said they were
considering selling these properties.
Some of the interviewees had pre-existing debt, which created more challenges posthurricane. For example, A6 who had found work on Eleuthera said that because her loan payments
were so high, she had little left to support the household when she got paid. Although the loans
pre-empted the storm, the payments did not cease while the family recovered from the hurricane.
A few evacuees who came to Eleuthera owed money to the utility companies before the hurricane,
which complicated connecting utilities to their rentals on Eleuthera. In a few cases, disaster
response organizations paid the outstanding debt to connect services for evacuees on Eleuthera.

Physical resources
Most of the interviewees lost their physical assets in the storm, including homes, vehicles,
boats, and personal items. Interviewees attempts to secure their housing before and during the
storm by fastening storm shutters and reinforcing their roofs did not protect their property.
Interviewees commented on losing their computers and tablets, irreplaceable personal items and
the tools and supplies they needed to work.
In some cases, interviewees had taken precautions before the hurricane to protect their
physical resources by bringing boats inland and parking vehicles on high ground. Knowing that
having access to a vehicle after the storm would be necessary, A14 said part of his preparations
was to ensure he had a full tank of gas. Interviewees talked about rationing their fuel to travel
around the island to various evacuation points. A7 slept in her car with her family until they could
evacuate, highlighting the importance of having a vehicle after the hurricane.
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Households that sustained minimal damage to their homes had somewhere to live that
offered safety and protection. However, there were concerns about looting after the storm, which
prompted some interviewees to leave their homes. A8, who owned a home in Marsh Harbour,
explained:
People [were] out there looting. They were looking for shelter. They were taking over other
peoples’ homes. It was like a disastrous mess afterwards. That it wasn't per se safe to even
stay. If you could get out, you got out.
Interviewees from Elbow Cay suggested that their physical and community infrastructure
allowed them to cope and adapt to the hurricane. On the island, most houses have a rainwater
cistern which allowed residents to be confident that they would have access to water after the
storm. There were also many houses that were off-grid or where generators were available to
sustain the community once the hurricane had passed.

Social networks
Social networks and connections were essential resources before and after Hurricane
Dorian. Approximately half of the interviewees stayed with friends and family in more secure
homes or higher ground in preparation for the storm. In addition, many interviewees said they were
receiving updates about the storm from friends and family members living overseas via WhatsApp.
After the hurricane, survivors used social networks to get evacuation information. In some
cases, international family and friends sent planes or boats to evacuate loved ones. Once
interviewees had evacuated, displaced households in the Bahamas and overseas used social
networks to find places to stay during immediate and longer-term displacement. A10, who
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evacuated to Nassau to fly to Canada, described arriving in Nassau, where she had to stay overnight
before her departure:
And I don't know what I was going to do. I thought I'll just sleep in the airport, and I'll
catch the next flight to Canada. And then I remembered friends of family are in Nassau.
And someone else that was on the boat with me was also going there. My godfather and
Godmother were already at their house, so I went and spent the night there and it was just
the most beautiful, like survivors. Just we didn't even know what was going on. We just had
a few beers and then they cooked us a meal and they took us in and took care of us.
Social connections on other islands of the Bahamas, particularly New Providence Island,
where Nassau is located, were crucial in the storm's immediate aftermath. Many interviewees
commented on the difficulty of finding affordable accommodation in Nassau after the hurricane
without social connections. A20 who evacuated by boat with her husband and five children, was
pregnant and needed to stay in Nassau to deliver the baby3. This family found an apartment through
a friend from Nassau who lived on another island but knew someone in Nassau who had a rental
available. Another family was provided accommodation for a month in Nassau by a tourist family
who regularly employed the mother for childcare. A9 who went to a shelter in Nassau said that her
friends and family would bring food daily to her and her children.
Most interviewees stayed with family or friends for some period after the hurricane while
they planned for their recovery. For interviewees, family and friends had a meaningful role in
helping them cope with the trauma of the storm. A5, whose mother had arranged to evacuate her
family living on Abaco, explained that she knew she was safe when she was standing on solid
ground beside her mom. Evacuees who were initially from Eleuthera but had moved to Grand
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Deliveries are not done at the family island clinics. All women delivering babies go to Nassau or travel
internationally to have their babies.
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Bahama or Abaco and who returned after Dorian discussed the importance of having family and
friends to support them through offering accommodation, helping to find employment, and
assisting with childcare.
Social connections to other displaced survivors were also important to interviewees. A8
said that although she had not talked to a counsellor, she talked to other people from Abaco who
had also relocated to Spanish Wells who could relate to her experience of the storm and the
struggles of being displaced. Social supports were also helpful for interviewees who were hesitant
to watch the weather channel or the news after the hurricane. A18 said she met other Dorian
survivors in a group counselling session on Harbour Island with whom she kept in contact.
All of us in the group have kept in touch with each other. So, whenever there’s bad weather,
we’ll all check in with each other. You know, you doing OK? You know, don't be scared,
it's just the thunderstorm. Stuff like that. We support each other. Like for me, I don't like to
watch the weather anymore. So, they know that. So, other people watch it and they'll say,
Hey, this is what's happening. There's going to be a thunderstorm. Or when we thought the
hurricane was coming, they kept me up to date because I just… that's my like mental block.
I don't wanna hear or see anything about hurricanes.
In the Bahamas, churches are a cornerstone of many communities and social networks. A
few interviewees talked about how finding a church in their new community helped them cope
with the trauma of the hurricane and the experience of displacement.
Some segments of the population, mainly migrants and people of Haitian descent, did not
have strong social networks on other islands that could receive them, particularly if they were new
to the country. The government opened shelters in Nassau which were largely populated by
Haitians. Bahamian interviewees said they avoided the shelters because they did not want to
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associate with Haitians. In addition to the shelters, there was a strong network of Haitian churches
that housed evacuees of Haitian descent across the northern islands of the Bahamas in the months
after the storm. People of Haitian descent who did not have social connections in other islands
were hesitant to leave affected islands after the storm and those who did go to other islands did so
after being offered housing, housing assistance or employment.

Human capital
Interviewees had varying valuable skills and expertise in preparing for and responding to
Hurricane Dorian. In this section, skills and expertise include people's experience, their education
and expertise gained through employment. These skills and expertise informed preparations before
the storm and provided opportunities after the hurricane.
All interviewees had experienced a hurricane though not everyone had been responsible
for previous storm preparations. People relied on their previous experience and the preparations
they had observed to prepare for Hurricane Dorian. They prepared their homes by putting shutters
up, foaming their windows to keep water from coming in, reinforcing their roofs, and removing
clutter and debris from the yard. Like previous storms, interviewees bought supplies, such as nonperishable foods, water, and batteries. Some people said they had each person in the household put
together a bag with some clothes and supplies in case they needed to evacuate in the storm. Few
people commented on securing documents, but a few said they had lost their passports and housing
title documents during the storm.
After the hurricane, interviewees used their skill sets to find employment, establish
businesses, rebuild homes, and provide leadership in the recovery efforts. There were some
consistencies across types of employment that transferred to displacement. For example,
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interviewees who were government employees, such as teachers at government schools, were
transferred to schools across the Bahamas. However, government teachers commented that despite
having the skills to teach children, the supplies needed to do their jobs well were not replaced or
provided. A5, who had training as a teacher but had not taught in four years, used her skillset to
find employment during displacement as a teacher at a private school.
Interviewees who had worked in the service industry or tourism had more challenges
finding employment during displacement, particularly on Eleuthera. It was harder to find work
partly due to the limited housing in areas with higher employment rates and an overall high
unemployment rate on the island. Some evacuees found employment with OEF in the distribution
centre, the kitchen and the hotel. Four evacuees who had worked in agriculture before the hurricane
took over the farm at CTI, increasing production to provide food for the restaurant and creating a
space to teach Eleutherans about sustainable farming methods.
Interviewees who remained on their affected islands or returned quickly after the storm
used different skills and expertise to cope and adapt to the hurricane impacts. A23 in Marsh
Harbour attributed her ability to survive after the storm to her experience living off-grid. Like the
other interviewees who remained or returned quickly, she also relied on her experience from
previous storms, such as securing tarps to protect her home. Interviewees who had built their own
homes relied on this experience and skill set to repair and rebuild their hurricane-damaged homes.
Interviewees from Elbow Cay discussed individuals with skill sets that contributed to the
overall community. For example, A10 shared that a second homeowner in her community was a
trained disaster response specialist who assisted with evacuations and immediate response after
Dorian. In addition, the emergency response skills of the existing fire and rescue team offered
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strong leadership to the response and recovery efforts and became a key point of communication
and coordination.

Emotional wellbeing
The commitment of interviewees to a positive perspective was evident in most of the
interviews. Interviewees would often express gratitude for being alive and say that they could not
complain about their circumstances because they were better off than most people. Many of the
interviewees shared that after hearing the stories of other survivors, they did not feel they had a
right to complain. Only a few interviewees had lost family members and friends in the hurricane,
but many people had seen dead bodies after the storm. A32, the Haitian pastor with a large
congregation from The Mudd, said he and the other pastors could name 1200 people who had died
during the hurricane.
Despite the tragedy and trauma of the hurricane, most interviewees felt it was essential to
maintain an optimistic outlook, especially interviewees who had children. Most people felt there
was no benefit to being negative. Some interviewees' previous experiences with trauma and
tragedy had informed how they coped with the hurricane. For example, A11’s husband was killed
in a motorcycle accident a few years before the storm and at another time in her life, she had lost
everything in a house fire. She explained:
I've had experiences before, but realize that you know what? That breath and life still goes
on, and if you're fortunate to get up every single day, then you put one foot in front of the
other. You keep going, you keep going. Yeah, it sucks, it freaking sucks. Oh my God.
Other interviewees relied on their faith to support them through challenging times,
regularly praying that God would keep them safe and not let more hardship come their way.
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For some interviewees, keeping busy was their way of coping after the storm. They threw
themselves into helping other people or their work to avoid addressing their trauma. A1, who was
active in local government in Marsh Harbour, explained:
You know, keeping busy is the one thing because keeping busy gets out of your head, you
know it gets out of yourself. You know so it, it, it got me out of myself. It got me looking to
help other people and to not be, to not, to not so much worry about myself, but worrying
about everybody else and making sure families had food.
Though it was evident throughout the interviews that keeping busy was a strategy used by
some interviewees to manage the trauma, few identified it as a coping strategy.

Citizenship and legal status
After the hurricane, moving throughout the Bahamas or internationally was a common
household response. In addition to having financial and social resources, having documentation
was a requisite resource to allow for household movement outside of the country. Interviewees
talked about ensuring that their documents were securely stored in preparation for the storm,
having to return to their damaged homes to salvage documents, and losing documents in the
hurricane. GB7, who had a month-old baby, talked about her experience in Nassau getting a birth
certificate and passport for her baby in order to travel to the U.S. to stay with family.
So, it was really jammed pack. It was really, really, difficult. So, I tried to bring all the
papers there [to the government office], you know. I am married so a lot of things, they
needed my husband's signature and all of these things, and I didn't have that. And then the
passport office, that was crazy because you know, the signature you need or authorized
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picture, you know, that you need. It has to be signed. It has to get signed on the back. Of
course, where am I gonna find a pastor in all of these things.
The people who remained on Abaco after the storm were largely of Haitian descent. A23,
who did not evacuate after the storm, reported that of the 80 people who were in the shelter she set
up in the days after the storm, 90% of them were Haitians who did not speak English. She
explained:
The Creole population, that’s who was left with us. The ones that didn't get out, because
they were like too scared, if they didn't have work papers and stuff. Too scared to go out
on the flights that were being supplied because then the chances of them getting straight
off deported.
The decision not to evacuate due to fear of deportation was a common factor discussed by
interviewees who had close relationships with the Haitian community. A32, a pastor from Marsh
Harbour, suggested that approximately 10% of the Haitian population in Abaco stayed after the
storm because they were scared to go into Nassau. Interviewees of Haitian descent commented
less on their mobility being restricted by citizenship challenges than they discussed issues
accessing assistance after the storm. However, O3, a representative from an NPO on Eleuthera
said she knew of two shelter residents who had been deported to Haiti after going to the shelter in
Nassau.
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6.4 Dimensions of post-Dorian vulnerability
to hurricanes (T2)
The

following

section

examines

household vulnerability after Dorian by
describing how household exposure and
adaptive capacity changed after the storm
(Figure 6-4).

6.4.1 Exposure
Figure 6-4 Post-Dorian vulnerability assessment (blue box)

Many displaced interviewees found themselves more exposed to environmental and
livelihoods stresses during the 18 months after the hurricane, whether they remained on other
islands or had returned home. A few of the interviewees returned home shortly after the storm to
rebuild their homes, living in tents or damaged houses during construction. The amount of time it
took to rebuild homes and infrastructure such as shelters increased the exposure of interviewees to
hurricanes, and to everyday weather like sun, rain, and wind. A12, who lived in a tent with her
family as they rebuilt their home, felt it was cleaner and dryer to stay in a tent than to live in a
damaged house with mold. To reduce their exposure to regular winds and rains, they placed one
tent inside another tent. Interviewees who had returned to affected islands were concerned about
the exposure of survivors who continued to live in tents during the hurricane season. They
expressed similar concerns for people living in houses with tarped roofs. While the tents and tarps
had provided shelter in the immediate aftermath of the storm, they had become threadbare after an
extended period in the elements. A10 commented on her concerns for the affected islands to even
a small storm.
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I'm very concerned and worried because every structure is compromised still. If a
hurricane were to hit right now, even if it was a category one, there would be a significant
loss of life just due to the fact that people don't have anywhere to go. They're in tents.
Interviewees also felt that the number of abandoned houses left them more exposed to
looting and crime. They speculated that because there were fewer people to protect the
neighbourhoods, thieves and criminals were coming in to loot the homes or find shelter.
Interviewees living on the hurricane-affected islands commented that a lack of shelters in
the years after Hurricane Dorian heightened many people's exposure to storms. During the storm,
most of the hurricane shelters were damaged or destroyed. Many interviewees commented that
they did not believe there was one shelter they could go to in the event of a hurricane in Abaco. In
2021, construction began on a central shelter in Marsh Harbour.
Some interviewees decided to repair or rebuild their homes. A19 had built a small
efficiency apartment in their garage before starting repairs on their home so she would have
somewhere to live during construction. During the hurricane, the bathroom in the middle of the
house was the only room not damaged. When rebuilding, the family had spent extra money on
reinforcing the room so that they would have somewhere safe to shelter in the event of another
hurricane. At the time of the interview, in August 2020, the interviewee was living in the efficiency
apartment with her daughter. She was nervous about their exposure to storms and discussed her
response to a recent storm.
I just want to hurry up and get it finished because it's hurricane season again. We had a
storm the other day. And I moved from the shed to the house because it's more secure, but
I just want to get the house done because God forbid another hurricane come.
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Other interviewees decided not to return and relocated internationally and within the
Bahamas. For some, this decision was based on the expensive costs of rebuilding after the storm
while for others the decision was made in response to the changing nature of hurricanes. GB2 who
lived on Grand Bahama said that she had observed the changes in the storms over the years and
was unwilling to expose herself to the risks any longer. In response, she planned to move in with
her daughter, who relocated to Texas after the hurricane. She commented on the need to reduce
people's exposure to hurricanes through building codes and urban planning:
We need to build two story buildings that are stronger, sturdier, built in the more downtown
areas. Not in the outlying areas. No, people might not like it, but yes, it's going to be in
their best interest because it's gonna protect 'em. And I talk, like I said, I've talked to people
about it, but I don't know who is listening. But, um, things need to be done differently
because the reality is with climate change, this isn't gonna stop anytime soon.
Most interviewees who rebuilt were considering future exposure in their plans, though
some discussed why they were not making changes. A30, who was planning to rebuild his vacation
rental cottages, recognized the high exposure of his properties but commented that he had to build
this way to satisfy the preferences of tourists who wanted to be on the beach. Others said that
different building practices would not protect anyone from a storm of Dorian’s strength.
The most exposed population after the storm were people who had been living in The Mudd
and Pigeon Peas, two shantytowns in Marsh Harbour. After the storm, the government fenced off
and razed the shantytowns without offering alternative housing for former residents. This forced
displacement meant that survivors from the shantytowns were left homeless. It was reported that
some people from the Mudd and Pigeon Peas had started building in a shantytown north of Marsh
Harbour, the Farm. However, because new buildings were not covered by a court injunction that
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restricted the demolition of shantytowns, the government has begun destroying newly built
structures in the Farm. A32, a Haitian pastor from Marsh Harbour who lost many people from his
congregation in the storm, explained the dire circumstances:
The biggest thing, the big challenge now, is plenty of them just don't have nowhere to sleep.
No house at all. They still live in a church and stuff. They still live at the shelter. They still
under a tent. That's the biggest issue right now. And then, the [unclear] who living at the,
at the farm, the government telling them they going to break their houses.
Interviewees said they felt a heightened sense of exposure because they would have
nowhere to go in the event of another storm as they did not have the funds to evacuate or the social
networks in a new place to shelter at other people's homes.
6.4.2 Household adaptive capacity during the recovery period: key determinants
After the hurricane, Dorian-affected households found ways to cope and adapt to the
conditions of displacement and recovery. While interviewees adapted to changing conditions after
the hurricane, many of the resources used in adapting were finite, which challenged the long-term
sustainability of households during displacement. This section describes how households coped
and adapted after Dorian and how the hurricane and displacement impacted future adaptive
capacity.

Financial capital
As interviewees used up their savings, they became more anxious about the uncertainty of
the future, particularly for interviewees who had not found stable employment. Savings were used
to respond to immediate hurricane impacts, but they were also needed for everyday costs that arose
throughout displacement.
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After the hurricane, interviewees made decisions about how to use available finances to
meet the immediate needs of their households. For some, this meant temporarily relocating, while
others invested in repairs to their damaged homes quickly after the storm. While finances were not
the only determinant in decision-making, access to money was an important factor in where people
went after the hurricane. Some interviewees who came to Eleuthera said that limitations to their
finances, combined with limitations to support from social networks, resulted in their decision to
come to Eleuthera.
The living costs also shifted for many of the interviewees, particularly for people who had
owned their homes before the hurricane who began renting after the storm. Rent was the highest
cost discussed by the interviewees who were not living with family or in homes owned by family
or friends. Interviewees who were renters before the hurricane shared that the costs of rentals were
higher where they were living after the hurricane. The rent costs varied across the displacement
locations but were exceptionally high in Spanish Wells and Nassau because of the number of
tourist rental accommodations. In the follow-up interviews, people who returned to Abaco were
surprised by the increase in rental costs in Abaco after the hurricane.
Despite reaching a relatively stable financial position during displacement, many
interviewees commented that the living costs were higher than before the storm, and they were
still trying to replace many items they had lost. For other households, the living costs remained the
same as before the storm or increased during displacement while their access to funds decreased.
A33 commented on how difficult it was to start from nothing, noting that even if people had started
working, that did not mean that they were not still in need of support. For example, the cost of
food on Eleuthera is high because there are no wholesale stores. Whereas before the storm,
evacuees may have bought cases of food supplies for their large families, the smaller grocery stores
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were much more expensive. A7, who was feeding a family of six, said she could easily spend $300
and still not feed her family for the week.
Throughout displacement, interviewees had to spend money to provide the basic needs for
their families. Although many interviewees did receive assistance as rental support, groceries, and
clothing, the assistance did not cover all the household needs for the duration of displacement. A7
explained that although she was grateful for the support she had received, she still had additional
costs, such as sending her four children to school when she was displaced in Nassau.
So now, that's something else. I don't have a vehicle, so they had to catch the bus. So, I had
to purchase their uniforms and stuff like that to get them at the school. They had to catch
two buses in the morning and two buses in the evening every day. And I had to pay for that.
Some interviewees commented on needing medical support and resources for themselves
and family members. A26, whose husband had a stroke the day before the hurricane, said that they
needed to use their savings to pay for his rehabilitation and therefore were living in an office in a
building they owned rather than rebuilding. Two other interviewees living on Eleuthera had to
travel to Nassau frequently with elderly parents to attend doctor's appointments because Eleuthera
clinics did not have the necessary medical support. The costs of these trips added financial stress
to the households but were unavoidable.
Though the hurricane forced interviewees to use their savings or income to secure housing,
food, and clothing for their households, interviewees commented on the need also to use finances
to include aspects of normalcy into their lives and their children's experiences. Despite not having
much assistance, A7 explained her decision to spend some of her money on treats for her kids:
I'll go to the store and get an extra, I'd rather sacrifice $20 and get them an extra bucket
of ice cream. I don't want y'all to feel a unnormal. And you realize that kids are always
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going to remember that childhood. That's a memory that they're gonna have for the rest of
their life. You know, I don't want them to grow up so fast because they went through
something that was so horrific and traumatic. I try and make life as comfortable as possible
for them.
The disparity in financial capital between different segments of the population in the
Bahamas made finding sustainable housing options for evacuees challenging, particularly those of
the Haitian population. The costs of the available housing, for instance vacation homes or houses
of second homeowners in Nassau, were too expensive for most families. Although they were able
to provide a short-term solution, organizations were challenged to find longer term housing options
for low-income families. Without status, Haitians were not able to access any government rental
assistance or support from social services. A7, who is of Haitian descent but born in the Bahamas,
shared her experience:
I said after the hurricane, I can't get no benefits. I can't even go to social services to get
rental assistance. I cannot get no assistance, by the Bahamian government without
citizenship. So, where does that leave me and my children after a disaster?

Physical resources
Housing was the biggest challenge for interviewees throughout displacement and was
closely tied to financial resources. During displacement, support with housing diminished as time
passed and most survivors became financially independent. O4, who worked with the OEF
Hurricane Dorian response, said that by March of 2020, most of the households they had supported
with rental assistance were working and no longer needed OEF's support to pay for rent and
utilities.
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Interviewees described their post-Dorian accommodation compared to the homes they had
lived in before the hurricane. Almost all of them lived in smaller homes after the hurricane and, in
some cases, with more people, though rental costs were higher. The quality of the house was also
an issue for some of the interviewees. A21, who was living in a one-bedroom house with her four
adult sons shared that the house where they were living was leaking and full of termites. Before
the storm, she and her sons lived in three houses she owned on the same property in Marsh
Harbour. She had not had insurance and could not afford to rebuild the houses.
For interviewees of Haitian descent, most of whom were renters, available
accommodations were limited. Many survivors, both Haitian and Bahamian, lost passports,
driver’s licenses, and National Insurance Board cards during the storm, including their
documentation of status. Without documentation landlords were hesitant to provide housing to
people of Haitian descent. Many Haitians who had been living in The Mudd, began building homes
in another shantytown north of Marsh Harbour, in The Farm, which were demolished by the
government. Uncertainty about housing security contributed to interviewee’s anxiety about the
future.
Most of the interviewees evacuated with few items, many arriving in a new place with only
their clothes. Interviewees commented that although there were plenty of clothing donations, it
was difficult to find sizes that fit and were their style. While working at the distribution centre on
Eleuthera, I observed that there were few items in large sizes, and most of the clothing was not in
good shape. Interviewees discussed how it felt strange wearing clothes that belonged to someone
else previously and were not exactly the right size or your style.
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Interviewees also talked about missing their things and their homes, saying it was difficult
not being able to decorate your home to your style. A8, who had relocated to Spanish Wells, talked
about the importance of having her things on her mental health.
Like I miss my stuff. I know that sounds weird, but I miss my stuff. I've missed something
that's mine. I miss MY STUFF. It's like I just miss the things that I used to have. And I did
pottery for years. So, I miss my pottery that I made. I miss all my things. I miss my closet,
my clothes, my shoes, my boots, I miss my boots. My purses, you know, the things that you
just had that was yours. If I had that again, that would make life feel more normal. You
know, I mean, you get the things piece by piece by piece, but you have to also stop to
remember you're paying rent on a house.
Interviewees on Eleuthera spoke about the need to have a vehicle on the island and the
limitations of not having transportation. Some interviewees had been able to transport their
vehicles to the islands where they relocated after the hurricane, but many of their vehicles did not
survive the storm. Without a vehicle, interviewees felt a lack of independence, relying on
volunteers and friends for transportation to get groceries or run errands. Many people on Eleuthera
without vehicles hitchhike along the highway that spans the island from north to south.
Interviewees said they often would not get picked up along the highway because they were
strangers and were hesitant to get into people's cars because they did not feel like part of the
community.
Interviewees who had working vehicles on Grand Bahama and the Abacos could use their
vehicles to work and support the recovery efforts. Similarly, interviewees who owned boats that
survived the storm could find work ferrying goods and people between islands or fishing. A9’s
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household that had brought their boat to Eleuthera was trying to raise funds to fix the boat to open
a fishing and snorkeling business for tourists.

Social networks
Most interviewees were separated from their existing social networks and connections
during displacement. For some, this was acute as they were separated from their partners and
children. Interviewees separated from their nuclear family shared how difficult it was to be apart
from one another in addition to processing the trauma of the hurricane. For other interviewees,
being disconnected from their friends, their church and their home communities made it difficult
to cope and adapt to the trauma of the storm and the challenges of displacement.
It was evident throughout the interviews that people were more inclined to move or stay
where they had social connections to support them. In some cases, interviewees had decided to
relocate because they had family and friends there to support them or because they knew people
from their pre-Dorian settlements who had moved there. Interviewees who had returned to
Eleuthera after the hurricane said they were happy to be back with family and friends. A14 said it
was 'awesome' to be back and talked about how happy he was that his sons could reconnect with
their uncles and grandparents. Many interviewees shared how important it was to have at least one
person they knew from before the storm nearby.
Throughout displacement, the supports provided by social networks changed. For example,
interviewees stayed with family and friends after the hurricane, ranging from a few weeks to the
duration of their displacement. Interviewees talked about the stress on relationships when staying
with family or friends. GB2, who had decided not to rebuild her home on Grand Bahama, said she
planned to become a 'nomad', travelling to stay with her children and family in different places but
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never staying longer than a month. Interviewees who had stayed with family or friends for most
of their displacement were thankful for the support but were also ready to be back in their own
space. GB4, who had been living with her father for over two years, felt there would be mixed
feelings about her family moving back into their own home.
It has been just over 2 years, and although it was my dad, I'm sure we have more than out
lived our welcome. I think he will miss the constant company though. I will go back to my
old routine of visiting him on my way home in the evenings and carry him dinner.
Once interviewees had established themselves in terms of having a home and employment,
there was often a missing component of a community. One of the interviewees from O6 on
Eleuthera shared an observation they had made about a woman they had supported:
So, success is, she has a job, she's making money, she has a home, she's able to provide for
her six-year-old daughter. That is a success because her daughter is in school and is doing
well and has, you know the needs that she has are met. But for her mom, who's our age
[late 20s], she wants to have her friends and have a life.
Interviewees were received differently in the various communities. Some interviewees
thought that the receiving communities would be more understanding and welcoming than they
were, while others commented that the support they felt from the community had influenced their
decision not to return to their pre-Dorian settlements. The differences may have been due to the
variation in where people were living. Interviewees in Spanish Wells reported feeling very
supported by the community, while interviewees on Eleuthera more often commented on feelings
of social isolation. This difference may be attributed to the smallness of Spanish Wells compared
to the dispersion of evacuees across the length of Eleuthera.
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Interviewees said that they found churches to attend where they could connect with people
in the community. On Eleuthera, a group of women from Abaco had begun a weekly bible study
group at their homes which some of the volunteers from OEF attended. A9, who was very involved
in their church before the hurricane, became active in a church on Eleuthera where one of her
daughters led the youth program. Despite being separated from their regular church community,
the family's faith helped them cope and connect with people in a new place.

Human capital
Government employees or employees of multi-site organizations provided people with
more financial stability as they were transferred to different islands. Other interviewees used their
creativity and skillsets to find new ways to meet their needs. Some interviewees became
entrepreneurs, creating new businesses upon returning to their home settlements or in the places
where they relocated. A8 opened a boutique on Spanish Wells that sold children's toys and
cosmetics and offered karate classes. A3, who returned to Marsh Harbour a few weeks after the
storm, began a delivery and taxi service because she had a vehicle that had survived the storm.
These entrepreneurs relied on assets like access to credit and vehicles, in addition to their skill sets,
to create businesses. In addition, OEF provided small business grants to a few evacuees who had
relocated to Eleuthera. A15, who was originally from Eleuthera and returned after the hurricane,
received a grant and opened a restaurant in her hometown.
Having a diverse skill set was also valuable for interviewees, but only if they found
themselves in a place that could utilize these skills and expertise. However, these diverse skill sets
did not lead to full-time employment in many cases, often resulting in interviewees finding odd
jobs with little stability. Despite various evacuees having similar skillsets, there were differences
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in the levels of employment that they found, suggesting that skills interacted with other factors,
such as access to tools and transportation and emotional wellbeing that influenced a household's
capacity to cope and adapt during displacement.
Some of the interviewees developed new skillsets. For example, A23, was hired by a
disaster response organization to facilitate community-based disaster management training based
on her experience after the storm. Another interviewee, A33 began working with a disaster
management non-profit in the Bahamas while the school where he was principal was being rebuilt.
Faced with challenges accessing food after the hurricane, some people on Abaco began
backyard farming. A23 said it was like the community reverted to the old ways.
A lot of people started doing that [backyard farming and keeping chickens] shortly after
Dorian, because we were trading. Trading. You've got chicken eggs. I have a vegetable
garden that survived. He's got a boat that's finally working. I was trying to get in seeds,
and fishing hooks and lines. So, people could start producing crop and getting food from
the sea again, 'cause there were no stores to buy that stuff from. Doesn't take that long at
all to get tomato trees and stuff like that growing. Especially leaf, leaf greens. Like literally
weeks.
The hurricane interrupted the skill development of some of the interviewees who were
enrolled or planned to enroll in college courses. Two of the interviewees needed to complete a few
courses to complete their degrees which was derailed when they had to prioritize recovering from
the hurricane and managing displacement. As mentioned, A23 used the funds that she had saved
to pay for her education to run a distribution centre on Abaco.
Parents tried to resume their children’s education as quickly as possible, which meant
relocating. Despite these efforts, interviewees who were teachers identified challenges that the
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children faced in their schooling. In addition to being traumatized by the storm, GB4, a teacher
explained that she was teaching her students out of a damaged school. In addition, children were
returning sporadically which made it challenging to maintain a consistent curriculum. She
explained:
And then you also have persons who were here, but because of the state of devastation that
they were in because they were displaced and weren’t any place stable then they came
back late as well. So, it was really difficult for some of these kids. It was really difficult.
You’ve got one group you’ve been teaching the whole time and then you've got a new
student. Then you’ve got, OK, so this student needs to try and catch up somewhere here
and get some of this. And then you've got another new student or another two new students
and it’s like, Oh my God.
Another teacher, A16, who had transferred to Spanish Wells after Dorian, shared that many
of the students in Marsh Harbour and on the Cays had attended private schools which had a
different method of teaching and learning expectations than the government schools that they
attended during displacement.

Emotional wellbeing
Interviewees' strategies to cope with the trauma of the hurricane and the challenges of
displacement varied. While some coped by staying busy, others shared that they felt that they were
incapable of functioning normally for months after the storm. A18, who was offered a job and
housing on Harbour Island weeks after the hurricane, explained her experience moving to a new
place:

184

They took care of everything for me. It's amazing because honestly, I think if it was left up
to me, I just, I couldn't. I wasn't… I wasn't a fully, like a fully functional human until months
after. I just, I wouldn't have been able to do it.
Although many interviewees felt they had improved mentally and psychologically since
the immediate hurricane aftermath, many struggled with being displaced from their homes. When
asked how she felt she was coping, A8 shared that she had little excitement about life. She said:
To be honest, like I tell my husband, I don't have a feeling of excitement. It's just been too
many hurdles. One after the next and I don't have a feeling of excitement for basically
anything. And I know that sounds really depressing, but that's just how I feel. I feel that it's
just something missing. It's just always some dark hole that doesn't ever get filled. And it
has not been filled since we got here. And I don't know what's missing. Just something's
missing.
Many of the interviewees said they and their children experienced post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and anxiety about the weather. These feelings were continuous but peaked during
the hurricane season. Children would ask if they were having a hurricane if it began to rain and
would be fearful if the wind picked up. In one case, a child did not speak for weeks after the storm
and some children would resist going into a bath or swimming.
Interviewees tried to maintain a positive outlook, but it became more challenging over time
if households felt a sense of uncertainty. When they were able to start making plans, interviewees
said they started to feel more optimistic about the future. Many of the interviewees on Eleuthera
who had decided to stay permanently had felt a sense of excitement about re-establishing
themselves in a community where they felt comfortable.
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Citizenship and legal status
People who had travelled to the US after the hurricane were only allowed to stay up to six
months as a tourist. In some cases, households were able to get extensions if they were sponsored
by family member or friends. Although the Bahamas and the US has historically had good
immigration relations, quickly after the hurricane, the president at the time, said that anyone
coming from the Bahamas needed to have proper documentation to stop some ‘very bad people
and some very bad gang members and some very, very bad drug dealers’ from entering the U.S.
(Chuck & Ainsley, 2019). Bahamians were consequently denied temporary protection status in the
US. GB3 explained her experience when she returned to the Bahamas from Florida, where the
household owned a condo:
Because the US President went on live TV and said that Bahamians are all drug dealers
and gang members and that is a direct quote of what he said. And directly after that, all
immigration into the United States for Bahamians was met with extreme suspicion. I made
a trip back to Nassau the day he said that, unbeknownst, to get issued a new driver’s license
because I lost my driver’s license in the storm. And when I was on my way back to United
States, I was met with the third degree and actually denied entry. Somehow, they took pity
after grilling me, and pretty much putting me in what felt like county lockup for two hours.
They allowed me to come through and said you have to be out of the country in two months.
Not six months like we would normally be allowed to. So. That pretty much threw a wrench
into the we’re going to stay in the United States and figure it out.
Many Haitians who had evacuated after the hurricane returned to Abaco in the months
following the storm as a result of limited housing and employment options elsewhere. After the
short-term housing ended, particularly in the hotels, the Haitian population became widely
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dispersed, with some becoming homeless. A32 who was providing support for their Haitian
congregation relayed what he was hearing from his parishioners:
Well, after the government closed the shelter, they don't have no option. They living with
family, but they not left Nassau. Plenty of them, they coming back here. Some of them, when
I talk to them, I don't see them with my eyes, telling me they living in cars and on the street.
Some of them they living in the bushes and stuff like that.
The recovery of migrants has been challenged because resources were limited before their
livelihoods were disrupted. Additionally, some interviewees have irregular immigration status4
which limits the assistance that is available to their households. Immediately after the storm, NGOs
assisting with housing were able to provide accommodation for evacuees in hotels and in the
shelters, whatever their legal status. However, when shelters closed and hotels limited the amount
of accommodation available, NGOs were challenged by the legality of housing undocumented
Haitians in the Bahamas. Many of the interviewed organizations commented on the legal
implications of finding housing for Haitians with irregular immigration status, O7 stating:
When, when it got time to move on from the hotels and into long term housing. It is illegal
to house, you know, somebody that doesn't have their paperwork. So, the landlords could
get into a lot of trouble if they took on somebody that was Haitian that doesn't have a work
permit or passport of some sort. Just legal, you know, a legal reason to be in the country.
Before the storm, many of the interviewees travelled frequently to the U.S. However,
without documents, many Bahamians were restricted from travelling to the U.S. A16, who had
lost all of her clothing in the storm and had trouble finding donated clothing to fit her stature

4

In the Bahamas, citizenship is determined by parent’s citizenship. Persons born to non-Bahamian parents are who
were born in the Bahamas are eligible to apply for citizenship but this often takes numerous applications and takes
many years to receive. As a result, there are many people of Haitian descent in the Bahamas who were born in the
Bahamas who have irregular status in addition to legal and illegal migrants.
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commented on her inability to travel to the U.S. to buy appropriate clothing to work as a teacher.
She said:
There are no shirts in the shop. A lot of these women are short and petites, so they bring
in the clothes that myself. I have not traveled. My documents got destroyed in the hurricane.
I'm having to redo passports. Redo visas. So, you know, I said I can't travel to the purchase
things because I'm here working.

6.5 The implications of the Covid-19
pandemic for vulnerability and posthurricane recovery (T3)
In March 2020, the Bahamas
government closed its international borders
and introduced restrictions to inter-island
travel

within

the

Bahamas.

Shortly

afterwards, a national lockdown was put in
place, allowing only essential businesses to

Figure 6-5 Vulnerability assessment during the pandemic (Blue
box).

operate and restricting people to their homes. Schools shifted to online learning, and recreation
had to be within a certain radius of the home and was limited to one hour per day.
During the interviews, which took place during the pandemic, most interviewees talked
about the impact of the pandemic restrictions on their livelihoods. I asked interviewees to comment
on how the pandemic had influenced their ability to cope and adapt to the impacts of Hurricane
Dorian and their displacement. Most of the interviewees said that life was worse due to the
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pandemic for a variety of reasons. This section introduces how the Covid-19 pandemic impacted
interviewees' vulnerability to hurricanes.

6.5.1 Exposure
When the pandemic struck the Bahamas, many people were repairing their homes, and
household recovery was still in progress. Many international NGOs actively supported the
recovery and repairs of homes and infrastructure across the affected islands. In response to the
border closures across the world, most international NGOs left the Bahamas, stalling the recovery
efforts. A31 shared his perspective on the impact the pandemic had on the recovery of Abaco:
I'm convinced that, again if we did not have COVID-19 that stopped everything, not slowed
it down. Stopped it. This, this would be, would be, we would have made tremendous
progress.
The combination of the loss of the NGOs and the lockdowns led to repairs on damaged
houses not being completed despite people returning to live in their homes. As a result, many
people lived in damaged homes which increased their physical exposure to storms. While repaired
homes may have been able to withstand category 1 or category 2 hurricanes, interviewees
suggested that some of these damaged homes would be unlikely to protect the inhabitants from a
small tropical storm.
For many people, especially interviewees who had precarious employment, the pandemic
introduced financial challenges, which led to many interviewees being threatened with eviction
and evicted when they could no longer pay rent. In response to the possibility of eviction or
eviction, some interviewees moved back to Abaco, saying that they would prefer to risk being
homeless in a familiar place than in a new place. Interviewees who moved back to their home
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communities reported living in damaged homes for cheaper rent and sharing homes with other
families experiencing similar circumstances.
Though none of the interviewees shared that they were experiencing homelessness during
the pandemic, some shared that they had observed people living in their cars or the bushes. In
addition, they commented on the exposure of the many people still living in tents at the beginning
of the hurricane season. A23 in Marsh Harbour shared:
I'd say there's still about…30% island-wide living like that. 70% in Central. That are still
living without utilities. And living in some form of a broken house. Be it a tent inside the
house with a tarp over the roof. Or living in the vestibule of the house. Or you're living in
a dome. Or you're living in a pod. Or you're still even living in a tent. But some level of
not, not a secured house living, at least 70% in central still.
Interviewees also expressed concerns that in addition to not having enough shelters on the
islands, it was unclear how emergency shelters would implement Covid-19 safety protocols. They
felt that even if there were enough shelters, the risk of catching Covid-19 would deter people from
going to the shelters, limiting their ability to reduce exposure. One woman suggested that shelters
be designated for different populations, such as the elderly and families with children, in the event
of a hurricane during the pandemic to protect different vulnerable groups from the virus.
After Dorian, almost all interviewees said they planned to evacuate in preparation for future
hurricanes. The travel restrictions implemented in response to the pandemic caused anxiety for
interviewees recovering from Dorian's trauma. Though many of the interviewees said that there
would be challenges to evacuate in non-pandemic times, removing the option to leave made
interviewees feel trapped. Without the option to leave the island where they were living or the
Bahamas, they felt that they were more exposed to the risk of hurricanes.
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6.5.2 Changes to household adaptive capacity as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic
Financial capital
The negative impacts of the pandemic on interviewees' financial capacity were significant.
As discussed above, many of the interviewees found employment and became financially stable
in the six months after the hurricane. However, the restrictions implemented by the government in
response to the Covid-19 pandemic meant that workplaces closed down, laying off residents and
displaced individuals in receiving communities. Although the loss of employment was experienced
across the Bahamas, the impacts were particularly challenging for interviewees recovering and
adapting financially after Dorian. A30 explained what he observed when the pandemic struck:
Of course, there are people everywhere. And they, they left trying to get a job. And then
when COVID hit, they're gonna be the first people to get fired because they are the newest
people who were hired. That's a very common story right now.
The uncertainty introduced by the Covid-19 pandemic to interviewees forced them to
question how long they could financially sustain themselves and how this would affect where they
lived. Some of the interviewees talked about not being able to afford rent, while others suggested
that most people were returning to Grand Bahama and the Abacos because they were
uncomfortable staying in a strange town with no funds. Interviewees who returned to their home
settlements during the pandemic reiterated this sentiment of preferring to be somewhere familiar
in times of financial stress.
Most of the interviewees talked about the financial challenges they were experiencing
during the pandemic. Some of the interviewees were evicted after not paying rent and left large
debts with their landlords. Despite being evicted or threatened by eviction, most of the
interviewees understood their landlord's circumstances. A9, who returned to Abaco from Eleuthera
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during the pandemic, talked about the ripple effect of not paying rent on the landlord's
situation. She said:
And this morning again, my landlord called again, and he said he understands, but you
know his hands are tied. And I could truly understand that because he was patient. He
really was patient. I have to understand his situation as well. He has his family as well.
Interviewees who had been able to start saving again after the hurricane to repair their
homes talked about using the funds for daily living. For example, one family was relying on food
donations because they wanted to keep their savings in case of an emergency. The household of
six people relied on one person's salary during the pandemic. GB5, who had collected donations
to help pay for repairs on his farm, discussed the frustration of using these funds during the
pandemic for daily expenses. He explained:
We came here [Grand Bahama] now, you know, and we didn't expect to stay this long.
Now with this pandemic, you have to, you have to buy food and stuff. So now you're using
up that, that, what you thought would have been a cushion, you know?
Entrepreneurial interviewees had mixed experiences of the pandemic. A3 continued doing
deliveries throughout the pandemic, while A8, who had opened a shop, was paying additional rent
for a space that she could not use. Most interviewees who were employed before the pandemic
could apply for unemployment insurance (NIB) if their workplace closed or they were let go.
However, few reported receiving any funds, saying they had not heard back about their claims
months after the hurricane or had not worked long enough to make a claim. One interviewee said
he did not bother to apply because there would be too many stipulations. A4, who relocated to
Nassau with his wife and mother, said that although he did receive NIB, it was only 50% of his
regular pay. He shared:
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And, you know, you get a little bit from National Insurance, but they only pay you for like
50% of the salary. So that, you know, when you're living pay cheque to pay cheque and
you lose 50% of your pay cheque, you know, kind of, it kind of stinks.
A19, in Marsh Harbour, said that she had observed more crime and looting as a result of
the pandemic. She explained that many people had come to Abaco or returned to Abaco for job
opportunities after the hurricane, particularly in construction. When their jobs were deemed nonessential, they were left without work and began looting out of survival.
The uncertainty of the pandemic amplified the financial challenges already being
experienced by Hurricane Dorian survivors. Just as people began to recover and re-establish
themselves, they were faced with another disaster. Many interviewees felt the pandemic made
them more vulnerable to hurricanes because they were more exposed, without access to shelters
or evacuation, and their capacity to adapt in the event of a hurricane would be limited as finances
were used to sustain everyday life.

Physical resources
The pandemic impacted interviewees' housing situations and access to food. As discussed
above, the loss of financial capacity affected interviewees' ability to pay rent and maintain housing.
In some cases, households lived in smaller spaces than before the hurricane and shared space with
other families. During the lockdowns, staying indoors in a small space created additional stresses
for households.
Alternatively, some interviewees commented that they had been able to find housing
because second homeowners and tourists were not visiting during the pandemic. A16 was living
on Spanish Wells and was able to stay in the vacation rental cottage she was renting longer because
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people were not able to travel. GB5 had friends in Grand Bahama who offered him and his wife
their home because they could not travel.
The pandemic stalled the progress for homeowners who were trying to complete repairs on
their homes. A18 had returned to Abaco after a year of living on Eleuthera and explained how the
pandemic had affected the recovery in her community:
I think there were about 300 houses, but only I think two or three were actually intact
enough for people to live in them. And we're kind of in limbo right now. Because they, they
were mortgaged, so they did have insurance. But with COVID, you know, government
offices, they're not really open every day. And with, you know, construction has slowed
down, so there's been kind of a hold on, you know, home repair.
The government coordinated with NGOs across the islands to distribute food through the
RAPID program in response to the pandemic. About half of the interviewees said they had received
food through the program but commented that the quantity was insufficient for their family.
Interviewees with larger families said they were getting the same amount of food as a couple and
said it was not enough.
Interviewees raised concerns about the limited capacity of hospitals, particularly those
damaged in the hurricane, to respond if there were a Covid-19 outbreak on the islands. They
commented that it was challenging to provide medical support to island residents even at the best
of times. A1 summarized their concerns about the virus coming to Abaco:
You know, it scares me because of the mere fact we're not capable of containing an
outbreak in Abaco. We do not have the facilities. We do not have the homes to quarantine
people in because a lot of people's homes are still damaged. When it rains they have tarps
on their roof.
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With the pandemic lockdowns, schools transitioned to online learning. Some interviewees
commented on the benefit of this transition, which allowed their children to return home. However,
some households did not have the resources, such as computers or tablets, reliable internet, and
consistent electricity, for their children to continue their studies. In the Fall of 2020, I was
contacted by interviewees who asked for help paying their internet bills so their children could
complete their school. GB4, a high school teacher on Grand Bahama, said that teaching was
particularly challenging because the internet was inconsistent, and students did not have the
resources they needed. She explained:
Because we had so much damage, due to the storm, that our Internet connection is
sometimes null and void. So, and then with the, a lot of the kids being displaced as well,
and we're also displaced. It's like, the things you had, you don't have so even connecting
with people is kind of difficult. So yeah.

Social networks
The social isolation that resulted from the pandemic lockdowns and travel restrictions was
challenging for Hurricane Dorian survivors. The pandemic introduced a new dynamic for
interviewees who were separated from partners during displacement because they were unsure
when they would see each other again. A5, who had found work on Harbour Island while her
husband stayed on Abaco for his job, explained the impact of the pandemic on her relationship:
So basically, we've been doing long distance since October. But like, what's different with
that and now is at least before COVID we would make plans and say okay well I'm coming
to Abaco on this date, or you're coming here on this date and like now, we don't know. We
don't have anything we could count down to.
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Before the pandemic, interviewees said they had relied heavily on their family and friends
for social support in daily life and to have people to talk to about their hurricane experience. The
pandemic put strict restrictions on interacting with people outside of your household and promoted
social distancing. Because of this, interviewees said they felt that they lost essential emotional and
mental health supports. Originally from Grand Bahama, A11, who had been living on Elbow Cay
before the storm had decided to move back to Grand Bahama with her mother and daughters. She
said the pandemic had been more challenging than being displaced. She said:
I think COVID had more of an effect on me and it had to do with social distancing and not
being able to see friends that I haven't seen in 23 years and not being able to allow my kids
to play with other kids. You know that took more. And I think mentally on a whole I think
it's affected people more than, than anything else.
Some interviewees said that as introverts they were fine being forced to stay inside, but that
the lockdowns were very hard for their children. They could see that the kids were missing playing
outside with other children, which was restricted during the lockdowns. Additionally, A26 had run
a school lunch program for over 30 years and was concerned that these children were not getting
the food they needed because they were not attending school.

Human capital
Although teachers were forced to adapt their teaching method to online learning, they were
the most stable occupation of the interviewees during the pandemic. The four interviewees who
were teachers continued to work throughout the pandemic, though they all commented on how
challenging it was for the students to learn in this type of environment. A5, a pre-school teacher
on Harbour Island, shared that she had to change her teaching methods so that parents could do
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the work with their kids. She tried to find activities that used items they would already have in
their homes.
A high school teacher on Grand Bahama, GB4, was concerned about her student's
engagement in their final year of school and said she continued to be in contact with her students
throughout the pandemic. Although she had tried to maintain communication with her students,
she was worried about how the loss of education would affect their futures. She explained:
And a lot of them, after this, after this COVID thing, they’re like if they make us repeat
twelfth grade, I'm not coming back. I can't take this. It’s like, but what are you going to
do? You're ready to get outta school and I understand that. This is your year to graduate,
but are you graduating? 'Cause you haven't finished. You spent this whole year just trying
to catch up because you started late. So you've been trying to catch up from you before you
even started. So, yeah. They’re, they’re I feel sorry for them, especially the 12th graders
this year. I really… This has been a blow. This has been a blow.
During the pandemic, the challenges to food security in the Bahamas were highlighted as
supply chain issues emerged. In Marsh Harbour, interest in backyard farming emerged after the
hurricane and expanded with the onset of the pandemic. A27, an interviewee living in Marsh
Harbour shared her observations about the shift to backyard farming:
I'm hopeful. I see a lot of persons are doing backyard farming. I'm, and we're encouraging
that. And a lot of persons, because there's no jobs, they're doing their own businesses.
They're going out of the box. They're thinking, OK, something would happen again, like
how COVID is here, and they don't want to go to the shop, they're planting the stuff that
they can get from the back of the yard. That's something we didn't have before. So, persons
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who have sit on their visions, that have businesses they're doing it now, if they can find
persons to sponsor them and stuff like that.

Emotional Wellbeing
As discussed above, social isolation was particularly difficult for displaced households.
Interviewees shared that the uncertainty and stress of the pandemic led them into a state of
depression. Though many of them said they put on a brave face, particularly for their children,
they hid their trauma. A15 said that people did not understand she was struggling. She shared:
Everybody say, you were chosen, because God bring you out of the storm, find a place for
you and now the COVID is here so now you have to deal with that, so you are strong. But
they think you're so strong, but they don't know, you don't be strong every day, you know?
Some interviewees shared that it was not until the pandemic that they realized that they had
been keeping busy to avoid thinking about the hurricane and their current situation. A16, a teacher,
shared how her emotions surfaced during the initial weeks of not working during the pandemic:
It [the pandemic], that's what's put me back into like worrying sometimes. Because you sit
here, and you think because you don't have anything to do. When I'm teaching, I always
have either papers to mark or a lesson plans for next day. Or a chart to make. Or homework
to do with my son. Whereas with COVID here, you're stuck inside. Because we were on
lockdown now for two weeks.
A18, who had been working throughout most of the pandemic, said that she had not felt
the isolation others had felt until her contract ended, and she was not working. She had planned to
return to Abaco when her contract ended, reuniting with her son, but had not travelled because of
the lockdown. She reflected:
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And I guess then I realized, you know, not seeing people for the last two weeks, other than
quick trips into the shop. Not really interacting with people, that, I can see how difficult
it's been for other people who weren't able to work at all through all of this. You know the
isolation is difficult.
Interviewees coped with their feelings of trauma in different ways. Some mentioned that
they would go to the beach or paint to calm their nerves, though almost everyone said some days
were more challenging than others to feel motivated to address their mental health needs. A7, an
interviewee caring for her four children and her mother, who had dementia in a two-bedroom home
in Eleuthera said that sometimes she just needs time in her room by herself to cope. She shared:
I lock myself in the room and I tell my kids don't come in here. And even if I hear my
mummy knocking and banging, I do not open the door. Because not every time I'm mentally
ready, you know, to face and deal with her.
She also added that it was difficult to think about the uncertainty and sometimes distract herself
from the concerns she had about her families' future. She added:
You can't process. I don't even think about the rent. I don't think about like I do, I think
about it, but I I found myself just. Just go on Netflix and watch TV. You know what I mean?
Just you do other stuff, just to occupy your mind so you don't dwell on the things that you
have to do and have to accomplish.
The media attention of the pandemic also created anxiety amongst some of the
interviewees. Some interviewees explained this was related to the sense that they were trapped in
the event of another hurricane. GB5 shared that the discussion about death triggered his PTSD:
When the pandemic came I, it took me into little bit of um, it brought some more of that
PTSD out of me. Because now you were being told fearful things. You know government
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was telling the same people gonna die. And when you have PTSD those types of things are
triggers. They trigger. Any, any, any bad news in any situation of that kind. It triggers at
those things, right?
Thankfully none of the interviewees died from the Covid-19 virus, though some lost family
members or had contracted the virus and were still managing the longer-term symptoms. However,
the social isolation, uncertainty and stress had significant impacts on Hurricane Dorian survivors.

Citizenship and legal status
Interviewees discussed the different impacts of the pandemic on international mobility. For
example, the A11 household had returned from the U.S. to repair their home on Elbow Cay during
the children's school break. During that week, the children's school in the U.S. closed due to the
pandemic, and the borders became restricted. As a result, the family stayed in the Bahamas with
just the clothes they had brought for their vacation despite having a rented apartment in the US.
GB5 had relocated to Canada with his wife to be closer to her mother while she was in
hospital after sustaining injuries during the hurricane. They returned to the Bahamas to renew their
passports, and while they were in Grand Bahama, the borders closed. They were able to find
housing through friends and said that they were happy that they got stuck because they could seek
out grants that they would not have received if they were off the island. Interviewees also talked
about friends and family getting stuck in Canada and the U.S. because of the travel restrictions,
though they did not elaborate beyond people trying to get home.
Two of the interviewed households had tried to relocate internationally. The pandemic
slowed the process as government offices transitioned and adapted to online services. A28’s family
decided to return to Abaco to work rather than wait on work permits in the U.S., though they said
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they would have stayed if the permits had worked out. GB3 remained in Canada, though they were
anxious that they would have to return to the Bahamas as their savings were used up. They
eventually received their immigration status.
The primary concern for most interviewees was that they would not be able to evacuate in
the event of a hurricane. Nearly all the interviewees said they would leave their island or the
Bahamas when asked how they would prepare for future hurricanes. The pandemic introduced
limitations to interviewees' movements in the event of a hurricane through travel restrictions and
a lack of financial capacity. Many interviewees shared this sentiment expressed by A16, a single
mother living on Spanish Wells:
I always said if another hurricane would come, I would take my mom and my son
somewhere in Florida where we can drive and get out of the way of it. But now with COVID
and domestic travel and international travel being shut down. We're stuck where we're at.
And for me that's scary, because even just the slightest thunderstorm and it doesn't sit well
with me. It doesn't sit well with my son. My mom. None of us.

6.6 Summary of key findings
This chapter addresses the question of what Hurricane Dorian revealed about household
vulnerabilities and how the hurricane's impacts affected future household vulnerability? To answer
this question, I used a community-based vulnerability assessment framework to identify the factors
that contributed to exposure to the storm's impacts and the adaptive capacity of households. The
framework is an expansion of the cycle outlined in the Access model to assess household
vulnerability before and after the hurricane. The assessment also examines how the Covid-19
pandemic amplified the vulnerability of households to hurricanes. The key findings of pre-Dorian
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and post-Dorian household vulnerability and the implications of the pandemic on household
vulnerability are illustrated in Figure 6-6. The diagram provides a general overview of how
mobility decision-making impacted households’ vulnerability as a function of exposure and
adaptive capacity. Household general vulnerability after the hurricane affected how prepared the
household was to respond to the impacts of the pandemic, which in turn influenced their
vulnerability to future events.

Figure 6-6 Impacts of mobility decision-making on exposure and adaptive capacity (household vulnerability) and relationship to
disasters.

The interviewees' experience highlighted how secondary events, the Covid-19 pandemic
in this case, can compound the challenges faced while trying to adapt and recover from the initial
event. While interviewees adapted to the impacts of Hurricane Dorian, the use of resources resulted
in fewer resources to adapt to the pandemic. Additionally, the impact of the pandemic on
household resources affected how households were able to adapt to reduce their vulnerability to
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future hurricanes. The limited ability to reduce vulnerability to hurricanes created stress and
anxiety amongst interviewees, particularly during the hurricane season.
The findings highlight how different dimensions of household vulnerability were impacted
by the hurricane and the pandemic (Table 6-1). The themes that emerged throughout the interviews
were closely aligned with the assets-based approach to assessing adaptive capacity, specifically
financial, physical, social, human and political capitals. Although these dimensions are discussed
as specific categories, they were actually closely related. For most interviewees, certain resources
were more readily available than others during different stages after the hurricane. Interviewees
used stronger abilities and resources to supplement areas where they had limited resources,
knowledge, and skills. For example, people used finances to pay for housing if they did not have
social networks to provide accommodation. When interviewees had limited resources or abilities
to rely on, or as they were exhausted, they would rely on external assistance. If assistance was not
available, interviewees had to make difficult decisions about what risks they were willing to
absorb. In nearly all cases, limited access to each of the resources impacted interviewee emotional
well-being, which in turn limited their agency to make decisions. In addition, some households
were more flexible in their responses, especially if they had social or financial safety nets or had a
diverse skill set.
Table 6-1 Implications of Hurricane Dorian and the Covid-19 pandemic on household dimensions of vulnerability.

Dimension of
vulnerability
Exposure

Pre-Dorian

Impacts of Dorian

Homes in low-lying
areas
Homes not built to
hurricane standards
Previous adaptations to
secure homes
Shantytowns in Marsh
Harbour

Relocated to unfamiliar
places
Rebuilding in same
spots
Adapting building to be
more hurricane-proof
People living in tents
and damaged houses

Amplification by the
pandemic
Rebuilding and repairs
stalled when NGOs left
Restrictions limited
construction
More people returned
to Abaco during
pandemic
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during the 2020 and
2021 hurricane seasons
Shantytowns torn down
with no alternative
housing for residents
Financial
capital
(financial
capital)

Physical
capital
(physical
resources)

Social capital
(networks and
relationships)

Human capital
(skills and
experiences;
emotional
wellbeing)

Saving for college, to
move, to build homes
Financially comfortable
with disposable income
Some people had
existing debt, loans and
mortgages
Vehicles
Boats
Homes
Tools for employment
Personal items
Rental properties and
second homes

Savings were used to
evacuate, relocate and
recover
Lack of income due to
unemployment,
underemployment

No vehicles- limited
employment
opportunities
Loss of tools for
employment (damaged
boats, lost tools, lost
tech and supplies)
Loss of personal items
Repairing and
rebuilding homes,
living in damaged
homes
No properties to rent
Lived close to family
Separated from nuclear
and friends and saw
family
them regularly
Separated from
Strong church
extended family and
community
friends
Small, geographically
Relying on family and
close settlements,
friends internationally
familiar with most
and on other islands
people
Strangers in an
unfamiliar place
Donations and supports
from international
friends and family
Consistent full time and Unemployment and
part time employment
underemployment
Business owners
Some people embraced
Completing college
entrepreneurial skills
degrees
College interrupted

Occurrences of
homelessness
No option to evacuate
Limited capacity of
remaining shelters with
pandemic distancing
regulations
More people became
unemployed- no
income
People used funds to
recover from hurricane,
limited funds as safety
net during pandemic
Limited finances to
replace physical assets
Stalled progress on
rebuild and repairs of
homes
Rental properties
vacant because of
border closures

Family and friends
providing support were
also stressed, limited
how much they could
give and support
Social isolation as
people were restricted
to their homes during
lockdown
Children separated
from families could
return home when
school went virtual
Restrictions to
businesses led to more
unemployment
Lockdowns limited
clients coming to home
businesses
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Political
capital
(citizenship
and legal
status)

Children enrolled in
private schools
Existing health
concerns (asthma,
dementia, diabetes)

Children’s education
interrupted
Children’s education
not to the same
standard as before
Health challenges
exacerbated by stress
Lack of accessible
medical services
Mental health and
emotional wellbeing
suffered (anxiety,
PTSD, stress, etc.)

Work permits
(Haitians)
Regular travel to the
US for shopping,
medical, social
Dual citizens
(Bahamian +
American/Canadian/Bri
tish)
Bahamas-born Haitians
waiting for citizenship

Issues with work
permits- issued to
employer
US visa limitations
Strict border
enforcement to US
Limited access to
assistance without
Bahamian citizenship

Schools shut down,
eventually switched to
virtual- had to pay for
tablets, WIFI
Social isolation
amplified mental health
challenges
Additional anxiety
about costs of living,
eviction
Limited travel to
medical services in
Nassau and
internationally
Border closuresinternational and
restricted inter-island
travel
Left people stranded in
US/Canada and in
Bahamas who were
home to repair

Many interviewees began to feel established and more certain about their futures before
the onset of the pandemic. Interviewees felt that they were re-establishing themselves and
beginning to regain some aspects of their “normal” life before the storm. For example, education
was a key priority of households with children, relocating their households or their children to
ensure that they return to their studies as quickly as possible. When the pandemic struck,
interviewees had to use the resources they had built to manage the pressures of lockdowns and
restrictions, including buying technology to ensure their children's education was not further
interrupted.
Although all the interviewees were surviving, most did not have the financial resources or
the means to acquire finances to recover quickly. For many households, as money was earned, it
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was quickly spent to meet basic needs. For households who used savings meant for other priorities,
such as education or housing, to survive after the storm, there will be long-term impacts as
households recover this money. In the meantime, past priorities will be postponed, impacting
future household vulnerability. For some interviewees, the hurricane disrupted skill development
as interviewees used funds to recover that would have otherwise been used for education and used
their energy to address meeting basic needs.
Interviewees emphasized that just because the hurricane happened did not mean that life,
and the costs associated with living, stopped. In addition to the costs of starting over in a new
place, interviewees needed resources to find a sense of normalcy for themselves and their
households. In some cases, this meant buying a tub of ice cream, and for others, it meant getting
back to familiar routines. The ability finding this normalcy reflected household’s adaptive
capacity.
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7. Filling the gap: Effectiveness of government and civil society actors in the response to
Hurricane Dorian
7.1 Introduction
Individuals and households, governments and civil society will have to adapt to prepare
for, respond to and recover from the projected impacts of intensifying hurricanes. Hurricane
Dorian illustrated many of the characteristics of hurricanes projected to occur more frequently in
the future by the IPCC: slow-moving nature, with intense precipitation and extreme wind speeds
(IPCC, 2021a). Hurricane Dorian also highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the disaster
management cycle in the Bahamas and underscored opportunities to adapt existing national
disaster response systems to support survivors of future hurricanes. Some institutional actors were
better prepared than others to assist in response and recovery, emphasizing the importance of
cooperation to support hurricane survivors. This chapter assesses the role and effectiveness of
government agencies, international NGOs, Bahamas-based non-profit organizations (NPOs) and
other civil society actors in the Hurricane Dorian response to identify improvements for future
planning to reduce the adverse social impacts of hurricane displacement in SIDS (objective 6).
This chapter responds to research question 3: How can national adaptive capacity in The
Bahamas be enhanced to mitigate household vulnerability to hurricanes? I answer this question by
analyzing interviews with hurricane survivors and with representatives from hurricane response
organizations. Hurricane response organizations included 8 Bahamian disaster response NPOs,
one international NGO, three pastors, one representative from a church, and one chairman from
local government in Abaco to explore the types of support and services provided after the storm
and what was learned from the experience. A brief overview of the interviewees from civil society
can be found in Table 3-2.
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This chapter begins with a brief overview of disaster response in the Bahamas (7.2). This
is followed by introducing the various actors and agencies active in the hurricane response and
recovery (7.3). Section 7.4 summarizes critiques of the government’s preparedness and response
to Hurricane Dorian. Section 7.5 provides a detailed account of the supports provided by Bahamasbased NPOs and civil groups to hurricane survivors, highlighting what resources they used to
provide these supports. Section 7.6 presents opportunities to strengthen future hurricane response
as expressed by displaced interviewees and representatives from Bahamas-based NPOs. Section
7.7 summarizes the key finding from the chapter.
7.2 Overview of hurricane management in the Bahamas
The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is the central government agency
responsible for hurricane preparedness, response and recovery. In the event of a hurricane, the
Department of Meteorology works closely with NEMA to send out a hurricane warning while
NEMA activates emergency shelters in the islands anticipated to feel the impacts of the storm.
Churches, schools, and community centres are typically used as hurricane shelters across the
Bahamas. Before the hurricane, there were 15 hurricane shelters on Abaco and the surrounding
cays.
Pre-hurricane evacuation is a relatively new form of disaster risk management in the
Bahamas. The first instance of evacuating an entire island in the Bahamas before a hurricane was
in preparation for Hurricane Irma in 2017. Prior to Hurricane Irma, 1500 residents were evacuated
to Nassau from the southern islands of the Bahamas (Maura, 2017). NEMA has not mobilized prehurricane evacuations since 2017, in part because there has not been a hurricane that was
anticipated to warrant evacuation. In addition, evacuation is an appropriate preparedness action
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for smaller islands, like the southern islands of the Bahamas, but is more challenging to execute in
more populated islands. On the more populated islands, such as Abaco and Grand Bahama,
designated emergency shelters are relied on to protect people from hurricanes.
After a hurricane, local administrators are responsible for assessing the damages to
government buildings and infrastructure, and travel to settlements within their area of
responsibility to assess the damages to housing and identify the needs of survivors to inform the
types of supports needed from NEMA. They then submit requests to NEMA for assistance, with
NEMA then coordinating meetings with relevant government agencies to determine a plan of
action. For example, NEMA works in conjunction with the Royal Bahamian Defence Force to
move canned goods and water to the islands once the damage has been assessed and it is safe to
travel. NEMA will move people who need to be evacuated for health and safety concerns, such as
when water systems are compromised, clinics are damaged, or power lines pose a danger. If
needed, NEMA will deploy the police to ensure public safety.
NEMA works in coordination with U.N. agencies, such as OCHA, IOM and UNICEF, and
international NGOs, the private sector and Bahamas-based NPOs to address the needs of hurricane
survivors. In the case of minor hurricanes or tropical storms, it may not be necessary to engage
international organizations, the needed response coming from NEMA and from local NPOs and
civil society.
Historically, recovery and reconstruction after hurricanes in the Bahamas have been slow.
Displaced interviewees from Grand Bahama shared that some people’s homes had not been
completely repaired after Hurricane Matthew (2016), leaving them more vulnerable to the impacts
of Dorian. Some people referred to the slow recovery of Ragged Island when discussing hurricane
reconstruction; Ragged Island has not been habitable since Hurricane Irma in 2017. Despite
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promises by the government to rebuild Ragged Island as a ‘green’ island, most of the recovery
efforts have been driven by the small population of former residents (Thomas & Benjamin, 2019).
During recovery, NEMA visits the affected islands to learn from the response and identify
how disaster management can be strengthened. During an informal discussion with a
representative from NEMA, prior to Dorian, I was told that learning from the experience of
survivors and providing counselling was a critical aspect of NEMA's disaster management cycle.
In addition, it is part of NEMA’s mandate to provide community preparedness training, mitigation
planning and public information.

7.3 Overview of the actors in the Hurricane Dorian response
The response to Hurricane Dorian relied on various actors, many of whom do not have a
formal role or responsibility in disaster management in the Bahamas. Examining the actions taken
in the Hurricane Dorian response efforts suggests that the actual activities in the aftermath of a
hurricane do not reflect the formalized hurricane preparedness and response processes. This
section describes the different actors' actions in response to Hurricane Dorian. Table 7-1 provides
an overview of different organizations and agencies and the activities with which they were
involved.
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Table 7-1 Overview of types of support provided by different actors.

Type of
assistance
provided
Evacuation

Category of actor
NGOs
NPOs
(international) (Bahamasbased)
BahamasAir/NEMA
IDEARelief
Government

Distribution of
donations (food,
materials,
clothing,
financial)

NEMA

Samaritan’s
purse, SOL

Rebuild/repairs

DRA

All Hands and
Hearts, CORE,
Christian Aid
Ministries
Rubicon,
Church of
Scientology
UNICEF,
Samaritan’s
Purse
World Central
Kitchen
Dome
structures

Debris
removal/mucking
houses
Training
Food preparation
Housing/shelter

Health
Water

Social services,
NEMA

Americares
Water Mission

Head Knowles,
IDEARelief,
One Eleuthera
Foundation,
NPCC, Abaco
Hands and
Feet, FEWL,
Bahamas Red
Cross, ECRA,
Hopetown
United

Other civil
society
Friends/family
with
boats/planes,
Fast Ferries
Churches

Sailing group,
friends and
family

IDEARelief
Abaco Hands
and Feet, OEF
OEF, Bahamas
Disaster
Housing
Association,
Bahamas
Methodist
Habitat

Hotels
Churches,
League of
Haitian
Pastors

Abaco Hands
and Feet
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7.3.1 Government
In Nassau, NEMA led the response with support from Caribbean Disaster Emergency
Management Agency (CDEMA), coordinating with humanitarian organizations and supported by
U.N. agencies (OCHA, 2019). Though NEMA coordinated the response efforts in the storm's
immediate aftermath, their operations were not always obvious on the ground. Few interviewees,
both organizations and evacuees, discussed the role of NEMA and none spoke of CDEMA, though
official reports on the response suggest that these two agencies coordinated the response. Most
organizations, leaders and displaced interviewees described their post-hurricane experiences and
observations referring to local government, international NGOs, and civil society organizations.

7.3.2 International non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Many of the evacuee interviewees commented on how important the international
community had been in the Hurricane Dorian response and recovery. They mentioned many
international NGOs by name (Table 7-1) and described specifics of how they provided support,
such as providing materials and labour to help people repair their homes. In addition, interviewees
said that international military, like the U.S. Coast Guard, were the first to arrive to evacuate
American citizens off the islands.

7.3.3 Bahamas-based non-profit organizations (NPOs)
Bahamas-based NPOs had an essential role in the Hurricane Dorian response, focusing
primarily on evacuation, shelters, housing assistance, and donations and distributions (these
activities are discussed in more detail in section 7.4). Several organizations had previously worked
in disaster response and had existing relationships with NEMA and were familiar with disaster
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response mechanisms. For example, one of the organizations (O2) had acted as an evacuation
shelter in preparation for Hurricane Irma (2017), coordinating with NEMA and social services to
support evacuees during and after the storm. Another organization (O3) had emerged after
Hurricane Andrew (1999) and was familiar with NEMA through their work rebuilding homes after
hurricanes. In another case, an existing NPO (O4) created a new department to assist with response
efforts.
In the aftermath of Dorian, new NPOs emerged in different islands to respond to displaced
peoples’ needs based on the organization’s capacity. For example, on Abaco, one emergent
organization (O8) started with search and rescue activities, then began operating a shelter and
distribution centre and later created a school to incentivize people to return to Abaco. In Nassau,
a realtor volunteering with the response effort realized that her skills could be used to find
evacuees' housing, so she created an independent NPO (O7) for this purpose. On Eleuthera, an
organization (O6) emerged to raise money to buy food, water and household items for evacuee
families displaced across the island.
The largest NPO to emerge after Hurricane Dorian was initially self-named the Core Group
and later became Bahamas Strong. The Core Group was a group of volunteers in the capital,
Nassau, made up of private citizens and representatives from the private sector who collaborated
to respond quickly to the needs of Hurricane Dorian survivors. They filled the gaps in the response
by the government and NGOs, such as housing, evacuation and medical response (Thomas et al.,
2021).
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7.3.4 Other civil society
In addition to existing Bahamas-based NPOs, local groups and organizations responded to
the needs of survivors after Hurricane Dorian. Interviewees talked about the critical role of
churches after the storm as shelters for displaced people, particularly people of Haitian descent
and Haitian migrants, and later as a place to connect with people in a new community. In addition,
many local churches distributed donated goods to displaced households on Eleuthera and in
Nassau. Interviewed pastors said they were in regular contact with many of their parishioners,
providing emotional, spiritual and administrative support. Displaced interviewees who were
connected to international communities through their churches also reported being sponsored by
people overseas who provided rental and livelihood assistance.
Service organizations, such as local and international Rotary and Kiwanis clubs, were
essential to the recovery efforts, providing funds and recruiting volunteers to repair homes. There
is a strong foundation of Rotary clubs across the Bahamas, and many island leaders are members.
These groups coordinated with local leaders, local NPOs and international NGOs in the recovery
efforts in the Abacos and Grand Bahama.
The private sector was also active in the response efforts. Private airlines, ferries, and cruise
ships, along with private boat owners, used their resources to evacuate survivors. Some hotels
provided free accommodations and food to evacuees as they arrived in Nassau, in addition to using
their lobbies as distribution centres. Many retail businesses donated large quantities of supplies for
evacuees and survivors who remained on the affected islands.
The indirect impacts of Hurricane Dorian were felt across the Bahamas, as residents on
other islands reflected on their past experiences of hurricanes and offered their support. Though
the experiences of interviewees varied, most said that the kindness extended to them after the
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hurricane made them feel more comfortable as they dealt with the uncertainty of displacement.
When I spoke informally with people on Eleuthera about Hurricane Dorian, they reflected on their
circumstances following Hurricane Andrew and the support provided by the people of Abaco. One
interviewee, a pastor in Abaco who had been a pilot who carried supplies to Eleuthera after
Hurricane Andrew, summarized this sentiment of supporting each other when he said:
I think, you know, we have to continue to think and promote, that we are still one Bahamas.
We are, we are 700 islands, but we are still one Bahamas. And we need each other.
In addition to community support from Bahamians, the international second homeowner
community was very supportive. Displaced interviewees from the cays said the second homeowner
and tourist community drove the recovery efforts through their commitment to reconstruction and
significant financial donations. In Nassau, second homeowners provided support by allowing
evacuees to rent or stay in their homes in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane. The availability
of rental properties and the wealth of the international tourist and second-homeowner community
were vital assets to the recovery of some hurricane-affected settlements.

7.4 Critiques of the Government’s disaster management effectiveness
For many Bahamians, the government's response to Hurricane Dorian highlighted a lack
of planning and preparedness. Many interviewed survivors felt that it was the responsibility of the
government, particularly NEMA, to have proactive hurricane plans in place to help mitigate risks
and support recovery. They felt that their geographic location in the hurricane belt made them
particularly exposed to hurricanes and they identified ways in which the government could
enhance their capacity to prepare for and respond to hurricanes, which included building and
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maintaining strong emergency shelters, planning for pre-hurricane evacuation, and developing
response and recovery strategies that respond to the needs of survivors.
7.4.1 Critiques of NEMA’s preparedness for Hurricane Dorian
Nearly all the displaced interviewees commented on the hurricane shelters and their
decision not to go to one before the hurricane. Only one interviewee, A17, said that she had planned
to go to the shelter but did not because she could not find transportation to the shelter for her and
her five children. The interviewees' hesitations, observations, and concerns provide insight into
how the government approaches enhancing and developing hurricane shelters to better prepare for
future hurricanes.
Many interviewees were concerned about the physical structures designated as hurricane
shelters. They said that while the shelters may have been built to hurricane standards when they
were erected, interviewees were not confident the structures had been updated in the past several
decades to reflect changes in building codes. In addition, they felt a lack of building maintenance
over time had weakened the structures prior to the storm. Most shelters in Abaco were
compromised during the storm, in some cases collapsing on the people inside and forcing them to
flee to find safety elsewhere. Many people ended up at the government complex, which was not a
designated shelter.
An overarching concern about hurricane shelters was insufficient capacity to accommodate
everyone on the islands who needed shelter. As a result, people who felt that they were secure
enough in their own homes or the homes of friends or family decided not to go to shelters. It was
a common sentiment amongst interviewees that many people needed the shelter that had nowhere
else to go, so interviewees did not feel that they should take the space. One woman also commented
that she would not want to go to a shelter as a single woman. She said she would not feel
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comfortable going to a shelter alone. A15 described her experience seeking shelter during the
storm as follows:
By the time that [the hurricane] started coming in, everybody was trying to leave their
homes to go to the different shelters, churches, and other places. But the main two that
everybody kinda ends up in, were the government complex and then the clinic, the hospital.
So, you had everybody going there. And then they were filled to capacity. You couldn't even
get place to sit on the ground there. So, a lot of people had no choice but to try and go to
friend's house that they felt was stronger and stuff like that. So, people was actually
scrambling all about.
Many interviewees commented on the need for a national hurricane plan, knowing that there
will be more Category 5 storms in the future. Government plans need to consider preparedness
and possible evacuations before a hurricane, but they also need to quickly get supplies to the
affected islands and evacuate survivors. Usually, runways and ports are damaged after a hurricane,
creating challenges in transporting supplies to affected islands. Interviewees felt that these were
consistent problems that could be identified and addressed before a hurricane. A30 felt that there
should have been ships loaded with supplies prepared to travel to the islands in anticipation of the
storm as soon as it was safe. In theory, this is what NEMA is supposed to do. In reality,
interviewees said they had experienced NEMA creating barriers to private donors sending supplies
and planes to evacuate survivors. Based on the number of interviewees who commented on this
red tape, it is likely that NEMA was managing many private flights while also trying to manage
the evacuation of thousands of people from the islands. Knowing there will be frequent flights in
and out after a hurricane, there should be a plan in place to manage transport.
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Interviewees from Abaco were disappointed by the lack of a government plan to carry out
an organized evacuation before the storm, and many interviewees felt there may not have been as
many deaths if this had been done. Interviewees who were warned they should evacuate said that
the information came too late, and that transportation options were limited. Additionally, many
evacuees thought they were preparing for a category 3 hurricane; the speed and timing at which
Dorian became a category 5 affected people's ability to evacuate from the islands.
Some people might have options to travel to other islands outside of the hurricane path
before a storm, but many others did not have the finances to pay for flights and hotels if they were
to evacuate. A7, who lived in Dundas Town with her four children before the hurricane, said she
watched the Prime Minister's warning on the T.V. and could see the fear in his eyes while telling
people to take precautions. However, she was not sure what to do without a plan. She explained:
My thing was, where do you evacuate all these people? You telling somebody to do
something and not having nothing in place with... what options do you have? You can tell
me something, but if I don't have nowhere to go. You know, and I don't have plan A or plan
B. Where do I go?

7.4.2 Critique of NEMA’s response to Hurricane Dorian
NEMA was responsible for coordinating the immediate response. Once the magnitude of
displaced people was realized, NEMA opened shelters in Nassau, but this took time and there were
not enough places available in the short term to accommodate all who needed shelter. To fill the
gap, civil society and NPOs responded, contacting hotels and owners of short-term rentals to
provide housing for evacuees.
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Interviewees who went to shelters after the hurricane said that they did not feel safe being
there and chose to leave when they found alternative options, even when it meant travelling to an
unfamiliar island. A17, who evacuated to Nassau after the storm, said that when she arrived at the
Kendall Isaac Gym Shelter, the largest NEMA shelter opened in NPI, she was told there was no
room for her and her five children. She described her experience:
Um, basically when we went, we went there, it was basically filled already. You know, there
was like no space. And I was like, how [laughs] how could you bring us to the shelter and
now you're saying there's no space? From one disaster to the next. It was like, nothing was
prepared, nothing was organized. It was just like crazy. Nothing was organized. Nothing
was put in place. You know. It was like, from one thing to the next.
Eventually, she was given two beds with help from an officer from the Royal Bahamas
Defence Force. Other interviewees who evacuated to Nassau and stayed at the shelters told stories
of their children being threatened with knives and their fear of their daughters being sexually
assaulted or raped.
Most interviewees agreed that no government could have been fully prepared for the
situation but that the response could have been handled better. Displaced interviewees expressed
their frustration with trying to access government assistance. Many of them said they did not bother
because they were familiar with how the government works. O7 shared what she observed of
people trying to access government assistance:
And I get it because the lines are long. It's a very frustrating process. You get a lot of run
around. So, a lot of the times people just give up on government because it's, it takes and,
and I totally understand that because, you know, I'm also a citizen of the Bahamas. So, you
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know, I get how you know the lines are long and the government takes a while and it's
always come back tomorrow. Come back next week. Figure you out later. And nothing ever
gets done.

7.4.3 Critiques of post-hurricane reconstruction
After Hurricane Dorian, the central government created the Disaster Reconstruction
Authority (DRA) to ‘remove the red tape too often associated with government processes and
should enable the reconstruction process to proceed as efficiently and quickly as possible’
(Thompson, 2019).
A few displaced interviewees commented on their disappointment that funds were used to
create the DRA rather than directly supported affected residents. A1, who worked in local
government in Abaco, felt that rather than creating the DRA to coordinate recovery efforts, NEMA
could have remained in this role and relied more on local government to support efforts on the
ground. He felt the money used to create the DRA would have been used more efficiently if NEMA
had used the local government's knowledge of the community and existing departments:
They [central government] could have used NEMA and local government. Use us as your
people on the ground, that never left or came back. We're the ones along, with the church,
that knew what people needed. Knew who is the most critical or, you know, the people that
needed things the most. We have town planning, we have licensing, we have hotel licensing.
These are all different boards that local government has. What they could've done is
utilized local government and put members of government on these different boards and
used them as functioning boards. But no, they go and pay somebody $150,000 to be the
chairman of the DRA, that doesn't even live in Abaco.
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In 2022, the DRA Board of Directors expressed their disappointment with the
mismanagement of several critical projects by the previous government, which was replaced in the
fall of 2021 (Russell, 2022). The new administration is investigating the use of funds for
reconstruction, specifically contracts that were overbilled and financial mismanagement (Jones Jr.,
2022). They are also exploring how to use 200 domes that were bought for more than $6 million
to provide temporary housing for residents on affected islands after Dorian, many of which were
never used. It has been revealed that the government has been spending nearly $1 million in
charges to store the domes in shipping containers (Cartwright-Carroll, 2022).
Residents of the Dorian-impacted islands are eager to have new shelters built for future
hurricane protection. In June 2021, the government reported nine official hurricane shelters on
Abaco and the surrounding cays (Ministry of Social Serivces and Urban Development, 2021), and
that construction of the shelter in Marsh Harbour had been started.

7.5 Gaps in response filled by civil society after Hurricane Dorian
In general, most of the interviewees attributed the progress of recovery efforts to the
international community and the Bahamian private and non-profit sectors. Most interviewees had
received some form of support from Bahamas-based NPOs. Some displaced interviewees on
Eleuthera commented that the NPOs had done the government's job by supporting evacuees while
they re-established themselves, mainly when accessing housing assistance.
Existing and emerging NPOs addressed the gaps in the government response, focusing
primarily on housing and distributions. Existing and emerging NPOs relied on their individual and
organizational capacities to meet the needs of survivors. Civil society groups such as churches,
service clubs, schools and hotels provided additional support to meet the needs of survivors, such
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as donations, help with rebuilding, scholarships, and housing. This section examines the key areas
of support provided by Bahamas-based NPOs and civil society, including evacuation, housing,
donations, distribution of goods, and home repairs and rebuilding.

7.5.1 Overview of interviewees
Table 3-2 provides a brief overview of the interviewed Bahamas-based NPOs and the
international NGO. The sample provided here is not representative of the number of NGOs, NPOs
or civil society actors within the Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian and instead reflects the NPOs
and actors that were willing to participate in an interview. In some cases, interviewees were
survivors who were also active in the response efforts. This section focuses specifically on
Bahamas-based NPOs identified by interviewees as having played an essential role in filling the
gaps in assistance to displaced households.

7.5.2 Existing NPOs
All existing Bahamas-based disaster response NPOs had been established in response to
past hurricanes. O1 had been created in 2015 in response to the damages of Hurricane Joaquin on
the southern islands of the Bahamas. The founders, three female business owners in Nassau who
had family in one of the most impacted islands, Long Island, watched the hurricane path and began
organizing to accept donations before the hurricane had made landfall. After calling for donations
on radio stations across Nassau, they received an estimated 5 million dollars of donations, most of
which were supplies. Despite not being familiar with hurricane relief, the women organized the
distribution of donations to islands across the southern Bahamas. They relied on their skills as
business owners and the skills of their friends and family, such as pilots, boat captains and the
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generosity of volunteers willing to provide their time. In reflecting on this experience, O1 said that
they had no intention of taking on as significant a role as they did in hurricane relief, but because
at the time there was a gap in hurricane preparedness and a need for private sector involvement,
they became an important actor in Hurricane Joaquin response.
O2, another organization in Nassau, was a community of faith active in disaster management
predominantly as an emergency hurricane shelter over 20 years but who had stepped into a new
role during Hurricane Irma in 2017. Whereas the facility that the organization operated had
previously been used as a hurricane shelter for residents of Nassau, offering a maximum of three
days of safety and security, in preparations for Irma, the organization housed evacuated
communities from five islands for ten days. This shift in responsibility posed new challenges for
the organization as they had not previously sheltered this many people for an extended period. The
organization built relationships with many corporate partners, community organizations, and
government agencies to support the evacuees while also learning how to keep accurate records,
raise funds and manage donations. Over time they began sending donations to the affected islands,
establishing procedures to ensure that goods were received and distributed appropriately upon
arrival.
O3, on Eleuthera, had been primarily involved in disaster relief after hurricanes and
running a hurricane shelter in north Eleuthera to prepare for storms. Like the organization that
acted as a shelter in Nassau, O3 was prepared to house residents who brought their own food and
supplies to last the storm's duration. Their primary role was to provide safety and security to island
residents when activated by the government. In addition, O3 worked in response, recovery and
mitigation, engaging volunteers with community outreach disaster response. This non-profit
outreach ministry was founded in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and has organized
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and facilitated short-term missions throughout the family islands of the Bahamas, Haiti and Turks
and Caicos. The organization faced new challenges as they stepped into a new role in the disaster
management cycle but were able to rely on past experiences to help inform their approach.
O4, on Eleuthera, was not a disaster response organization before Dorian but was an NPO
run by a CEO who had worked in international disaster response. Prior to the hurricane making
landfall, he recognized the impact this storm would have and mobilized a team, under the umbrella
of the existing organization, to prepare for the response on Eleuthera. The team collected nonperishable food items, clothing, shoes, and other household donations. They partnered with
different organizations and individuals across Eleuthera and Spanish Wells to coordinate their
efforts. Most of their hurricane response efforts ended in March of 2020.
In the periods between hurricanes, existing NPOs either turned their attention to assisting
people for other reasons or simply went dormant until the next hurricane made landfall in the
Bahamas. O3 worked primarily in disaster response, acting as a government-activated hurricane
shelter during storms and having the explicit mission statement to help communities repair and
recover after hurricanes. Two NPOs (O2 and O4) were active in addressing sustainable
development priorities and community building.

7.5.3 NPOs that emerged in response to Hurricane Dorian
O5 emerged in response to Hurricane Dorian. The group began organizing evacuations out
of Abaco and the cays days after the storm, sending boats from North Eleuthera to rescue survivors,
registering evacuees, and organizing transportation to shelters, family, or other islands. O5 was
instrumental in the evacuation of survivors and has continued to work in the recovery efforts and
create disaster preparedness workshops for the Family Islands of the Bahamas.
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Recognizing the needs of the survivors in their communities, O6, O7, and O8 emerged to
respond to specific gaps in the response and recovery after Hurricane Dorian. At the time of the
interviews, all of these organizations were working towards receiving their NPO status. O6 was
created by two Americans who taught on Eleuthera for a couple of years before the hurricane.
They had not experienced the hurricane but recognized that the displaced population coming to
Eleuthera needed groceries and household items. O7 emerged in response to housing shortages in
Nassau after the storm. The organization was spearheaded by a realtor in Nassau who recognized
her skills would be best used to find housing for the evacuee population because a) the government
shelters were not ready as evacuees arrived, b) shelters did not have the capacity to house the
number of evacuees arriving in Nassau and c) many evacuees did not want to go to the shelters.
In Abaco, A23, a hurricane survivor who remained in Marsh Harbour after the storm
created O8. She created O8 to accept donations on Abaco and support international NGOs and has
continued to respond to the community's needs. Immediately after the storm, O8 became a central
point for donations and distributions, a contact for international NGOs arriving on the island, a
shelter for survivors who remained on the island and later coordinated an effort to create a school
to encourage people to return to the island. Though A23 did not have previous experience in
disaster management, she did have firsthand experience of previous hurricanes and was motivated
by the negative impacts that prolonging recovery has had on other islands of the Bahamas, like
Ragged Island.
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7.5.4 Gaps addressed by Bahamas-based NPOs
Evacuation
Many interviewees evacuated through private groups and family and friends who sent boats
and private planes. One Bahamas-based NPO, O5, took a leading role in evacuating survivors from
Abaco and the surrounding cays, relying on their relationships to support their efforts. O5 recruited
boat captains and fishermen to volunteer to evacuate survivors off of Abaco and the cays to North
Eleuthera. With their team of volunteers, they evacuated 600 people in three days. As boaters and
fishermen, the founders of O5 had strong existing relationships with other boat captains whom
they could mobilize quickly. In addition, their friends on Harbour Island and North Eleuthera
opened their homes, hotels, and kitchens to ensure those boat captains were fed and housed
between their rescue missions.
NEMA provided free evacuation flights to Abaco and Grand Bahama residents travelling
to Nassau (Russell, 2019). There was, however, some confusion about how to access the free
flights, and some of the interviewees had bought flights, not realizing that there were free flights
available. Interviewees shared that the evacuation process in Abaco was disorganized and
confusing. When interviewees arrived at airports and docks, they had to sit in the sun for hours
with no food or water until they could procure a spot for evacuation. A7 described her evacuation
experience for her and her children at the Treasure Cay airport.
She said, the plane is coming in an hour, right? So, basically, they put us in the middle of
the sun. You did not want to move 'cause you did not want to miss your spot 'cause you just
wanted to get out. So, me and my kids literally burnt in the sun. We baked in the sun. We
were dehydrated in the sun. For 5 hours. When we fin--, when we finally got in the flight.
I mean when we, listen like everybody was just trying to jump line, skip line, you know how
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that go. There was no organization 'cause people just was. They just, we wanted to leave
to, you know, that's what they cried, everybody had the same cry. We need to leave.

Shelters
The number of people displaced by Hurricane Dorian was unprecedented in the Bahamas.
As discussed above, there was limited capacity to house displaced households when they arrived
in Nassau. The largest shelter was the Kendal Isaac Gym in Nassau which housed over 1000
evacuees after the storm, more than its intended capacity. There were few government shelters on
the Family Islands, despite the need for shelters in Abaco and on Eleuthera. As an immediate
response to the limited capacity of shelters, NPOs collaborated with hotels and homeowners to
provide short-term housing solutions for survivors and later transitioned to providing rental
assistance to households for up to three months.
In Abaco, O8 received permission from a local church to use the space to shelter survivors
who remained on the island. She explained how the shelter expanded to meet the needs of the
people who remained:
And then I got permission from the church to use that as a shelter. We ended up with like
80 odd people in the church as a shelter. I turned all of the Sunday school classrooms-And by then Samaritans Purse was getting me like cots and that type of stuff-- and we ran
outta room there. Shift pods, the silver dome looking ones, they found me by then, so then
they gave me 10 of those for more overflow. We were cooking for everybody by bringing
the different supplies together. My second owners by then, had started getting down times
of half an hour at the Marsh Harbour airport and they were bringing in a lot of supplies
for gardeners, maids, coworkers. And everybody had left. So, then we’re like, is it OK to
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use the supplies for whoever has stayed that we can find, even if you don't know the people?
And everybody was like cool with it. So, because now we had a neighborhood and a lot of
people finding us. We, um, started having to cook for everybody. Like having an extended
family.
As an emergency shelter and disaster relief organization, O3 had experience housing
people in anticipation of a hurricane, relying on households to bring their own supplies for the
storm's duration. A week after Dorian, they transitioned to become an evacuation shelter for
displaced survivors. Their existing space provided lodging for evacuees, but they worked with
other organizations to feed residents and supply them with necessities such as hygiene items and
clothing. O3 said they housed 76 individuals over two months, some of whom stayed longer than
others, though the organization's goal was to provide a place to 'catch yourself5' and support
evacuees in moving into their own homes.
The shelters hosted by O4 became more populated as the shelters in Nassau began closing.
Interviewees who came to Eleuthera with help from O4 found out about the opportunity while
staying in short-term accommodation and shelters in Nassau. Initially, O4 rented rooms at local
hotels to house the evacuees and later rented a vacant hotel with apartments to house families.
Organizations that provided shelter reported that they did not necessarily document
people's nationality when providing services, though O8 said that most of the survivors she housed
in Abaco were of Haitian descent. She estimated 90% of the shelter population spoke Creole.
Churches had an essential role in providing shelter to evacuees of Haitian descent who were
hesitant to go to government shelters. One Haitian pastor on Eleuthera shared that his church
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‘Catch yourself’ is a common phrase in the Bahamas meaning recover.
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housed evacuees of Haitian descent though many had returned to Abaco shortly after evacuation.
Two shelter residents at O3 had been deported to Haiti in the months after the storm.

Housing
Civil society organizations and NPOs collaborated with hotels and homeowners to find
temporary accommodations for evacuees while government shelters were being organized. The
Core group documented arrivals at Odyssey Aviation and organized housing options for evacuees
in Nassau. O7 was part of the Core group and described the process at Odyssey:
Obviously, we documented everybody that had come in on the emergency evacuation
flights in the hanger. And then they were asked the question, do you need shelter? And if
the answer was yes, then you got a band that was, I think yellow. And if the answer was
no, then you got a different colour band. And then what happened was they moved from
the hanger, at Odyssey, to a different tent, the housing and transportation tent.
As temporary housing expired, NPOs providing housing to the displaced population relied
on their existing relationships with homeowners to find longer-term housing options. For example,
on Eleuthera, volunteers working with O4 used personal contacts to find long-term housing for
displaced households. In some cases, O4 helped landlords finish repairs on homes in exchange for
discounted rental rates.
In Nassau, O7 used their existing connections to hotels and relationships with second
homeowners to find immediate housing for displaced individuals and households. O7 commented
that the smallness and connectedness of the population in Nassau contributed to the organization’s
success in finding housing. As a realtor, O7 also had experience with rental agreements and knew
how to incentivize hesitant homeowners, such as providing upfront payment. Organizations like
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O4, who were less familiar with rental agreements, had challenges in ensuring that both tenant and
landlord were satisfied with the agreements. In some cases, tenants left properties without paying
rent, a challenge that O4 will integrate into their future hurricane response supports.
Both O7 and O4 provided rental assistance to displaced households in addition to helping
them find housing. In most cases, the organizations provided a minimum of two months of rental
assistance and in some cases provided more. O4 provided funds to displaced households residing
in two different islands where rental costs were significantly different; on one island, the rent was
sometimes double the cost as on the other. Upon reflection, O4 questioned the fairness of providing
rental assistance by the month when there was a significant discrepancy in costs.
The government did provide rental assistance to displace households, however, access to
assistance was conditional on having employment. O7 commented on the challenge this posed to
evacuees:
And one of the biggest challenges we had was, you know, social services, they were only
giving rental assistance to those persons that had employment. So, I thought that that was
totally backwards. Because here you have it. These people lost their homes, their jobs.
They are here in Nassau with no clue as to where life is going to take them now. And the
government is requiring that they have a job before they can even apply for rental
assistance.
NPOs were challenged by the legality of housing undocumented Haitians in the Bahamas.
Abaco had a large population of Bahamians of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants before the
hurricane. Organizations providing housing assistance commented on the legal implications of
finding housing for Haitians with irregular immigration status. O7 shared:
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When, when it got time to move on from the hotels and into long term housing. It is illegal
to house, you know, somebody that doesn't have their paperwork. So, the landlords could
get into a lot of trouble if they took on somebody that was Haitian that doesn't have a work
permit or passport of some sort. Just legal, you know, a legal reason to be in the country.
In cases organizations could not find housing for evacuees, they suggested that displaced
individuals go to the Department of Social Services to seek assistance. Additionally, once
displaced households became established with employment, and could access government rental
assistance, they transitioned to social services for support.

Distribution
The majority of the interviewed NPOs and civil society organizations were engaged in
fundraising, donations, and distributions after the hurricane. When the magnitude of the storm was
realized, these groups began fundraising and collecting essential supplies to distribute to evacuees
as they arrived in Nassau and Eleuthera and to ship to the hurricane-affected islands.
NEMA organized a Hurricane Dorian Relief Fund to manage donations to survivors and
opened distribution centres on the affected islands a month after the storm. NEMA distribution
centres were located across the island (Figure 7-1), though they were predominantly located in the
north, where there had been less damage. O8 shared that people who came to her distribution
centre said they had tried to go to the government distribution centre and were poorly treated, for
example not being provided items that they could see were available.
When supplies did arrive on Abaco, there were challenges to distributing goods. First,
interviewees said that although NEMA sent the supplies, they did not send support to unload or
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distribute the goods. For example, at one
point, A1, said that there were 36 trailers
of supplies delivered to Abaco and only
four people on the ground to unload
them. When the food was finally
unloaded, most had to be thrown out
because of weevils. Additionally, O8
commented

that

donations

were

delivered to Cooperstown, in the north
of Abaco, which required driving hours
on hurricane-damaged roads to pick-up
supplies.
Despite

the

government

Figure 7-1 Map of Abaco reflecting the approximate locations of
government distribution centres (November 2019)

organizing a platform to accept donations for hurricane relief, many Bahamians urged people to
direct their donations towards the GoFundMe started by O1. They raised over $800,000 in the first
24 hours after the hurricane. Having experience in disaster response and recovery was an asset to
organizations because they had a pre-existing reputation as trustworthy to manage donations. In
addition, they had internal infrastructure organized, such as accounting systems, record keeping
and NPO status, which allowed them to focus on the response rather than the logistics of
establishing an NPO.
Organizations that distributed donations commented on the lack of trust in sending
donations to the Family Islands. Because they did not trust island administrators to distribute
supplies fairly, O2 sent a member of their organization on the flight with the supplies or had a
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trusted ‘team captain’ on the ground to receive the donations. This fear was not unfounded; O8
shared that she had arrived at the airport several times to find that her supplies had been 'hijacked.'
She explained:
And I'd find out that they dropped the stuff off. And I'd go back down there and find like
my name written all over, you know, packing material and stuff and nothing there. That
happened dozens of times. And it also happened with my money several times. Stuff I
specifically ordered on Amazon, that was specific needs for the shelter to operate better
and for us to function better. And then homeowners give the stuff rides in. And then it'd be
stolen.
Interviewees, both evacuees and response organizations, commented on the government
closure of ports in the three weeks after the storm. For example, O2 used a personal contact with
a politician to get entry for a medical ship carrying essential supplies after the ship had been denied
entry to the port.
Not only did the government close essential ports, but interviewees also talked about the
'red tape' that the government created to receiving private donations from overseas. At one point,
second homeowners tried to come from the U.S. by boat to deliver essential supplies to O8. The
government diverted the boats, sending them to Nassau, where they had to wait a week until they
were cleared to bring supplies. After this incident, O8 split up the GPS coordinates of delivery
locations, sending one half to the boat captain and the other to someone else on the boat in order
to ensure the government would not 'hijack' the supplies.
Both existing and emerging organizations relied heavily on their existing relationships to
support their efforts. Organizations such as O1 and O2 had previously established relationships
with major corporate sponsors, key personnel with specific skills to support their efforts and
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international non-profits. On Abaco, O8 received 90% of the financial help and donations from
tourism clients, many of whom were second homeowners or rental guests. Donors and sponsors
were comfortable sending supplies because they trusted the character and knowledge of the
organizations.
For O6, the most important relationships to support evacuees were existing relationships
with friends and family at home who were willing to donate funds to support their organization.
O6 ran a successful social media campaign to raise money and supported several families on
Eleuthera with groceries, school supplies and household items. In addition, through their networks
on Eleuthera, they connected with the O4, with whom they ran events and coordinated relief for
evacuees. For O8, communication with organizations and groups outside of Abaco was essential
to maintaining donations and external support. She explained her day-to-day activities:
And then… I fall asleep some nights on the, on the phone with just random, calling
megachurches and stuff like that. Talking with people and trying to like plead our cause.
You're trying to distribute what you do have during the day, and then like figure out where
the next stuff is coming from at night.
Having access to a large amount of physical space to store donations was a primary concern
for organizations doing distribution. Response organizations in Nassau with experience in
distributions were familiar with the amount of space they would need to operate based on previous
experiences. O1 knew right away they would need a larger space than after Joaquin because of the
extent of the damages of Dorian. Initially, O1 coordinated with O2 to support their distribution
efforts within their facility, but later moved to abandoned grocery store to run its operations. O1
was also provided with a residential property in Abaco where they set up military tents to run their
distribution and response coordination. Despite having other spaces, the interviewee from O1 said
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a lot of her work was from her dining room, which became known to her family and friends as the
‘war room.’
After Dorian, O2 used their auditorium as a warehouse for inventory, trying to move donated
supplies quickly to maintain enough space for incoming donations. In addition to receiving
donations, O2 recognized a need for a hub where all the response organizations could be
centralized to strengthen communication and coordination in the response. The interviewee from
O2 said he was designing a larger facility, including a 10,000 square foot warehouse, office and
sleeping quarters for NGOs, a commercial kitchen and living quarters with locker rooms and large
bathrooms if the space is needed for a shelter.
On Eleuthera, O4 moved their distribution centre partway through the response to the fire
station because it offered enough space to hold the donations and pallets of supplies being
delivered. On Spanish Wells, the distribution centre closed because the space was needed for
another reason. O6 did not have space to store many donations; however, because donations were
financial, they would buy groceries and supplies and then immediately deliver them to the
families.
In Abaco, finding space to store and distribute donations was challenging. O8 began doing
distributions from her brother's backyard for two weeks before she got permission from the church
to use their space.
Bahamas-based NPOs tended to coordinate with one another, and civil society
organizations based on their location. For example, O1 and O5 initially were working out of the
O2 facility in Nassau and on Eleuthera, O3, O4 and O6 coordinated at different times to support
evacuees with food donations and social events. NPOs engaged more often with civil society and
the private sector to provide relief to Hurricane Dorian survivors than with government. For
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example, churches would collect donations from their congregation and give them to the NPOs to
distribute or groups from clubs like Rotary or private businesses would volunteer to package
donations for distributions. Generally, interviewees from NPOs felt they would have been more
effective if the government had not been involved in the response.

Rebuilding and recovery
Hurricane Dorian prompted the government to create the DRA to coordinate the
organizations and actors involved in post-hurricane construction. Interviewees said that the
recovery process had been slow, which was compounded by the pandemic and a national election
that resulted in new appointments to key leadership positions in the DRA. As discussed above,
many of the interviewees, survivors and disaster response organizations are critical of the DRA
and its outcomes to date.
None of the interviewees from Bahamas-based NPOs were active in rebuilding. One of the
NPOs, O5, had been active in debris removal and continued to do marine debris removal along the
coasts of Abaco and the cays. Most of the rebuilding and recovery work was directed by local
government, civil society groups, such as Rotary International and churches, and international
NGOs.

7.6 Opportunities to build national adaptive capacity
Displaced individuals and representatives from disaster response organizations described
ways to strengthen disaster management capacities in the Bahamas. This section highlights how
organizations have adapted to better support the displaced population and suggests opportunities
to invest in building island and organizational capacity to enhance national disaster management.
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7.6.1 Build and strengthen emergency shelters
The need to assess existing shelters and replace them with more secure shelters was
apparent after Hurricane Dorian. Interviewees reflected on the need to build capacity that reflected
the needs and differences of the Family Islands. For example, the populations of some Family
Islands are small enough that evacuation before a hurricane is realistic, where in islands with larger
populations the challenges of evacuating everyone are significant. In islands where evacuation is
not realistic, secure shelters are necessary.
Interviewees made suggestions for building new shelters. One interviewee from Elbow
Cay identified the political challenges in funding shelters and suggested that the buildings be multiuse, for use outside of the hurricane season. A14, a carpenter by trade, had physical building
suggestions for constructing shelters:
They could find the best land possible where there's no water gonna get there. You know,
they need to build nice solid structures. And I think round, round shelters would do well.
As the breeze would slide around it instead of square, flat, wall the debris would just press
against. They build lighthouses in the most tremendous parts of the ocean. They take the
pressure from the ocean and they are round. The water just slap and just wrap around it
and just keep going. That's why I say round.
To address some of the social issues that influence the use of hurricane shelters, one
interviewee suggested that there should be different hurricane shelters for different groups of
people. There is a strong feeling of xenophobia towards Haitians in the Bahamas (Baussan et al.,
2021; Fielding et al., 2008; Perry, 2014, 2017) and shelters are generally stigmatized as a place
where there are many Haitians. The xenophobia towards Haitians in the Bahamas prompts people
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to find alternatives to going to the shelters. A18 stated explicitly what many others were hesitant
to say when discussing their reasons for not going to a hurricane shelter. She explained:
And part of the reason is we don't want to go and you--I mean people say this out loud-we're not going to go to a shelter with 300 Haitians. And that's the problem right there.
And like would they go into segregated shelters? And they probably would. But then, also,
you know, how segregated would they want it to be? You know, OK, now it's Bahamians
separated from Haitians. What's going to stop, OK, now we were going to have the white
shelter, the black shelter, and the Haitian shelter?
There is a clear need for shelters that people feel can provide them protection and safety,
the design of which must take into account the social challenges of integrating different groups of
people.

7.6.2 Create a protocol for mandatory evacuation
Though none of the displaced interviewees decided to evacuate in response to Hurricane
Dorian. Most interviewees said that they would evacuate in the event of another Category 5 storm
and advised that everyone in the path of a Category 4 hurricane or higher should heed evacuation
warnings. However, most felt that there needed to be a proper plan in place in order to evacuate.
O7 commented on the need for a better evacuation plan and suggested how they could do this:
You know, maybe partnering with some of the hotels in Nassau and some of the other
islands. And just saying like, OK, well this is the path of the storm. These are the islands
that are most vulnerable. The evacuation plan for these islands that are the most vulnerable
are to evacuate to Bimini or wherever, you know. So, I think that we need to start thinking
along those lines as well and prepping ahead of the storm.
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Interviewees also speculated that the government would require mandatory evacuations in
the future, though there were mixed feelings about whether mandatory evacuation was an
appropriate disaster management strategy. Interviewees who spoke about mandatory evacuations
doubted that the government had the capacity to evacuate islands and house evacuees before and
after a hurricane and felt that this, not the hesitation of people to evacuate, would be the biggest
hurdle to evacuation. They also felt the uncertainty of the hurricane path could make people more
vulnerable to the impacts if there is a change in the trajectory.
Rather than depend on government, many displaced interviewees said that they were taking
steps for future hurricane household evacuation by putting money aside and making sure their
documents were in order. They did not feel that the government could create plans to evacuate the
islands and were taking actions to ensure that they would not be left to experience another Category
5 storm again in their lifetime.

7.6.3 Formalize and prioritize the role of NPOs in disaster response
Hurricane Dorian highlighted the critical role of NPOs in supporting evacuees and
households experiencing displacement. Currently, the role of NPOs in disaster response is ad hoc
and responsive to the immediate needs of hurricane survivors. Formalizing the role of NPOs in
disaster response can strengthen NPOs to relieve NEMA of certain responsibilities where their
capacity has shown to be weak.
Organizations relied on their strong leadership skills and sense of selflessness in their
response efforts. Interviewees who distributed donations discussed the personal resources to
mobilize and sustain their relief efforts. They reflected on the amount of time they committed to
their efforts, commenting that they rarely slept in the month after the storm and often did not eat
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well. Additionally, individuals who started NPOs in response to Hurricane Dorian, such as O6 and
O8, relied on their personal funds and vehicles to retrieve and distribute donations. O8 used the
savings she had planned to use to pursue a college education to finance the costs of distribution
that were overlooked in the donations, such as transportation, packaging, and labour.
NPOs need to be recognized and reimbursed for the work that they are doing to address the
gaps in the government response. Additionally, expanding national training in disaster response
logistics would provide a network of experts to support these organizations in the face of crisis
and reduce the burden on individual leaders.
Bahamas-based NPOs, particularly NPOs local to the affected community, should be
prioritized in the event of a hurricane as they provide critical local knowledge which can reduce
inefficiencies in response efforts. Relying on local organizations can also create less stress on the
remaining infrastructure and support the return of evacuees. For example, while international
NGOs provided significant support, they also occupied local housing resources. Both O3 and O8
attributed housing shortages in Abaco to international NGOs. O8 explained:
Housing is the number one issue at the moment, yes. And the couple people that came back
to get housing going. It seems like were getting it going to get the highest bidders, which
are the NGO's and not thinking about getting people back.
In response, O8 rented her home to returning evacuees who needed somewhere to stay
while they got themselves organized with more permanent accommodation.

7.6.4 Create a central hub of information
Although there should be a more prominent role for local leadership in disaster
management, there is an essential role for government. For example, O9, the only international
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NGO interviewed, said that it would have been helpful if the government had provided a central
information hub so that they could refer people to organizations providing specific types of
assistance. She said that when people came to them for medical care, they often asked for support
in other areas such as food or helping loved ones return from overseas. As an international NGO,
she was unfamiliar with the assistance landscape which limited her ability to assist people in need.
As part of a central hub for response organizations, disaster case managers could be introduced to
advocate for and support hurricane survivors by referring them to the assistance they are eligible
to receive.
In addition, the Bahamas disaster response would be more robust if the local NPOs directed
international response agencies. O3 said that while international groups have an important role in
disaster response, they do not respond to smaller storms or events. After smaller events, the
responsibility to respond is on local groups, some not disaster-focused, who come together to
provide relief. She emphasized the need to strengthen national capacity to respond to all
magnitudes of hurricanes.
Though the government needs to have a national plan for hurricane risk management, the
private sector and Bahamas-based NPOs need to be part of the development of these plans.
Bahamas Strong has become a formal organization to position itself as the liaison between the
government, private sector and NPOs or NGOs to ensure more effective disaster management to
future hurricanes.

7.6.5 Encourage coordination amongst actors
Coordination amongst agencies and actors in hurricane response can limit redundancies
and streamline the process for survivors. The local government coordinated with international
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NGOs to initiate the recovery efforts in the affected islands. For example, an interviewee who was
active in local government on Abaco teamed up with an international NGO to start debris removal
and house repairs. He explained that the local government had existing funds for capital projects
that they could use to ship supplies such as plywood and nails from Nassau. The local government
used existing capital funds to procure building supplies and identify houses that had not received
structural damage and needed minimal repairs. They then coordinated with international NGOs to
repair these homes.
However, international NGOs were without direction in the immediate aftermath because
the local government officials had evacuated after the storm. Because of her knowledge of the
island, O8 became a point of contact for international NGOs, providing them with details about
where to direct their search and rescue efforts. She recounted her conversation with an international
NGO:
You know, what are you here doing? We're looking for bodies? OK, well, we got no water
in this neighborhood that would have brought in any bodies. 'Cause the three cays out from
us, nobody died. You need to be looking on the other side of the island. That's what I mean
about local knowledge.
There were also instances where international NGOs were not familiar with the local
building codes and expectations. For example, O5 shared that after one international NGO repaired
hundreds of roofs, it was found that the type of metal they used was the wrong gauge and therefore
could not be insured. This mistake may have been avoided if there had been better coordination
between NGOs and local leaders.
International NGOs and local NPOs coordinated with one another during the recovery. For
example, while one NGO might repair roofs, another would then come and work on the interiors
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of the homes. In another example, an international NGO, World Central Kitchen, was preparing
food for survivors in Abaco and the cays, which a local NPO, O5, transported by boat to the
communities. Although NGOs did coordinate with one another, there were gaps in knowing what
other organizations were doing and whom to contact for different services, as discussed above.
Some NPOs identified the benefits of coordinating with government agencies. O3 said they
often worked closely with the Department of Social Services after hurricanes to identify people
needing home repairs. They commented on how supportive and helpful the Department of Social
Services on Eleuthera were after Dorian. O2 kept an open-door policy with the government,
allowing them to call on the organization when they needed a facility to support disaster
response. Additionally, O9 said they had a good experience working with the Ministry of Health.
In response to the hurricane, O5 had begun disaster risk reduction training on the southern islands
of the Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian. They coordinated with NEMA, who contacted the local
administrators on the Family Islands to identify residents to attend the workshops. Although
NEMA does not contribute to the program itself, their contact with government officials on the
Family Islands legitimizes the program.

7.6.6 Develop a mechanism for recovery financing
The needs of Hurricane Dorian survivors, particularly rental assistance, extended beyond
the timeframe that Bahamas-based NPOs received donations. The more established organizations
whose mandate was to work in disaster relief were able to provide support for a longer period than
newer organizations who ended their programs when they no longer received Dorian-directed
donations or their board members decided to return to their original priorities.
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The pandemic significantly impacted the donated funds available to support survivors.
However, before the pandemic, NPOs had seen a decrease in the number of donations they were
receiving from overseas. The interviewees from O6, who used social media for fundraising to buy
groceries for displaced households on Eleuthera, explained what they saw happen:
Initially everyone was taking interest in it, everyone wanted to repost and show that they
care. 'Cause ultimately everyone loves a disaster when it happens. They eat that up. But
then it dies down when other disasters happen.
The hurricane highlighted the importance of having accessible funds to support people
impacted by the hurricane, especially during displacement. Two displaced interviewees
commented on the need to have funds to finance disaster management and suggested ways to raise
money. A17, who had relocated to Eleuthera for over a year, but moved back to Abaco during the
pandemic, suggested that there needed to be a task force in place, regardless of the political party
in power, that receives a portion of the value-added tax (VAT) to pay for hurricane preparedness.
A30, who had worked in tourism, suggested that every tourist who enters the Bahamas be charged
$1, to be directed towards a disaster preparedness fund. He added that the challenge would be to
keep the funds away from corrupt politicians.

7.6.7 Decentralize disaster response
There is a need to incorporate and develop local capacities to be part of the disaster
management cycle. Interviewees expressed disappointment in the way the government had used
funds, referring to the construction of the domes rather than using funds to repair people's homes.
Interviewees suggested that more people could have returned home if houses had been repaired
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quickly after the hurricane. A23, who remained in Marsh Harbour, observed that houses that had
needed minor repairs after the storm were no longer salvageable because they had been exposed
to the elements for too long. Many people felt that recovery could have been faster if the
government had listened to the needs of the people. Displaced interviewees felt that local leaders
and churches were the best people to involve in response because they knew the needs of the
community.
Many of the Bahamas-based NPOs had created protocols to distribute donated goods across
the affected islands by utilizing local leaders and contacts. As mentioned, O1 sent a team member
or relied on a trusted local to receive supplies. O2 recruited island-local agencies to distribute
supplies and assistance. They said they picked agencies instead of individuals to distribute relief
that had influence and credibility. O2 explained:
And so, we're going to go through those agencies, just to make sure that money doesn't go
missing and that we're going to let them use their discretion to say, well, these are the
families, we'd like to offer like, like for instance you know who might have the greatest
need. Is it people with elderly people or disabled, you know, disabled people in the
household, like if you were to come up with lists, what might that look like? And we've been
working with him for so many years. It's just been a beautiful relationship.
Organizations that worked in distribution discussed building bunkers on each of the
inhabited islands of the Bahamas that would house essential supplies for the immediate aftermath
of the hurricane. After Hurricane Dorian, O5 had stockpiled food and water supplies to
accommodate double the population of each shelter on Abaco and the cays for a week. O1, who
advocated for bunkers on each Family Island, said that in addition to the supplies, like water and
fuel totes, there should be a protocol for local leaders to follow in preparation for hurricanes.
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After Dorian, O5 started doing disaster risk reduction and first aid training on the southern
islands of the Bahamas, including leaving a waterproof First Aid Kit with a community leader.
They were putting together a safety kit for each island, including a Satellite Phone, a VHF radio,
personal first aid kits, and a tool to cut electrical lines. They will next deliver a chainsaw course
and provide chainsaw and maintenance kits to remain on the island for hurricane response.
Some interviewees suggested that NEMA’s response to hurricanes could incorporate
elements of the government’s Covid-19 RAPID program. The RAPID program was a coordinated
effort between NEMA and Family Island organizations and community leaders to provide food
assistance to households impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns. Local organizations
were given the flexibility to provide vouchers or food items to community members registered
with the program. NEMA would provide half of the funds to support the program, and the local
organization was responsible for matching the support. Approximately half of the displaced
interviewees accessed support from the RAPID program, more than the number who received
assistance after the hurricane. The response was organized and transparent, key characteristics that
interviewees said they would like to see replicated in future hurricane responses.

7.7 Summary of key findings
This chapter has focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the Hurricane Dorian response
to inform how national adaptive capacity in the Bahamas can be strengthened to mitigate
household hurricane vulnerability. Government has a critical responsibility to support disaster risk
management across the Bahamas though there are opportunities to strengthen local capacities. The
chapter highlights that although the central government has a vital role in developing protective
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measures, disaster response and recovery might be better executed through collaboration between
private sector, Bahamas-based NPOs and civil society at the island level.
Though a formal process for disaster management is outlined by NEMA, the realities of
disaster response in the Bahamas rely heavily on private-sector guidance and Bahamas-based
NPOs to meet the immediate needs of hurricane survivors. Coordination across local government,
Bahamas-based NPOs, international NGOs, and civil society exists; understanding how each of
these actors can support one another can help clarify who is responsible for different aspects of
response and recovery. The relationships that emerged during Hurricane Dorian suggest that there
is a need to formally decentralize the disaster management cycle to ensure resources and supports
are being allocated appropriately to mitigate island vulnerability to hurricanes based on island
needs.
Bahamas-based NPOs exhibited characteristics and domains of adaptive capacity
introduced by Cinner et al. (2018; Table 2-3) and the LAC framework (Table 2-2). These
organizations displayed flexibility to respond to the needs of the displaced population (Cinner et
al., 2018; Jones et al., 2010b) indicating a higher capacity to adapt than government agencies. In
the absence of national displacement policies, supporting NPOs who have the knowledge and
resources to find housing, procure basic needs and assist evacuees in re-establishing themselves in
an unfamiliar place should be a priority. Planning for extended displacement after hurricanes will
be an important component of disaster management practices and climate change adaptation
planning and can utilize the experiences of Bahamas-based NPOs after Hurricane Dorian to inform
necessary support mechanisms.
Organizations who were existing prior to Hurricane Dorian relied on what they had learned
from past experiences to inform how they would respond to the hurricane. Learning from their
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past experiences provided them with knowledge and information to support response activities.
Their past experience, combined with access to assets, contributed to their ability to organize and
exhibit agency in the response efforts.
More poignant, however, were the lessons that existing and emerging organizations felt
they had learned through their response to Dorian, particularly for NPOs that were supporting
displaced households in finding housing. These organizations were innovative and flexible during
their response efforts and had identified ways to streamline their processes to provide support for
the displaced population to future events.
The collective action of the private sector, Bahamas-based NPOs and other civil society
organizations to respond to Hurricane Dorian illustrated the ability to organize. The response to
Hurricane Dorian relied heavily on informal relationships, within the Bahamas and internationally,
to fund and support displaced households. Hurricane Dorian highlighted that the ability of civil
society to organize and act collectively is a significant contribution to adaptive capacity in the
Bahamas. The strength of this domain indicates the importance of supporting and encouraging the
inclusion of private sector, Bahamas-based NPOs and civil society into disaster risk management
and planning.
Hurricane Dorian highlighted the limitations that different actors experience during
hurricane response efforts. Some of these limitations, such as lack of secure shelters and theft of
relief supplies at airports appear to have straightforward measures to address the challenges. For
example, these can be fixed by building new shelters and ensuring more police presence at airports
during response. In the Bahamas, larger issues of corruption threaten these measures and
contributes to a continued lack of trust in government. Interviewees suspicions of Family Island
administrators and their hesitancy to coordinate with central government representatives on the
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islands illustrates this distrust. In order to regain this trust, a higher level of transparency of how
funds are used after a hurricane will be a necessary first step.
It is evident that in response to Hurricane Dorian disaster relief actors, government, NPOs
and civil society, adapted to meet the needs of survivors. The projected changing characteristics
of hurricanes in the Caribbean require that disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation
planning consider the magnitude of anticipated impacts in their planning to ensure that relief
efforts are organized, coordinated and responsive to the needs of survivors.
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8. Discussion & Conclusions
My dissertation examined the relationship between human mobility and the capacity of
evacuee households in the Bahamas to adapt to the impacts of hurricane displacement. The
findings from my research were introduced in chapters 5, 6 and 7 to respond to each of my three
key research questions. This chapter integrates these findings to discuss how my research
contributes to broader scholarship on household adaptive capacity and mobility in the context of
hurricanes in islands.
Climate change research suggests that at the current global rate of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, small islands will experience significant environmental change and more intense, and
more frequent hazards (IPCC, 2021a; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022; Robinson, 2020). Caribbean islands
have especially high exposure to the impacts of climate change, particularly sea level rise,
increased intensity of hurricanes, and drought because of their geographical location and physical
characteristics (IPCC, 2021a; Mycoo, 2018; Thomas et al., 2020). As a consequence, it is
necessary to explore how Caribbean islands can adapt and strengthen their capacity to cope with
and adapt to sudden-onset hazards at the national, local, and household scales.
My research examined household adaptive capacity as a component of vulnerability and
disaster risk. I examined the resources that households used to prepare for and cope with the
impacts of Hurricane Dorian, displacement and the factors that influenced their decision-making.
I documented the adaptations interviewees made after previous hurricanes and/or in preparation
for Hurricane Dorian to reduce their households' exposure; interviewees generally believed
exposure to hurricanes was part of the reality of living in the Bahamas. After Hurricane Dorian,
the people I interviewed chose between (1) relocating to places they felt were less exposed, either
in the Bahamas or internationally or (2) returning to their home communities to either rebuild their
homes or find rental accommodations, knowing that they may have to evacuate in the event of a
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future hurricane. This chapter discusses the relationship between household adaptive capacity and
mobility decision-making during displacement in the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian and highlights
opportunities to integrate planning for displacement into future climate change adaptation and
disaster risk management in Caribbean islands.

8.1 Conceptualizing adaptive capacity and mobility decision-making
Based on the research findings in the preceding chapters, I have developed a simple model
to illustrate the relationship between pre-and post-hurricane household adaptive capacity and the
impacts of mobility decision-making on adaptive capacity in Hurricane Dorian displaced
households (Figure 8-1). My suggestion is that this model can be used in a more general sense to
explain the factors that influence household adaptive capacity and migration responses in the
context of hurricanes, to identify gaps in post-disaster institutional support, and to contribute
toward future planning for disaster risk reduction and management. The model draws upon
previous research on vulnerability assessment by Ford and Smit (2004) and Smit and Wandel
(2006). My research indicated that using an assets-based approach combined with an examination
of mobilizing factors was useful in assessing adaptive capacity and mobility response at different
points in time. Interviewees identified the assets that they relied upon during displacement and
discussed how they changed over time, as well as discussing how they had used and would use
these resources to prepare for and respond to future hurricanes. The model is reflective of the
responses and themes that emerged from my research.
Starting at the top of Figure 8-1, pre-hurricane household adaptive capacity includes an
assessment of the household assets available before a hurricane and the mobilizing factors that
influence household decision-making. In the aftermath of a hurricane, post-hurricane household
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adaptive capacity is examined to determine how assets and factors influencing decision-making
have changed as a result of household mobility outcomes and experience of the event. Identifying
the assets available to households and factors influencing decision-making before and after a
hurricane requires engagement with individuals and households displaced by hurricanes, as well

Figure 8-1 Conceptual model for household adaptive capacity and mobility decision-making in the context of
hurricanes.
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as insights from disaster response organizations, using tools such as semi-structured interviews
and focus groups. Opportunities to support household adaptations and build capacity are sought to
strengthen household adaptive capacity to future hurricanes. The aim is to attain information on
the nature of mobility decision-making, as an adaptation to hurricanes, to identify ways to
strengthen or sustain household adaptive capacity in Caribbean islands highly exposed to
hurricanes.
8.1.1 Pre-hurricane household adaptive capacity
Examining pre-hurricane household adaptive capacity required identifying the resources
mobilized by displaced interviewees before and after Hurricane Dorian. Prior to Hurricane Dorian
interviewees had generally felt comfortable in their ability to prepare and respond to hurricanes.
Interviewees highlighted ways that they had invested in their homes to be more hurricane resilient.
For many, the cost of insurance had been too high to consider having their homes insured. Instead,
they used their money to invest in their own or their children’s education or to establish businesses.
Not having an existing insurance policy limited households’ capacity to rebuild homes after the
hurricane.
In addition to paying for adaptations before the hurricane, access to finances after the
hurricane provided interviewees with the capacity to travel to stay with family and friends
internationally temporarily and to begin rebuilding their homes quickly after the storm. The many
interviewees who stayed with family and friends immediately after the hurricane and who were
able to access donations and supports through existing relationships to rebuild their homes or
recover during displacement illustrated the importance of social capital.
Additionally, pre-Dorian human capital and political capital contributed to household
capacity to cope and adapt after the hurricane. Interviewees who had desired skillsets were offered
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employment opportunities after the hurricane, illustrating the importance of human capital to
adaptive capacity. Although having dual citizenship did not always result in the migration of
displaced households internationally, the challenges faced by lack of legal status and visa
restrictions highlighted the importance of political capital during displacement. For example,
Bahamian interviewees who travelled to the U.S. or Canada were careful not to overstay visas and
to follow legal immigration procedures. More prescient was how the limited political capital of
irregular migrants in the Bahamas limited the capacity of households to cope and adapt after
Hurricane Dorian. Fears of deportation and limited access to supports highlighted how critical
legal status was to households of Haitian descent in recovering from the hurricane.
However, availability of assets prior to Hurricane Dorian did not solely determine
household adaptive capacity; it was also influenced by factors that influenced households’
willingness to mobilize resources. Mortreux and Barnett (2017) identify five psychosocial factors
that influence households' willingness to adapt, including risk attitudes, personal experience, trust
and expectations in authorities, place attachment, and competing concerns. They also suggest that
household composition and dynamics influence adaptation. Many interviewees relied on their
personal experience of previous hurricanes to inform how they prepared for Dorian. Their
inexperience with a hurricane of this magnitude led to households being underprepared for the
impacts of the storm.
The (un)willingness of households to mobilize adaptive capacity is most clearly illustrated
by the decision not to evacuate before Hurricane Dorian. None of the interviewees evacuated
before the hurricane, and many said that they had not and had never considered this an appropriate
option to prepare for a hurricane. The decision to not evacuate was partly motivated by an
attachment to place and an unwillingness to leave their possessions unprotected. Other
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interviewees said they did not have the resources to evacuate before the storm, mainly because
they were given very short notice about the recommendation to evacuate.
8.1.2 Mobility decision-making and outcomes
Although households had limited say in where they were evacuated, they made rational
and informed decisions based on the resources they had available to them and household priorities
during displacement. Although interviewees weighted different factors differently in their mobility
decision-making, housing and employment opportunities were key variables for all displaced
households. For households with children, education was also a key consideration in decisionmaking. Other priorities included the need for a sense of community and the desire to rebuild
homes.
Most interviewed households remained displaced internally, staying in Nassau, on
surrounding Family Islands or returning to their home islands while repairing their homes. Initial
household decisions on where to live during displacement were influenced by access to housing,
employment, proximity to family and friends, the decision to repair one’s own home, and the
supports provided by Bahamas-based NPOs. Mobility outcomes also varied within households to
address conflicting priorities, leading to temporary separation, such as rebuilding homes and
enrolling children in school.
Household decisions to migrate internationally, either temporarily or permanently,
required access to finances and social supports within the country of destination. For many
households who travelled internationally, restrictions to employment were outweighed by the
benefit of having affordable accommodation, good schools for their children and proximity to
family and friends. Households who travelled internationally returned to the Bahamas to reunite

255

with other members of their households, in the case of separated families, because finances or
financial support had diminished and as result of the Covid-19 pandemic border restrictions.
If one of the decision-making factors changed, interviewees would re-evaluate how this
change would impact the household’s recovery and, in some cases, prompted moving elsewhere.
This highlights that household mobility decision-making is dynamic throughout displacement.
Interviewees continued to weigh the benefits and challenges of their decisions as they attempted
to recover in various locations to determine what was best for their households. The Covid-19
pandemic generally led to households re-evaluating their ability to recover where they were located
and for many led to the decision to return to their pre-Dorian communities.
8.1.3 Experience of event
The experience of Hurricane Dorian influenced how interviewees said they would prepare
for future events. Though not documented in my dissertation, interviewees recounted their
harrowing experiences of the hurricane during the interviews. In addition, the experience of posthurricane evacuation and the limited capacity of government authorities to support and sustain the
mass displacement that resulted after the hurricane, influenced interviewees hurricane
preparedness planning.
8.1.4 Post-hurricane household adaptive capacity
Mobility outcomes influenced post-hurricane access to assets, often depleting the resources
available to houses to adapt to future events. In most cases, interviewees’ financial resources were
used to evacuate, secure housing elsewhere and replace lost items, which eroded household access
to finances to prepare for future events. The erosion of financial resources contributed to
interviewees’ anxiety about the future and how they would cope with other environmental and
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livelihood stresses, impacting their mental health and emotional well-being. Additional stresses
included existing and hurricane-induced medical expenses, increased costs of living and education
costs.
Most interviewees encountered challenges finding employment during displacement if
they did not have a desired skillset or work for a government ministry. The (in)ability to find work
was related to limited employment opportunities in the destination location, lack of legal status to
work, particularly for interviewees who travelled internationally, caretaking of children and elderly
parents, and limited mental capacity to work due to the trauma endured in the storm. Without
employment income, displaced households were challenged to meet everyday needs and replace
possessions lost during the hurricane, while also trying to save money to prepare for future
hurricanes.
The loss of existing social networks significantly impacted interviewees’ adaptive capacity
as they found themselves in unfamiliar places lacking the pre-hurricane supports offered by family
and friends. This was particularly challenging for households with children who relied on family
and friends to help take care of children and on whom they relied for emotional support. The lack
of social connection made interviewees feel isolated, which influenced how they felt they would
be able to adapt to future hurricanes.
Although the legal status of interviewees in the Bahamas did not change after the hurricane,
the limitations and threats that existed as a result of irregular status were amplified by the
hurricane. For example, the fear of deportation led to many Haitian migrants remaining on the
hurricane-damaged islands. In addition, interviewees of Haitian descent shared the challenges they
had encountered in accessing assistance, particularly rental assistance, despite being born in the
Bahamas and having a claim to Bahamian citizenship. Interviewees who had travelled
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internationally during displacement were not able to work while overseas which eroded savings
and limited their ability to save money to prepare for and respond to future hurricanes.
Although most interviewees indicated that the hurricane and the subsequent mobility
outcome negatively affected their post-hurricane adaptive capacity, the proposed model does not
indicate how household assets changed by the hurricane, but instead shows that there is a
relationship between outcomes, access to assets and the willingness to mobilize resources. In a few
cases, mobility decisions increased specific characteristics of households' adaptive capacity. For
example, households who relocated to islands where they had strong social support networks could
quickly find employment, had support with housing, and were provided emotional support by
friends and family.
In general, interviewees said that in the future they would evacuate before a category 5
hurricane indicating that household adaptive capacity was also influenced by the experience of the
hurricane. The trauma of the storm led to nearly all interviewees saying that they plan to leave
their islands, and possibly the Bahamas, in the event of another category 5 hurricane. The decision
to evacuate before another hurricane highlights how the experience of the event impacted
households’ decisions to mobilize adaptive capacity in the future.
However, Hurricane Dorian did not appear to have a significant impact on the interviewees'
risk attitudes. For example, interviewees who felt strongly that climate change was a pressing issue
in the Bahamas used the hurricane as an example of the risks that islands face. Interviewees who
had relied on faith and prayer during the hurricane posited that God would not put the Bahamas
through another hurricane like Dorian and if they did experience another hurricane, it would be up
to God to protect them. Other interviewees felt it was doubtful that a hurricane like Dorian would
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make landfall under the same conditions and on the same islands to justify their commitment to
rebuilding the same houses in the same locations.
What little trust interviewees had in the authorities to prepare for, respond to and recover
from hurricanes was exacerbated by Hurricane Dorian. During the hurricane, governmentdesignated hurricane shelters collapsed, which interviewees attributed to a lack of continued
maintenance over decades. Despite the continued lack of trust in government authorities,
interviewees were impressed with the ability of Bahamas-based NPOs and the international
community, including NGOs and second-homeowners, to support the response and recovery after
Hurricane Dorian.
The impacts of the hurricane on household adaptive capacity were compounded by the
Covid-19 pandemic, highlighting how a secondary event can influence the ability of households
in island to respond to future hurricanes. As interviewees adapted after Hurricane Dorian, the use
of resources resulted in fewer resources to adapt to the pandemic. In turn, the impact of the
pandemic on household resources affected how households were able to build adaptive capacity
to future hurricanes. While most interviewees made decisions about their household's location
based on the capacity to rebuild their assets quickly, they had not anticipated a different disaster,
the pandemic, to occur amid their recovery.
8.1.5 Household adaptations and capacity building
An examination of the changes between pre-hurricane household adaptive capacity and
post-hurricane household adaptive capacity as a result of mobility outcomes and experience of the
hurricane can inform future strategies for supporting household adaptations and strengthening
adaptive capacity at the national, island, community and household scale.
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At the household scale there is a clear need for immediate, short- to long-term housing and
rental assistance programs to support employed and unemployed displaced households. This can
be addressed through developing hurricane displacement policies and planning that responds to
the challenges identified during the Hurricane Dorian response. The government’s limited capacity
to provide accommodation to displaced households was evident by the number of NPOs that
emerged to provide support in housing and rental assistance programs.
The perceived failure of the government to appropriately respond to the needs of Hurricane
Dorian survivors requires that trust in government be rebuilt. Without clear hurricane preparedness
planning, protocols, and supports households are left to mobilize their personal resources which
will influence their experience of hurricanes and the resources they have available to recover and
prepare for future disasters. When households erode their resources to cope and adapt to
hurricanes, they have a limited capacity to respond to secondary events, in this case the Covid-19
pandemic. National strategies that can effectively communicate and equitably provide the supports
and resources need for household hurricane recovery during displacement can relieve some of the
stresses and pressures experienced after a hurricane.
Post-hurricane household adaptive capacity was closely linked to the support provided by
the private sector, international NGOs, Bahamas-based NPOs, and civil society. Interviewees
without immediate access to resources, or with weak pre-hurricane adaptive capacity, relied more
heavily on the supports provided by Bahamas-based NPOs. This highlights the importance of
including these actors in the development of future disaster risk reduction and disaster risk
management planning to build upon the existing capacities.
Strengthening general household adaptive capacity to prepare and respond to disasters is
critical in Caribbean islands faced with multiple hazards. Programs to enhance household assets,
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such as diversifying employment opportunities and supporting entrepreneurs, community-building
exercises, hazards mapping and investments or subsidies for climate-resilient infrastructure and
housing, counselling and mental health supports, and clear and efficient immigration protocols
would contribute to building household adaptive capacity. In addition, effective communication
of the multiple hazards projected by climate change and sharing lessons learned from Hurricane
Dorian can influence how households better anticipate and respond to the challenges of
displacement and the impacts of category 5 hurricanes in Caribbean islands.

8.2 Contributions to research on disaster mobility responses
My research showed that displacement and migration in the aftermath of a hurricane are
dynamic and reflect the available household assets and priorities. Previously published models of
mobility in the context of climate change suggest that there are different types of mobility
responses to hazards ranging from reactive states of displacement to short- and long-term
migration to adapt to changing circumstances (Black et al., 2011b, 2012; Fussell et al., 2014;
McLeman et al., 2021; McLeman & Hunter, 2010; Piguet, 2010). In addition, a household's
mobility response to one event, like Hurricane Dorian, influences its ability to respond to future
events (Adger et al., 2018; Black et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2014b; Thomas & Benjamin, 2019).
My research suggests that, when faced with multiple hazards, households reassess their assets and
resources, and capacity to rebuild these assets and resources in order to prepare for future events,
which in turn influences their decisions on where to live.
Consistent with previous literature (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Foresight, 2011; McLeman,
2014; Suckall et al., 2017), most interviewees remained internally displaced, relocating to Nassau
or various Family Islands or returning to or remaining on their home islands though often not
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returning to their own homes. Interviewees who remained on their home islands made a conscious
decision to stay, though interviewees commented that survivors of Haitian descent remained on
the affected islands because they feared deportation.
My research focused specifically on individuals who had been displaced from their homes.
Mobility responses varied spatially and temporally. The different mobility responses to Hurricane
Dorian were:
-

Households remained on home islands, though not in the same house while rebuilding.

-

Households evacuated and returned to one's home island within a month of the
hurricane.

-

The household evacuated, and only some family members returned to their home island
while other household members temporarily relocated.

-

Household evacuated and relocated elsewhere in the Bahamas with the intent to
eventually return.

-

Household evacuated and relocated in the Bahamas with no intent to return.

-

Households evacuated and relocated internationally with the intent to return.

-

Households evacuated and relocated internationally with no intent to return.

Mobility responses after the hurricane were further influenced by the pandemic,
particularly for households who had decided to relocate. As a result of the pandemic, interviewees
grappled with multiple stressors, such as loss of employment and subsequent concerns of eviction,
delays in immigration paperwork, and restrictions to inter-island and international travel, which
led to a reassessment of their decision to relocate. The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic during
recovery illustrates how extreme events will amplify risk to small islands through cascading risks
(Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). This highlights how ‘double exposure’ can challenge small islands
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capacity to respond to simultaneous disasters and impact national capacity to cope and adapt with
future events (O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000).
My research provides insights into how displacement is perceived by those displaced by a
hurricane. While interviewees' evacuation was a response to the immediate hurricane impacts,
households made decisions about where to move and how long to stay based on their priorities,
exerting agency. Most interviewees who returned home before the pandemic felt that they were
recovering, albeit slowly. Although they may not have been living in their own homes, they were
most often rebuilding and felt that they were contributing to their recovery and the recovery of
their communities. Households who returned after the onset of the pandemic were more likely to
have returned under duress; they had lost their jobs, were fearful of eviction, and were concerned
about the lack of safety nets and a sense of security in an unfamiliar place. Despite returning to
their home settlements, many of these interviewees experienced a second type of displacement,
particularly if they had begun re-establishing themselves in a new place. For example, many of the
interviewees displaced on Eleuthera and were documented in the OEF initial intake questionnaires,
said they did not intend to return to their home islands, although many later did during the Covid19 pandemic.
Alternatively, some interviewees who had relocated and had found employment, housing,
community and a sense of familiarity continued to feel displaced despite indications that they were
re-established. The strong attachment to place and community in their former place of residence
led to many interviewees feeling unsettled in their new place of residence (Adger et al., 2018). For
example, one interviewee shared that she just did not have a sense of excitement, even after
opening a new business in her place of relocation, and that she could not get past the feeling that
something was missing. The importance of the mental health and well-being of displaced
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populations is increasingly being considered in climate change research (Cisse & McLeman, 2022)
the importance of which is exemplified in my research.
My research highlighted the challenges of externally determining a person’s displacement
status and underscores the importance of qualitative research in understanding the factors and
priorities influencing displacement. Indices like the 2010 Inter-Agency Standing Committee
Durable Solutions Frameworks base displacement status on certain criteria that indicate the extent
to which households and individuals no longer have assistance and protection needs that are linked
to their displacement (IASC, 2010). The framework is a useful guide to finding solutions to
specific displacement situations but needs to engage qualitative approaches to understand the
experiences of the displaced population.
However, my research shows that despite reaching the point of needing limited assistance,
displaced households are more vulnerable to additional stresses that can quickly result in returning
to needing assistance and protection. Suggesting that displacement has been solved when certain
criteria is met overlooks the accumulated vulnerability and cascading risks experienced in
households who have been displaced. Although individuals may have achieved certain milestones
towards returning to ‘normalcy’ during their displacement, the stresses to financial and social
resources, loss of physical resources, uncertainty in maintaining employment and effects of trauma
and stress on mental health, have long lasting effects that limit their capacity to feel established
after an event.
In addition, households continue to move along a continuum from temporary to permanent
displacement throughout displacement depending on the competing concerns and additional
stresses that arise. My research did not provide a clear understanding of when displacement ends;
for some people the decision was made immediately after the hurricane to relocate, while others
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were unsure of whether they return or relocate years after the storm. Many of the displaced
households remained in flux, suggesting they might return to their home islands in five to 10 years
when the islands had recovered. The question then arises whether this population who intends to
return in the long-term, but who has temporarily re-established themselves elsewhere, can be
considered to no longer be displaced.
Although interviewees demonstrated agency in addressing livelihood priorities for
themselves and their households, the perceived lack of choice in being able to return home resulted
in many people feeling displaced. In other cases, interviewees who had decided to relocate to
Eleuthera and were not considering returning home in the future expressed a more positive outlook.
For households who remained displaced when the Covid-19 pandemic was introduced into the
Bahamas, many had felt a sense of independence because they had found employment and were
able to pay their bills, their children felt settled at their schools, they had begun to build a
community, and they were making plans for the future. For households who had returned to their
home settlements, many were rebuilding their homes which gave them a sense of hope about the
future.

8.3 Contributions to research on adaptive capacity
Assessments of adaptive capacity tend to focus on the potential to mobilize resources to
projected or anticipated climate change impacts (Cinner et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2019; Jones et
al., 2010b; Mortreux et al., 2020; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Rampengan et al., 2014). My research
highlights the importance of examining how households cope and adapt after an event to assess
the determinants and factors influencing adaptive capacity to identify opportunities to strengthen
capacity to prepare for and respond to future events.
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My findings suggest that in addition to using an assets-based approach to assess household
adaptive capacity, it is critical to examine the factors that mobilize households to use resources
before and after a hurricane. Interviewees spoke about the social, financial, physical, human, and
political resources and capitals on which they relied to cope and adapt to the hurricane's impacts.
Access to these assets significantly influenced household decisions about where to travel after
evacuation and whether they decided to relocate permanently. Interviewees used their available
resources to cope and adapt to the hurricane and displacement, which eroded available resources
to respond to future events.
Consistent with the literature on adaptive capacity, access to financial assets and social
networks were essential to household adaptive capacity (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017; Siders, 2019).
Social capital was particularly important in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane as displaced
household were invited to stay with family and friends and were supported in evacuating off the
affected islands. However, interviewees did not mobilize these resources before the hurricane, only
after. This suggests that although interviewees had varying access to resources, psychosocial
factors identified by Mortreux and Barnett (2017) had a significant impact on household
preparedness and how resources were used before the hurricane. The findings of my research
support the argument that adaptive capacity cannot be measured simply by the availability of
resources but must consider the willingness of households to mobilize these resources to adapt
(Cinner et al., 2018; Eriksen et al., 2015; Mortreux et al., 2020; Siders, 2019).
At the household scale, the determinants of adaptive capacity introduced by the LAC
framework (Jones et al., 2019; Jones, Ludi, et al., 2010) and the interlinked domains of adaptive
capacity (Cinner et al., 2018) were not directly identified by interviewees, with some households
expressing characteristics of higher capacity than others. For example, households who had re-
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established themselves in new places were experimenting with new business opportunities,
exhibiting innovation, flexibility and agency. However, many of the actions taken by households
to adapt were more focused on adapting to livelihood changes and rebuilding assets than they were
to address adaptation to future hurricane events.
The determinants and characteristics of adaptive capacity introduced by the LAC
framework (Jones, Ludi, et al., 2010) and the domains of adaptive capacity (Cinner et al., 2018)
were more clearly observed in the interviews with disaster response organizations than with
displaced interviewees. The ability of civil society and NPOs to respond to the needs of displaced
survivors reflected the flexibility (Cinner et al., 2018; Jones, Ludi, et al., 2010) and ability to
organize and collaborate within these groups (Cinner et al., 2018). In addition, when asked about
future preparedness for hurricanes, the disaster response organizations identified ways in which
they had learned from their experiences from past hurricanes and hurricane Dorian to improve
future disaster risk management strategies (Cinner et al., 2018). For example, NPOs who provided
housing after Dorian said they would generate an inventory of available housing and landlords to
be contacted in the event of another hurricane to provide short-term housing for evacuees. Existing
organizations reflected on how they had responded to challenges in distribution on Family Islands
by identifying a team leader to travel with donations or to receive donations upon arrival to ensure
accountability. The interviews with disaster response organizations demonstrated flexibility to
respond to the needs after a hurricane, whereas government responses were inflexible (Thomas et
al., 2021).
My research findings suggest that existing assessments of adaptive capacity based on the
different characteristics and domains can be helpful to examine adaptive capacity when applied at
an appropriate scale. In order to better understand household adaptive capacity, an assets-based
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approach combined with the psychosocial factors that prompt the mobilization of resources is
appropriate (Mortreux & Barnett, 2017). At the local or national scale, assessments of
characteristics of adaptive capacity such as learning, organizing and flexibility (Cinner et al., 2018;
Jones et al., 2010b) are helpful to determine how organizations and governments respond to the
shifting needs of survivors after a hurricane. However, at all scales, these assessments need to be
considered in the broader context of root causes and dynamic pressures that influence the
conditions in which households make decisions (Wisner et al., 2004).
My research indicates that the assets and resources that contributed to household adaptive
capacity after the hurricane were consistent with assets used in responding to the pandemic,
underscoring the relationship between specific and generic adaptive capacity. The assets and
capitals available to cope and adapt to stresses and events are considered generic adaptive capacity,
where specific generic adaptive capacity is more commonly associated with risk management to a
particular threat (Eakin et al., 2014; Lemos et al., 2013). During the pandemic, households relied
on many of the same supports that they had used after the hurricane, if they had not been exhausted,
highlighting the importance of ensuring equitable access to assets and resources that support all
households’ adaptive capacity. The differences in access to resources across the displaced
population underscored some of the structural deficits that influence how households cope and
adapt during a disaster, especially those related to legal status, education, and gender dimensions.
Policies to reduce overall disaster risk (generic adaptive capacity) and to address particular
climate threats (specific adaptive capacity) in the Bahamas need to be introduced at different
scales, levels of government and sectors (Lemos et al., 2013). Investing in human capital,
addressing inefficiencies in acquiring legally entitled citizenship, addressing the challenges of
affordable and accessible homeownership and support community-building can enhancing
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community and household generic adaptive capacity, which contributes to capacity to manage
specific threats.

8.4 Contributions to climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in small islands
Long-term disaster-induced displacement is an indication of failures in adaptation to
hazards. The projected increased intensity of hurricanes increases the risk of disasters in small
islands, which can be mitigated through adaptation that addresses exposure and adaptive capacity
to hurricane hazards in addition to slower-onset hazards such as sea level rise, freshwater stress
and heatwaves (IPCC, 2021; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). Reducing exposure to multiple hazards
poses significant challenges to islands due to the high adaptation costs (Barnett & Campbell, 2010;
Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022; Thomas et al., 2020) and the lack of commitment of the global community
to meet greenhouse gas emission targets. Investing in enhancing the adaptive capacity of
households, NPOs, civil society, and the government is an essential strategy for mitigating risks to
multiple hazards.
The adaptations and decisions made at the household scale in the context of hurricanes are
influenced by the socioeconomic and political systems that dictate access to resources and the
ability to mobilize adaptive capacity (Burton et al., 2002; Cutter et al., 2003; Füssel & Klein, 2006;
Kelly & Adger, 2000; Wisner et al., 2004). My research highlights how adaptations at the
household scale impact household vulnerability as a function of adaptive capacity, but it does not
examine the systems and processes that dictate household decision-making. Climate change
adaptation and disaster risk management need to address the root causes and dynamic pressures
that create the unsafe conditions that influence household decision-making and vulnerability
(Cutter et al., 2003; Eakin et al., 2014; Füssel & Klein, 2006; Hewitt, 1983; Wisner et al., 2004).
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Climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in small islands can integrate
transformational adaptation strategies to address the root causes of vulnerability (Mycoo & Wairiu,
2022; Schipper et al., 2022).
Addressing the root causes of vulnerability embedded in socioeconomic and development
processes is a slow process that does not reflect the urgency of addressing hurricane hazards in
small islands. Therefore, enhancing the capacity to prepare for, respond to and recover from
hurricanes in small islands is a crucial investment to reduce disaster risks in the short term. Chapter
7 highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the Hurricane Dorian response and provided
suggestions to enhance disaster management informed by the experiences of survivors. My
research suggests that island-specific hurricane planning created in coordination with residents,
local leaders and NPOs can provide comprehensive assessments of the existing skills, knowledge
and physical resources on islands that can be used in disaster preparedness and response.

8.4.1 Strengthening national adaptive capacity for disaster management
National adaptive capacity in the Bahamas can be strengthened by addressing the gaps in
hurricane preparedness highlighted by Hurricane Dorian. To prepare for hurricanes, interviewees
identified that the government needs to design shelters and evacuation protocols according to the
needs of the various Family Islands. Hurricane shelters in the Bahamas need to be built and
maintained to a standard to which residents have confidence in their safety and physical capacity.
Hurricane shelters can mitigate household vulnerability by providing an option to mitigate
exposure for households living in low-lying areas or homes that may not withstand hurricane-force
winds. If pre-hurricane evacuation is going to be enforced on Family Islands, details about
transportation away and back to evacuated islands and duration and location of lodging during
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evacuation need to be communicated to Family Island residents before evacuation. Pre-hurricane
evacuation mitigates household vulnerability by removing people from the hurricane's path,
though it can be anticipated that physical infrastructure will sustain damages. Although NEMA
has suggested that they will enforce mandatory evacuations, there is little confidence from
Bahamians that the government has the capacity and resources to provide or enforce pre-hurricane
evacuations.
The Hurricane Dorian response emphasized where national adaptive capacity can be
strengthened to mitigate household vulnerability after a hurricane. First, the role of NPOs in
disaster response should be formally acknowledged and prioritized in disaster response
mechanisms. Hurricane response NPOs in the Bahamas have historically emerged to address gaps
in the government response; after Dorian, more NPOs emerged to address housing for the
displaced population and collect and distribute donations. The NPOs support households primarily
by securing and assisting households with housing and providing food, clothes, school supplies
and household items to displaced households, removing some of the recovery costs.
Second, Hurricane Dorian highlighted the importance of having a clear and coordinated
response effort, informed by local leaders and the needs of the affected population. Different actors
in the response effort, government, international NGOs, NPOs and civil society, are best suited
and capable of addressing different disaster response and recovery actions. Clear delegation of
roles and responsibilities and coordination amongst response actors can reduce household
vulnerability by clarifying whom to refer evacuees to for specific types of assistance. Local
leadership in response and recovery can inform how funds and resources are used to address the
priorities of affected populations to support the safe return of displaced persons.
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Supporting households before and after a hurricane requires substantial financial
investment. Strengthening the national adaptive capacity of the Bahamas to prepare and respond
to hurricanes will require developing a mechanism to generate funds to invest in disaster
management. Creating systems of accountability and transparency to manage disaster management
finances is essential to strengthening national adaptive capacity in the Bahamas. The perceived
mismanagement of funds and corruption post-hurricane needs to be addressed to build and
maintain household trust in government decision-making to reduce hurricane vulnerability
(Bethell-Bennett, 2021).

8.4.2 Strengthening national adaptive capacity to respond to hurricane displacement
The magnitude and duration of displacement caused by Hurricane Dorian were
unprecedented in the history of the Bahamas. The literature highlights the growing need for
policies addressing displacement and protecting displaced populations (Mycoo, 2017; Thomas &
Benjamin, 2019). My research highlights the priorities of displaced households after a disaster to
inform future displacement policies. The top priorities identified in my research are housing,
employment, children's education, and a need for security in the community.
The government's limited capacity to provide housing for the large number of displaced
people resulted in people relying on their own social connections and NPOs to support them with
short- and long-term housing. Though the government provided shelters in Nassau, there was
insufficient capacity to house the displaced population. In addition, concerns about safety and
privacy in the shelters made people hesitant to use this option.
Dorian demonstrated the expected characteristics of future hurricanes due to climate
change; it was slow-moving, and the intensity of winds and rains was unprecedented (IPCC, 2012,
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2021a; Mendelsohn et al., 2012; Mure-Ravaud et al., 2019). If storms are expected to be this strong
in the future, it can be expected that there will be similar circumstances of displacement in islands
in the future (Cisse & McLeman, 2022; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). This means that governments in
islands will have to be prepared to support displaced households for long periods or find ways to
build the capacity to respond to displacement.
Chapter 6 highlighted that household capacity to adapt was primarily influenced by access
to financial resources, social connections, physical assets, and skills and expertise. Emotional wellbeing and citizenship also had implications on household adaptive capacity, influencing people's
ability to make decisions and mobility. These factors are consistent with the literature on
environmental migration (Black et al., 2011a, 2011b; Foresight, 2011; McLeman, 2014; Mortreux
& Barnett, 2017; Sovacool, 2012). The household adaptive capacity combined with the priorities
of households influenced decision-making during displacement. Chapter 5 indicated that the
immediate priority of all households was to find housing. Households with children also prioritized
their children's education, while households without children prioritized employment. Preparing
for displacement needs to consider how these priorities can be addressed in response to hurricanes
in ways that minimize stress on household adaptive capacity. Table 8-1 outlines recommendations
to address these priorities, the appropriate actors, and positive impacts on national and household
adaptive capacity.
Table 8-1 Recommendations for future displacement planning in The Bahamas to address household priorities.

Factors
influencing
displacement
decision-making
Access to
temporary and
long-term
housing

Recommendations to support
household priorities in planning
for future hurricane displacement

Appropriate
actors

Impacts on
future adaptive
capacity

-

NPOs
Private sector
Government

National
Organized
Known capacity
for housing

Inventory of available housing
after a hurricane including
vacation homes, AirBnBs,
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-

-

Access to
education for
households with
children

-

unoccupied rentals in Nassau
and the Family Islands (O4, O7)
Community centres designed to
offer privacy, appropriate
facilities (toilets, showers,
sleeping quarters) in the event of
mobilization of a shelter (O2)
Minimum six month rental and
utilities assistance to all affected
survivors, regardless of legal
status

Virtual options for continued
education
Subsidized uniforms and school
supplies

NPOs
Government

Long-term
housing during
recovery
Household
Housing needs
met quickly,
households can
focus on other
priorities
Reduced anxiety
about being
homeless
Finances available
to recover

Government

National
Limits disruptions
to learning
Household
Option to return to
rebuild for
households with
children, single
parent households
Finances available
for other priorities
Sense of normalcy
for children,
affects children’s
mental health
Children’s skill
development

Employment
opportunities
and job offers

-

Learn to earn programs in
Family Islands (O4)
Subsidies for employers who
hire evacuees
Small business loan programs
for evacuees (O4)

Government
Private sector

National
Skills
development to
fill gaps in
national labour
force
Diversification of
economy
Household
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Income while
developing skills
for future
employment
More employment
opportunities
Development of
entrepreneurial
skills
Existing social
networks where
displaced

-

Access to
medical services
for pre-existing
and posthurricane
conditions

-

NPOs
Counselling and local mental
Government
health support groups for
Civil society
evacuees (O4)
Providing housing for evacuees
from the same settlement in
similar areas
Increased number of
caseworkers to check in with
evacuees (O2)
Events to integrate receiving and
evacuee communities (O4)

Regular medical team visits to
Family Island with high
concentrations of evacuees
Better clinic facilities/services
on Family Islands

Government
Private sector

National
Better
understanding of
impacts of
hurricanes and
displacement on
mental health
Addressing needs
of survivors
Household
Assistance with
supports and
available
resources for
recovery
Greater sense of
security in
community in
new location
Support from
other survivors
National
Better medical
care for evacuees
and existing
residents of
Family Islands
Household
Better or
monitored health
Finances available
for other
priorities, rather
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than travel to
Nassau or
international
Rebuilding
damaged homes

-

-

Government
Repairs and rebuild assistance
International
available to evacuees displaced
NGOs
to other islands (O8)
Prioritize repairs to housing with
minor damages
Prioritize repairs on multi-unit
homes and subsidize landlords
who rent to pre-hurricane
residents during recovery
Relocate homes in areas with
high exposure to impacts,
especially low-lying

National
More returning
evacuees living in
repaired homes,
reduces exposure
to future
hurricanes
Reduces costs of
repairs
Household
Reduces exposure
to future
hurricanes, houses
repaired
Reduces time
living in damaged
housing/tents,
more housing
available
Reduces costs of
repairs,
addressing minor
before major
damages
Short-term
housing available
while doing
repairs

Displacement policies in the Bahamas should prioritize supporting people’s ability to cope
with the impacts of the hurricane but also need to contribute to sustaining and building household
adaptive capacity to respond to future events (Thomas & Benjamin, 2019). The importance of
having the capacity to respond to multiple hazards was illustrated by the impacts of the Covid-19
pandemic on displaced households. Preparing to support households in their response to multiple
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hazards simultaneously needs to be considered in displacement planning through opportunities to
strengthen adaptive capacity.
Chapter 7 highlighted how the capacity to respond to displacement can be strengthened
through Bahamas-based NPOs. After Hurricane Dorian, NPOs had an essential role in supporting
displaced households, particularly in securing housing in both Nassau and Eleuthera. Although
there was limited capacity in shelters, the number of people that these NPOs could find housing
for after the storm suggests that housing was available to support displaced people in the short
term. Planning for displacement in islands should consider integrating and accessing different
opportunities for short- and long-term housing.
Hurricane Dorian demonstrated the need for planning and policies that address short- and
long-term hurricane displacement in the Bahamas. Although most people wanted to return to their
home islands, the slow recovery process hindered their return. Households with children were
reluctant to return until schools were open and basic infrastructure was in place. Limited housing
availability influenced interviewees' decisions to return home, mainly if they did not own their
homes before Dorian or if their homes were damaged beyond repair. In the absence of mechanisms
to ensure prompt recovery, there is a need to ensure that displaced populations are supported with
housing, rental assistance, and food assistance for a minimum of six months after a hurricane and
that access to these supports is not limited by employment status, citizenship, and social
connections.
Understanding the relationship between mobility and adaptive capacity in slow- and
sudden-onset events is vital for providing support and resources to help households and
communities adapt and cope with climate change. This section has discussed the key elements
highlighted in the research that influence household mobility decision-making and the impacts on
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future vulnerability to climate change. By reflecting on the experiences of Hurricane Dorian
survivors who experienced displacement, planning can help strengthen the household, community,
and national capacity to cope and adapt to future hurricanes and displacement.

8.5 Avenues for future research
My research examined the relationship between mobility and the capacity of evacuee
households to adapt to the impact of hurricane displacement. It exposes the strengths and
weaknesses in the existing disaster management strategies in the Bahamas, highlighting the gaps
in support for displaced populations. However, this study only examined a small sample of
displaced Hurricane Dorian survivors who mobilized adaptive capacity in response to the
hurricane impacts. Future research could examine a broader sample of hurricane survivors,
including households who proactively evacuated before the hurricane, to assess mobility decisionmaking and adaptive capacity before a hurricane.
Most of the research participants had been displaced on Eleuthera, and few had spent an
extended period in Nassau. As a result, the experiences of displaced populations were focused in
more rural communities. Future research might examine the experiences of displaced populations
in urban areas and/or on other islands to assess how household vulnerability changes in different
contexts and in relation to different environmental and livelihood stresses.
My research focused on a specific hazard event, Hurricane Dorian, though the
compounding impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic were also explored. It is anticipated that small
islands will experience increasing challenges related to multiple hazards (IPCC, 2021a;
Mendelsohn et al., 2012; Mure-Ravaud et al., 2019; Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022). Future research
might examine how different hazards, such as sea level rise, drought, and heatwaves, impact
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household vulnerability and the adaptations being made by households to respond to these hazards
(Thomas et al., 2020). Further examination of how these hazards interact to impact household
vulnerability could inform future integrated climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management policies and contribute to climate resilient development pathways.
Although I intended to include a larger sample from the Dorian-displaced Haitian migrant
population in the Bahamas, there were limitations in engaging this population in remote research.
In general, migrant populations are amongst the most vulnerable populations to extreme events
and are often the most severely impacted by disasters (Guadagno, 2015, 2021). The capacity of
migrants to prepare for, cope with and recover from sudden-onset events is limited by
socioeconomic and political barriers such as limited resources, an insufficient understanding of
the local environment, social isolation, irregular immigration status, language barriers,
discrimination and a lack of trust in authorities (Cardona et al., 2012; Fussell et al., 2018;
Guadagno, 2015). They may also be more exposed to hazards if they are living or working in
informal settlements on marginalized lands. Undocumented migrants are described as invisible
victims in the wake of a hurricane because they are often unaccounted for in census data and are
hesitant to access services after a disaster (Guadagno, 2015; Sironi & Guadagno, 2018).
My research does not adequately explore the experiences of Haitian migrants in the
Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian, though there were many indications in my research that Haitian
migrant’s experience of displacement was significantly different from the sample reflected in my
research. The Bahamas has a large population of second- and third-generation undocumented
people born of migrant Haitian parents. Not having legal status impacts daily life of migrants by
creating opportunities for exploitation, limiting access to education, and reducing availability of
services, and contributes to their disaster risk in the event of a hurricane. Future research should
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examine the adaptive capacity of Haitian migrants in the Bahamas before and after hurricanes and
the impacts of not having citizenship.
Despite the damages caused by Hurricane Dorian on the islands of Abaco and Grand
Bahama, there was little indication that the impacts of the Hurricane affected the spread of Covid19 across the Bahamas. The Bahamas Ministry of Health began disseminating information about
the number of cases by island in May 2020. The initial cases by island were confirmed on New
Providence Island (NPI; 66) and Grand Bahama (7). On August 6, 2020, the dashboard indicated
that New Providence Island (349) and Grand Bahama (336) had the highest number of Covid-19
cases accounting for nearly all of the cases (761). The population of NPI is significantly larger
than in Grand Bahama which could suggest that there were some affects from the hurricane that
impacted the spread of the Covid-19 virus. However, the timing suggests that the increase in cases
could also be attributed to the opening of tourism as NPI and Grand Bahama are important transit
and tourist hubs, particularly for American visitors.
Compared to other Caribbean islands, the cumulative confirmed cases were amongst some
of the highest in the region when tourism was reopened until December, though prior to this point,
the number of Covid-19 cases in the Bahamas was not especially great relative to other countries
in the region. The national statistics indicate that displacement did not have a significant impact
on the number of Covid-19 cases in the Bahamas, although it is also possible that Covid-19 rates
may have been higher without displacement. Future research could examine the relationship
between the impacts of Hurricane Dorian, including displacement, on the Covid-19 pandemic.
The ability of islands to invest in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is
diminished when they are recovering from hurricanes. The ‘unvirtuous cycle’ of recovering to
disaster caused by climate change while not being able to invest in adaptation is a significant
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barrier to reducing disaster risk in small islands (Thomas & Benjamin, 2018). International
mechanisms to fund climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in small islands needs
to be separated from the costs of recovering from the losses and damages of hurricanes (Roberts
& Pelling, 2020; Thomas et al., 2020). Future research should examine the costs of displacement
planning in climate change adaptation and disaster risk management in small islands to compare
with the costs of responding to displacement without policies in place. In addition, my research
indicates a low level of trust in the government’s ability to utilize funds appropriately in disaster
management. Transparent and accountable governance structures to manage and invest in climate
change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and disaster management need to be strengthened in
small islands to build national trust in institutions (Mycoo & Wairiu, 2022; Schipper et al., 2022).

8.6 Concluding Remarks
Although my research process has not been direct, I continued to focus on how people cope
and adapt to climate change impacts. I originally intended to assess how island communities'
exposure and adaptive capacity could be addressed to reduce their vulnerability to climate change
impacts. In the end, my focus has not changed dramatically. However, how I examined adaptive
capacity as a vulnerability component shifted from a prospective perspective of adaptation to a
retrospective examination of how survivors coped and adapted after the hurricane. The Covid-19
pandemic introduced additional challenges to displaced households which I integrated into my
research. The context in which I did my research was continuously changing, adding new
challenges to doing the research. These changes reflect how climate change research should be
approached, not as an examination of a single impact or event but as a component of interacting
changes that impact people's short- and long-term plans.

281

My research dissertation did not fully capture the experiences of survivors who were
displaced after Hurricane Dorian, though the key themes were addressed. The details of people's
experience during the hurricane, the moments of uncertainty that emerged before and after the
hurricane and during displacement, and the emotions expressed by interviewees cannot be properly
conveyed in a dissertation such as this. However, the interviewees' insights and my experience
working with survivors on Eleuthera have guided and will continue to direct my commitment to
research and practice that supports people faced with the challenges of dislocation and
displacement. Despite the hardships that were shared with me in my research, I am forever grateful
for having witnessed the hope, determination, and commitment to supporting one another other in
a time of disaster. I think it is fitting to end this dissertation with a comment made by A14 that has
stuck with me throughout my research and will continue to guide my personal and professional
commitment to supporting communities facing displacement.
To help other people, it’s not a small thing so. Everybody in the world should understand
that we need each other, especially with everything that's been going on, on the continent,
on the planet right now.
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Appendix A: Displaced Interviewee Demographic Profiles
Participant demographic profiles
ID

Gender

Age

Marital
status

Pre-Dorian
location

Housing
tenure

Interview location

48
45
21
44
33
49
44
33
41
33
48
38
21
39
62
43
39
36
33
40
60
33
40

Children
in
household
1
1
1
0
3
4
0
2
0
2
2
1
2
0
1
5
0
1
7
7
2
0
0

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
A11
A12
A13
A14
A15
A16
A17
A18
A19
A20
A21
A22
A23/O8

M
F
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F

Married
Single
Boyfriend
Married
Married
Married
Separated
Married
Married
Boyfriend
Widow
Married
Boyfriend
Separated
Divorced
Single
Single
Separated

Own
Own
Own
Own
Generational
Rent
Rent
Own
Rent
Rent
Own
Own
Rent
Rent
Rent
Generational
Rent
Own
Own
Rent
Own
Own
Own

Marsh Harbour
Nassau
Marsh Harbour
Nassau
Harbour Island
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Spanish Wells
Eleuthera
Canada
Grand Bahama
Elbow Cay
Nassau
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Spanish Wells
Eleuthera
Harbour Island
Marsh Harbour
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Sweetings Village

M
F
F
F

38
64
29

2
0
2
3

Single
Widow
Married
Married

Marsh Harbour
Central Pines
Marsh Harbour
Marsh Harbour
Casuarina Point
Murphytown
Dundastown
Marsh Harbour
Dundastown
Elbow Cay
Elbow Cay
Elbow Cay
Murphytown
Dundastown
Dundastown
Dundastown
Dundastown
Spring City
Marsh Harbour
Spring City
Marsh Harbour
The Mudd
Sweetings
Village
Guana Cay
Central Pines
Marsh Harbour
Marsh Harbour

A24
A25
A26
A27

Marsh Harbour
Central Pines
Marsh Harbour
Sweetings Village

A28
A29

F
M

36
42

1
1

Married
Married

Dundastown
Elbow Cay

A30
A31
A32
A33/O5
GB1
GB2
GB3
GB4
GB5
GB6
GB7

M
M
M
M
M
F
F
F
M
F
F

44
60
48
53
63
38
54
54
46
41

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
3

Engaged
Married
Married
Single
Married
Widow
Married
Married
Married
Single
Married

Elbow Cay
Marsh Harbour
Marsh Harbour
Central Pines
High Rock
Over the Bridge
Lucaya
Over the Bridge
Freeport
Freeport
Freeport

Rent
Own
Own
Provided by
employer
Own
Provided by
employer
Own
Own
Own
Own
Own
Own
Own
Own
Own
Rent
Own

Married
Widow
Boyfriend
Boyfriend

Dundastown
Elbow Cay
USA
Marsh Harbour
Marsh Harbour
Marsh Harbour
Lucaya
Nassau
Canada
Grand Bahama
Grand Bahama
Eleuthera
Freeport

Appendix B: OEF Evacuee Intake Form
DORIAN DISASTER RESPONSE ASSESSMENT FORM
Name: _______________________________________________________________________
Date of Birth: ________________________________ Age: _____________________________
Marital Status: _________________________________________________________________
Present Address: _______________________________________________________________
Phone Contact: Home: ___________________________ Cell: ___________________________
Email: ________________________________________________________________________
Home Address (Prior to Hurricane Dorian)
Settlement: _________________________________ Island: ____________________________
Form of Photo ID: ______________________________________ ID#: _____________________
Religion: _________________________________ Employment status: ____________________
Occupation: ___________________________________________________________________
Place of Past Employment: _______________________________________________________
How long: _____________________________
Do you intend to return to your home island? ____________________
What are your plans for the future?
Short term _____________________________________________________________________
Long term _____________________________________________________________________
Have you received any assistance since the hurricane? If yes, please give details.

Can you specify your present needs:

Dependents
Name

Age

Relationship

Employment/school

Present Situation/Living Arrangements

Referral Source: _______________________________________________Date: ____________

CONSENT
I _____________________________________________ give my consent to The One Eleuthera
Foundation to share information provided with other other partners and relevant agencies to
assist with the processing of my application for assistance.
Signature: ___________________________________________
Date: ______________________________________________
Witness: ____________________________________________

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Assessment: ___________________________________________________________________

Recommendations:
1) ________________________________________________________________________
2) ________________________________________________________________________
Coordinator: __________________________________________
Date: _______________________________
Approved by: ______________________________________ Date: _______________________

Appendix C: Red Cross Beneficiary Form

Head of Affected Family

Alternative Head of Affected Family
Relationship of Alternative
Contact (Dropdown:

Date of
Registration

Husband,Wife,Son (>18
years),Daughter (>18
years),Mother,Father,Other
[text response]

First Name

Last Name

First Name

Last Name

1

Alternate Contact

Details of Head of Affected Family

Number of People in
Affected Family

Affect

Pre-Disaster Island

Government ID Type

Gender

Date of Birth

Phone Number [242-#######]

2

[Dropdown: NIB,Drivers
License,Work
Permit,Passport,Other[in
sert text])

Government ID
Number

[Dropdown: Abaco Islands,
Grand Bahama, New
Providence, Exuma,
Eleuthera, Other [text
response]

Affected Family Location Information

Current Island Location Current Accommodation
[Dropdown:Abacos Islands, Type (Communal Shelter,

Pre-Disaster Address

Grand Bahama, New
Providence, Exuma,
Eleuthera, Other [text
response]

Host Family, Hotel, Shortterm Rental Home, PreDisaster Home, Other[text
response])

If staying in
communal shelter,
which one?

3

Any Comments

Appendix D: OEF Follow-up Questionnaire

Survey for households still in Eleuthera
OEF Follow Up survey for those still in Eleuthera
Telephone survey to head of household

Demographics & Housing (Use name and date of birth to link information to existing
database. Existing database already has household members, marital status, previous
employment, duration of employment, employer, previous place of residence)
1. First and last name: open field
2. Date of Birth: open field
3. Are you still living in Eleuthera?
Yes, continue this survey
No, go to survey for those that have left Eleuthera
4. Which settlement are you living in now?
Bannerman Town
Bluff
Current
Deep Creek
Delancy Town
Governor's Harbour
Greencastle
Gregory Town
Harbour Island
Hatchet Bay
James Cistern
John Millars
Millar's
Lower Bogue
North and South Palmetto Point
Rock Sound
Savannah Sound
Spanish Wells
Tarpum Bay
Upper Bogue
Waterford
Wemyss Bight
Windemere Island
Winding Bay

5. Has anyone from your household left Eleuthera permanently since you first settled here
after Dorian?
Yes
▪ Name, age, reason for leaving: open field
No
6. Has anyone joined your household permanently since you first settled here after
Dorian?
Yes
▪ Name, age, reason for joining: open field
No

7. Are you planning to stay in Eleuthera permanently?
Yes
▪ Why? Open field
No
▪ Do you have an idea of when you will leave? Open field
▪ Where are you thinking of going? Open field
▪ Why do you want to leave? Open field
Not Sure
8. Do you own or rent your current home or are you living with family?
Own
Rent
Living with family
Other: open field
9. Before Hurricane Dorian, did you own or rent your home or did you live with family?
Own
Rent
Living with family
Other: open field
10. Do you need any rental assistance?
Yes
▪ How much? Open field
No
11. Do you need any utility assistance?
Yes
▪ For which utilities? Open field
▪ How much? Open field

No

Wellbeing
12. How would you rate your overall quality of life now?
Extremely poor
Poor
Neither poor nor good
Good
Extremely good
13. Compared to before Hurricane Dorian, would you say your quality of life is:
Much worse
Worse
About the same
Better
Much better
14. What could help to improve your quality of life now? Open field
15. Besides rent or utility assistance, do you need anything additional to help with the
needs of your household?
Yes
▪ What type of assistance? Open field
No
16. What past assistance did you receive from One Eleuthera Foundation? Open field
17. How did past assistance that you received from One Eleuthera Foundation meet your
household’s needs?
Filled very little household needs
Filled some household needs
Filled most household needs
Filled all household needs
18. How could assistance provided by One Eleuthera Foundation be improved? Open field

Employment & Small Business
19. Are you employed?
Yes
No

20. How many people in your household are employed? Open field
21. For each employed person:
▪ Occupation: open field
▪ Place of Employment: open field
▪ How long have they been employed at current position: open field
22. For those not employed, are they looking for employment?
Yes
▪ Name: open field
▪ Past occupation: open field
▪ Skills: open field
No
▪ Why not? Open field
23. Is there a specific skill that you feel that you would like to obtain to support your
employment? Open field
24. Would you be interested in any of the following training areas offered by the Centre for
Training and Innovation?
▪ Trade Skills (Carpentry, Electrical, Culinary, Plumbing, Tiling
▪ Career Development
▪ Business Fundamentals
▪ Accounting and Finance
▪ Sales and Marketing
▪ Workplace Essentials
▪ Project Management
25. How often do you think you will be available to attend training offered by CTI?
▪ 1-2 times per weeks
▪ 2-3 times per week
▪ 3-4 times per week
▪ 5 or more times per week
26. What is your preferred mode of training?
▪ face to face
▪ virtual / remote
▪ blended
27. What is your preferred time for training?
▪ Mornings
▪ Evenings

28. What are your preferred days for training?
▪ Weekdays
▪ Weekends
29. Is there training not offered by CTI that you are interested in? open field
30. Do you own a small business?
Yes
▪ What is your small business? Open field
▪ How long have you had your small business? Open field
Go to question #32
No
31. Are you interested in starting a small business?
Yes
▪ What type of small business do you want to start? Open field
▪ Why do you want to start your business? Open field
▪ What type of experience do you have? Open field
No, go to question #39
32. Do you need any assistance for your business?
Yes
No, go to question #39
33. OEF offers the following types of small business assistance, what type of assistance
would you be interested in?
Business Plan Development
Small grants for equipment
34. Is there small business assistance not offered by OEF that you are interested in? open
field
35. How much money do you need for your business?
▪ $500
▪ $501-$1,000
▪ More than $1,000.00
▪ I don’t know
36. Do you have any funds to invest in your business?
Yes
How much funds to you have to invest? Open field
No

37. How many days a week will you have to give to your business? Open Field

38. Please rank the importance of assistance provided by OEF for your household. 1=most
important, 4=least important:
▪ Rent assistance
▪ Utility assistance
▪ Small business assistance
▪ CTI training

Volunteer Program
39. OEF is starting a volunteer program which will allow persons to partake in a flexible
short-term placement that help support our key pillars and projects during the summer.
Are you interested in volunteering with some of OEF and CTI’s programs?
Yes
▪ When would be a good time for you to volunteer? Open field
▪ How much time would you have to volunteer? Open field
▪ Which pillar would you prefer to work in?
o Economy
o Education
o Environment
o Health
o Heritage
o Operations (Farming Support, Communications Support, etc.)
No

Survey for households that left Eleuthera
OEF Follow Up survey for those that have left Eleuthera
Telephone survey to head of household

Demographics & Housing (Use name and date of birth to link information to existing
database. Existing database already has household members, marital status, previous
employment, duration of employment, employer, previous place of residence)
40. First and last name: open field
41. Date of Birth: open field
42. Are you still living in Eleuthera?
Yes, go to survey for those are still in Eleuthera
No, continue this survey
43. When did you leave Eleuthera? Open field
44. Which island and settlement are you living in now? open field
45. Did all members of your household move with you?
Yes
No
▪ Why not? Open field
46. Why did you leave Eleuthera? Open field
47. Do you own or rent your current home or are you living with family?
Own
Rent
Living with family
Other: open field
48. Before Hurricane Dorian, did you own or rent your home or did you live with family?
Own
▪ Did you receive any insurance payouts for your home after Hurricane
Dorian?
Yes
No
Rent
Living with family
Other: open field

49. Are you now living in the same home that you were in before Hurricane Dorian?
Yes
No

Wellbeing
50. How would you rate your overall quality of life now?
Extremely poor
Poor
Neither poor nor good
Good
Extremely good
51. Compared to before Hurricane Dorian, would you say your quality of life is:
Much worse
Somewhat worse
Neither worse nor better
Somewhat better
Much better
52. Compared to when you were living in Eleuthera after Hurricane Dorian, would you say
your quality of life now is:
Much worse
Somewhat worse
Neither worse nor better
Somewhat better
Much better
53. Are you considering moving back to Eleuthera?
Yes
▪ Why? Open field
No
▪ Why? Open field
54. What could help to improve your quality of life now? Open field

55. What past assistance did you receive from One Eleuthera Foundation? Open field

56. How did past assistance that you received from One Eleuthera Foundation meet your
household’s needs?
Filled very little household needs
Filled some household needs
Filled most household needs
Filled all household needs
57. How could assistance provided by One Eleuthera Foundation be improved? Open field

Employment
58. Are you employed?
Yes
No
59. How many people in your household are employed? Open field
60. For each employed person:
▪ Occupation: open field
▪ Place of Employment: open field
▪ How long have they been employed at current position: open field
61. For those not employed, are they looking for employment?
Yes
▪ Name: open field
▪ Past occupation: open field
▪ Skills: open field
No
▪ Why not? Open field
62. Is there a specific skill that you feel that you would like to obtain to help you with
employment? Open field
63. Would you be interested in any of the following training areas offered by the Centre for
Training and Innovation?
▪ Trade Skills (Carpentry, Electrical, Culinary, Plumbing, Tiling)
▪ Career Development
▪ Business Fundamentals
▪ Accounting and Finance
▪ Sales and Marketing
▪ Workplace Essentials
▪ Project Management

64. How often do you think you will be available to attend training offered by CTI?
▪ 1-2 times per weeks
▪ 2-3 times per week
▪ 3-4 times per week
▪ More than 4 times per week
65. What is your preferred mode of training?
▪ face to face
▪ virtual / remote
▪ blended
66. What is your preferred time for training?

▪ Mornings
▪ Evenings
67. What is your preferred days for traning?
▪ Weekdays
▪ Weekends
Is there training not offered by CTI that you are interested in? open field

Appendix E: Displaced interviewee consent form

WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
Vulnerability and mobility in The Bahamas: Examining the social costs of displacement in response to
Hurricane Dorian
Principal Investigator: Kearney Coupland, PhD Candidate
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Robert McLeman, Associate Professor
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to identify how displaced
households have coped and adapted to the social impacts of hurricane displacement. The researcher, Kearney
Coupland, is a PhD Candidate in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department working under the
supervision of Dr. Robert McLeman.

INFORMATION
As this interview will be done over Zoom audio/telephone, it would be best if you can find a comfortable,
private space to be throughout the call. I ask that you review this document prior to our call when I will be
able to answer any questions you might have pertaining to the research or any information included in this
form.
As a research participant, you will be asked to answer questions about your travel after the storm, your
experience living in another place, pre-Dorian life on Abaco/Grand Bahama and how you have coped and
adapted to the circumstances of displacement. You will also be asked about your experience of the impacts of
COVID-19. The interview will take between 45-60 minutes to complete. The time commitment is flexible: if you
wish to leave the conversation early, that is acceptable; if you wish to talk for longer that will be welcomed. The
interview will be conducted over Zoom audio/telephone. Data from approximately 140 evacuees, 10 research
participants from organizations supporting evacuees, and 10 community leaders will be collected for this study.
In order to participate in the research as an evacuee, interviewees are required to have been displaced from
their home island for a minimum of 3 months and be 18 years of age or older.
As a part of this study you will be audio-recorded for research purposes. You have the right to refuse being
audio-recorded. Recordings will be stored on a password protected hard drive. Only I, Kearney Coupland, will
have access to these recordings and information will be kept confidential. I will provide the recording of the
interview to you for review upon request. I will transcribe the recordings using Transcribear, a secure online
platform, by September 1, 2020. The audio recordings will not be used for any additional purposes without your
permission.

RISKS
Some of the questions in this study may trigger feelings of discomfort and cause you to become upset when
thinking about your own experience of evacuation and displacement, and the impacts of COVID-19. As a
safeguard to discomfort, you are free to discontinue the study at any time and to choose not to respond to any
question. Information regarding counselling services and mental health resources will be provided upon request.

1

BENEFITS
By participating in this study, you will have the opportunity to draw on your experience of hurricane
displacement to identify factors that contributed to the decisions you made and how you have coped with and
adapted to life after the hurricane and during a subsequent global disruption, COVID-19. Your participation will
help disaster response teams better understand what gaps and barriers exist in providing evacuation and
temporary/permanent relocation services in the event of a Category 5 Hurricane. Themes generated from the
data will inform the creation of recommendations that will be presented to the Government of The Bahamas
and humanitarian agencies working in disaster response. The research will contribute to the body of
literature/knowledge on vulnerability, disaster preparedness and response, displacement policies on small island
states.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The confidentiality/anonymity of your data will be ensured by removing and dissociating any identifying
information from the interview recordings and transcripts. I will record and store contact information in a
separate location than the interview recordings and transcripts. The interview will be conducted over Zoom
audio/telephone. The privacy and confidentiality of information collected through Zoom cannot be guaranteed.
In order to further ensure confidentiality, all phone numbers and logs of communication will be deleted from my
account daily. Recording of the interviews will be stored on a password protected hard drive. I will use a secure
online platform to transcribe data. Following transcription, recordings and transcripts will be removed from the
software and stored on a password protected hard drive.
The de-identified data will be stored for 10 years and may be reanalyzed in the future as part of a separate
project (i.e., secondary data analysis). Only aggregate results will be published/presented. If you consent,
quotations will be used in write-ups/presentations and will not contain information that allows you to be
identified. You will not be able to vet your quotations. Confidentiality may be broken if you present an
immediate danger to yourself or others.

COMPENSATION
For participating in this study, you will receive a $5 top-up to your cell phone account (BTC/Aliv).

CONTACT
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures or you experience adverse effects as a
result of participating in this study you may contact the researcher, Kearney Coupland, at
coup9080@mylaurier.ca or 242-458-2418 (WhatsApp) and 519-803-0174 (Canadian phone).
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University Research Ethics Board (REB# 6468), which
receives funding from the Research Support Fund. If you feel you have not been treated according to the
descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this
project, you may contact Jayne Kalmar, PhD, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University,
(519) 884-1970, extension 3131 or REBChair@wlu.ca.
2

PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If you decide to
participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You have the right to refuse to
answer any question or participate in any activity you choose.
If you withdraw from the study, you can request to have your data removed/destroyed by contacting Kearney
Coupland via WhatsApp call/message or email until two weeks after the interview.

FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION
The results of this research might be published/presented in a dissertation, books, journal articles, conference
presentations, and/or reports. A copy of a report will be provided to the relief organizations participating in the
research, the National Emergency Management Agency and international NGOS. The report will be an aggregate
of the findings, though may include individual (anonymized) quotes. The results of this research may be made
available through Open Access resources.

CONSENT
I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to participate in
this study. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers
to my questions, and any additional details I requested.
Participant's signature ___________________________________ Date _________________
Investigator's signature __________________________________ Date _________________

QUOTATIONS
I agree to the use of direct quotations that have had identifying information removed, and I understand I will not
have an opportunity to vet direct quotes. (Do this at the end of the interview?)
__ YES
__ NO
Participant's signature ___________________________________ Date _________________
Investigator's signature __________________________________ Date _________________

3

FUTURE CONTACT
I agree to my information being used to contact me in the future for the purpose of this research or a future
longitudinal study related to this study.
__ YES
__ NO

Organization________________________________

Phone number_______________________ Email___________________________________
Participant's signature ___________________________________ Date _________________
Investigator's signature __________________________________ Date _________________

4

Appendix F: Displaced interviewee interview guide

Evacuee Interview Questions
Evacuees living on Eleuthera will be asked to participate in a 1-hour long interview to share their
experience of displacement. In order to participate in the research as an evacuee on Eleuthera,
interviewees are required to have been living on Eleuthera as a displaced person or have been
displaced at some point to Eleuthera for a minimum of 3 months, and be 18 years of age or
older. I have reviewed the following list of questions with a Bahamian counsellor working with
evacuees on Eleuthera to ensure they are trauma-sensitive and culturally appropriate.

Question
Demographic information

Prompts
Current settlement, home island settlement, number
of people in household, age(s)/gender(s) of persons in
household, marital status, relationship to persons in
household, ethnicity, current employment, previous
employment, living arrangement, education level,
household income (previous)?

Can you tell me about how you travelled
from your home to Eleuthera following
the hurricane?

Where did you go?
How long were you there?
Where did you stay? How did you find a place to
stay?
Map travel.

Why did you decide to come to
Eleuthera?

Was this a family decision?
Who made the decision?
Why Eleuthera?
Did family and friends come too? Where are they
now?

Can you tell me about what life was like
on Abaco/Grand Bahama?

What settlement did you live in? Did you rent or
own your home?
How long did you live there?
Who did you live with?
Did you work? Where?
What was a normal week like for your household?
Repeat places of community that are mentioned
and ask to add any that are missing.

Can you tell me about what life has been
like on Eleuthera (pre-pandemic)?

What settlement do you live in? What is your living
arrangement?
Have you stayed anywhere else on Eleuthera?
If employed, how did you find your current job? Is it
part-time, full-time, occasional?
If not employed, what are the biggest challenges to
finding a job?
Are you able to meet your needs? Have you found
support? Have these needs changed since you first
arrived?
Have you found community? Where/how?
What is a normal week like for your household?

Has life changed as a result of COVID-19?

Are there new challenges?
Have you received support? From who? In what
form?

Before COVID-19, on a scale from 1 to 10,
how did you think you were coping to
living on Eleuthera compared to just after
the hurricane?

How are others in household coping?
Children?

What were some of the things that
helped you cope with the challenges of
being on Eleuthera?

Two year ago, if you knew what you know now,
what would you do differently?

Compared to before COVID-19, on a scale
from 1 to 10, how do you think you’re
coping?

How are others in household coping?
Children?

What are some of the things that helped
you cope with the impacts of COVID-19?

Eight months ago, if you knew what you know now,
what would you do differently?

What does the new normal look like for
you and your family?

Will you return to Abaco/Grand Bahama?
Do you have friends or family who have or who
plan to return?
Where are friends and family now? Map where
friends/family are now.
What are the challenges to getting back to normal
for you and your household?

Appendix G: Dorian response organization consent form

WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
Vulnerability and mobility in The Bahamas: Examining the social costs of displacement in response to
Hurricane Dorian
Principal Investigator: Kearney Coupland, PhD Candidate
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Robert McLeman, Associate Professor
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to identify how displaced
households have coped and adapted to the social impacts of hurricane displacement. The researcher is a Laurier
is a PhD Candidate in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department working under the supervision of
Dr. Robert McLeman.

INFORMATION
As this interview will be done over Zoom audio/telephone, it would be best if you can find a comfortable,
private space to be throughout the call. I ask that you review this document prior to our call when I will be
able to answer any questions you might have pertaining to the research or any information included in this
form.
As a research participant, you will be asked to answer questions about your organization and services offered to
evacuees during an interview. You will also be asked about your observations of the impacts of COVID-19 on
your organization, evacuees and the broader community. The interview will take about 45-60 minutes to
complete. The time commitment is flexible: if you wish to leave the conversation early, that is acceptable; if you
wish to talk for longer that will be welcomed. The interview will be conducted over Zoom audio/telephone. Data
from approximately 10 research participants from organizations supporting evacuees, 10 community leaders
and 140 evacuees will be collected for this study. In order to participate as a support organization, you must
have been or be working in supporting evacuees and be over the age of 18.
As a part of this study you will be audio-recorded for research purposes. You have the right to refuse being
audio-recorded. Recordings will be stored on a password protected hard drive. Only I, Kearney Coupland, will
have access to these recordings and information will be kept confidential. I will provide the recording of the
interview to you for review upon request. I will transcribe the recordings using Transcribear, a secure online
platform, by September 1, 2020. The audio recordings will not be used for any additional purposes without your
permission.

RISKS
As a result of your participation in this study you may experience discomfort when discussing the challenges and
trauma experienced by evacuees and the impacts of COVID-19 on your community. As a safeguard to
discomfort, you are free to discontinue the study at any time and to choose not to respond to any question.
Information regarding accessing counselling services will be provided.

1

BENEFITS
Participants may benefit from the participation in this research project by sharing their experience. The research
will contribute to the body of literature/knowledge on vulnerability, disaster preparedness and response,
displacement policies on small island states. Themes generated from the data will inform the creation of
recommendations that will be presented to the Government of The Bahamas and humanitarian agencies
working in disaster response. The research will contribute to the body of literature/knowledge on vulnerability,
disaster preparedness and response, displacement policies on small island states.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The confidentiality/anonymity of your data will be ensured by removing and dissociating any identifying and
contact information from the interview recordings and transcripts and will store it in a separate location.
Contact information will be recorded and stored in a separate location than the data. The interview will be
conducted over Zoom audio/telephone. The privacy and confidentiality of information collected through Zoom
cannot be guaranteed. In order to further ensure confidentiality, all phone numbers and logs of communication
will be deleted from my account daily. Recording of the interviews will be stored on a password protected hard
drive. I will use a secure online platform to transcribe data. Following transcription, recordings and transcripts
will be removed from the software and stored on a password protected hard drive.
The de-identified data will be stored for 10 years and may be reanalyzed in the future as part of a separate
project (i.e., secondary data analysis). Only aggregate results will be published/presented. If you consent,
quotations will be used in write-ups/presentations and will not contain information that allows you to be
identified. You will not be able to vet your quotations. Confidentiality may be broken if you present an
immediate danger to yourself or others.

COMPENSATION
For participating in this study, you will receive a $5 top-up to your cell phone account (BTC/Aliv).

CONTACT
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures or you experience adverse effects as a
result of participating in this study you may contact the researcher, Kearney Coupland, at
coup9080@mylaurier.ca or 242-458-2418 (WhatsApp) and 519-803-0174 (Canadian phone).
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University Research Ethics Board (REB# 6468), which
receives funding from the Research Support Fund. If you feel you have not been treated according to the
descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this
project, you may contact Jayne Kalmar, PhD, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University,
(519) 884-1970, extension 3131 or REBChair@wlu.ca.
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PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If you decide to
participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You have the right to refuse to
answer any question or participate in any activity you choose.
If you withdraw from the study, you can request to have your data removed/destroyed by contacting Kearney
Coupland via WhatsApp call/message or email until two weeks after the interview.

FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION
The results of this research might be published/presented in a dissertation, books, journal articles, conference
presentations, and/or reports. A copy of a report will be provided to the relief organizations participating in the
research, the National Emergency Management Agency and international NGOS. The report will be an aggregate
of the findings, though may include individual (anonymized) quotes. The results of this research may be made
available through Open Access resources.

CONSENT
I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to participate in
this study. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers
to my questions, and any additional details I requested.
Participant's signature ___________________________________ Date _________________
Investigator's signature __________________________________ Date _________________

QUOTATIONS
I agree to the use of direct quotations that have had identifying information removed, and I understand I will not
have an opportunity to vet direct quotes.
__ YES
__ NO
Participant's signature ___________________________________ Date _________________
Investigator's signature __________________________________ Date _________________
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FUTURE CONTACT
I agree to my information being used to contact me in the future for the purpose of this research or a future
longitudinal study related to this study.
__ YES
__ NO

Organization________________________________

Phone number_______________________ Email___________________________________
Participant's signature ___________________________________ Date _________________
Investigator's signature __________________________________ Date _________________
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Appendix H: Dorian response organization interview guide

Key Informant Interview Questions (Organizations)
I will engage with organizations/individuals providing support for evacuees on Eleuthera to assess
the capacity of evacuee households to cope with and adapt to the social impacts of hurricane
displacement. The criteria to participate as a staff participant include that the person must
work/have worked with an organization that provided/provides Hurricane Dorian response and
relief on Eleuthera and that they be 18 years of age or older. Below are the semi-structured
interview questions and the focus area to which they relate.
Focus

Questions

Details on the types of services and supports
provided to evacuees.

What is the organization called?
What are the goals of the organization?
What has been/is being provided to evacuees?
How many evacuees have you supported/are you
supporting?
How do people find out about your services?
How are you funded?

Observations of the challenges faced by
evacuees and receiving settlements after the
hurricane.

What challenges did you observe for households
as a result of displacement? For settlements?
Have the needs changed?
What is the general disposition of evacuee
households? Has it changed in the last 5 months?
What is the general disposition of settlements you
work in? Has it changed in the last 5 months?
Has COVID-19 impacted this?

Success of services offered for supporting
evacuee households.

How do you measure the success of your work?
Do you consider your services successful?
What would make your work more successful?
Do you service the same households or new
households?
Any additional information about evacuees that
would have helped your in offering services?

Lessons that have been learned in supporting What does your organization do well?
displaced households.
What do you think your organization could do
better?
Is there anything you would do differently?

Knowing what you know now, what would have
done differently to prepare 2 years ago?
Compared to before COVID-19, on a scale
from 1 to 10, how do you think your
organization is coping? What about your
community?

Staff?
Evacuee population?
Long-time residents?

What are some of the challenges and the
things that have helped your organization
cope with the impacts of COVID-19?

Eight months ago, if you knew what you know
now, what would you do differently?

Any additional comments or questions.
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HURRICANE DORIAN DISPLACEMENT ASSESSMENT
Introduction & Objectives
Hurricane Dorian made landfall on Abaco as a Category 5 Hurricane on September, 1
2019. It is estimated that 29,472 persons were affected by the hurricane as a result of damage to
their homes and assets1. On Abaco over 75 percent of the dwellings were affected and 57 percent
of homes were severely damaged2.
Due to its proximity and close kin connections, the islands of Eleuthera and Spanish Wells
became a point of transition for residents evacuating Abaco and the surrounding cays. In North
Eleuthera, government, NGOs and volunteers organized a grassroots response at Three Island
Dock. Upon arrival, as further travel arrangements were determined, evacuees were asked to
complete an Intake Registration form to collect important household and livelihoods data. From
Three Island Dock, individuals were either transported to the North Eleuthera airport to travel to
Nassau, transported to the homes of family and friends on Eleuthera, or welcomed at two shelter
locations, Camp Symonnette in James Cistern or the Retreat at the One Eleuthera Foundation in
Tarpum Bay. Simultaneously, a fleet of crawfish boats from Spanish Wells was making trips to
Abaco to evacuate person in Abaco and the surrounding cays.
Since September 2019, Eleuthera and Spanish Wells3 has welcomed over 600 evacuees in
213 households. Support for these families has come largely from the churches, non-profit
organizations and the One Eleuthera Foundation. Support has come in the form of clothing and
food donations, rental and utilities assistance programs, counselling, school supplies, and
employment opportunities. The report provides an overview of the information collected.
General objective: To provide information about the needs of the Hurricane Dorian
evacuee population on Eleuthera during immediate and short-term displacement.
Specific Objectives:
- Provide a snapshot of the evacuee population on Spanish Wells and Eleuthera as
reported on the intake forms.
- Highlight sources of assistance and resources provided.
- Discuss observations and gaps in data
- Identify next steps

1

ECLAC, IDB, PAHO, WHO, & FAO. (2019). Assessment of the Effects and Impacts of Hurricane Dorian: Executive
Summary. Retrieved from https://idbg.sharepoint.com/teams/EZ-BL-LON/BLL1028/_layouts/15/guestaccess.aspx?guestaccesstoken=dhGIt7RMUJIONwHScZD9S9BbwqrZ%2FnKCtvtkysaX
GkE%3D&docid=2_1aefcdb8623eb4704a5b3f312ae54bee0&rev=1
2
Ibid.
3
For the purpose of this report, Eleuthera refers to the ‘mainland’ Eleuthera as well as Harbour Island and Current
Island. Spanish Wells includes Russell Island and Spanish Wells. The two sets of data are differentiated because
they were largely supported by two different distribution centres and caseworkers in each location.
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Methodology
This report provides a summary of the findings from
the initial intake forms completed by evacuees on both
Eleuthera and Spanish Wells. Information was
collected between September 2019 and February
2020, with the bulk of the forms being completed in
September and October. Data was collected using
questionnaires developed by OEF and a Beneficiary
data sheet developed by the Red Cross.
Questionnaires were presented to evacuees on
Spanish Wells from October 6-8, 2019. In addition,
evacuees on Spanish Wells were invited to add their
information to the Red Cross Beneficiary Data Sheet
during this time. Questionnaires were provided to
evacuees at the shelters on the mainland and were
made available to evacuees visiting the OEF Hurricane
Dorian Response office and distribution center in
Tarpum Bay. The data has been aggregated to create a
snapshot of who evacuated to Eleuthera following
Hurricane Dorian.

Geographic coverage: Mainland
Eleuthera, Spanish Wells, forms
were received from Nassau, Abaco
and the USA.
Questionnaires were distributed in
Spanish Wells, Tarpum Bay, online
Instrument: Individual
questionnaire (OEF) and
Beneficiary Data Sheet (Red Cross)
Number of responses: 270
Unit of analysis:
Individual/household
Reference period: September
2019-March 2020

The data collected covers the majority of settlements
on Eleuthera, Harbour Island, Current Island, Spanish Wells and Russell Island. It is likely that
there are additional evacuees who came to Eleuthera who may have not had a need to or may
have been uncomfortable registering with a relief organization.
Due to the long time period
of data collection, there are
variations observed in
people’s living situations.
There has been limited
response to the follow-up
survey distributed by OEF. A
follow-up
survey
was
dispersed in Spanish Wells
in December.
Data provided
is
largely
based on the
original intake
form data.
Figure 1 Proportional representation of household populations in settlements across
Eleuthera and Spanish Wells.
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Overview
This section provides a summary of the overall evacuee population on Spanish Wells and
Eleuthera as well as in their specific geographic locations. The following data represents the data
presented on the forms. It is not always clear if spouses and dependents are living on
Eleuthera/Spanish Wells.
Total
602 individuals
214 households
197* under 18 (33%)
22** over 65 (4%)
40 Single-female headed households (19%)

*This number includes dependents documented on the forms whose ages were not specified.
**This number is based on the individuals who filled out the form. They often did not fill in an age for their spouse.

Spanish Wells
271 individuals
113 households
71* under 18 (26%)
20** over 65 (7%)
7 Single-female headed households (6%)

Mainland
331 individuals
101 households
138 under 18 (43%)
2 over 65 (1%)
33 Single-female headed households (33%)

*This number includes dependents documented on the forms whose ages were not specified.
**This number is based on the individuals who filled out the form. They often did not fill in an age for their spouse.

Population by gender
Female
Male
Blanks
Total
Population by age
Under 18
18-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61+
Blanks*

Spanish Wells
133 (50%)
108 (40%)
30 (10%)
271
Spanish Wells
75 (28%)
31 (11%)
27 (10%)
26 (10%)
22 (8%)
28 (10%)
62 (23%)

Mainland
172 (52%)
137 (41%)
22 (9%)
331
Mainland
150 (45%)
64 (20%)
41 (12%)
43 (13%)
14 (4%)
6 (2%)
13 (4%)

*Blanks are likely due to person filling out form not filling in age of partner.

Total
305 (51%)
245 (41%)
52 (8%)
602
Total
225 (37%)
95 (16%)
68 (12%)
69 (11%)
36 (6%)
34 (6%)
75 (12%)
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Size of households
# of people in
household
1
2
3
4
5
6
7+

Spanish Wells

Mainland

Total

34
25
25
16
7
1
1

26
18
17
22
10
6
2

60
43
42
38
17
7
3

Key Points
- Larger percentage of children under the age of 18 on Mainland Eleuthera.
- More senior population on Spanish Wells.
- The majority of single-female headed households were on the mainland.
- Higher percentage of smaller households on Spanish Wells. Larger families on the
mainland.

Mobility
This section is intended to provide a snapshot of the mobility of the evacuee population,
highlighting the settlements that they came from, where they relocated and their intent to return
home upon filling out the form. In addition, data collected during follow up surveys is presented
as it relates to individuals who have joined households on Eleuthera and persons who have
returned.

Spanish Wells
South
Eleuthera
Central
Eleuthera
North
Eleuthera
Eleuthera
Blank/unclear
Abaco
Nassau
Other
Bahamas
USA/Canada
Total

Marsh
Harbour
58
5

Cays
25
7

Abaco
(other)
7
33

Grand
Bahama
0
2

Blank/
unclear
1
5

Total
Households
91
52

1

0

5

0

0

6

7

1

14

2

0

25

2
2
2
2
0

0
1
4
1
0

0
2
1
9
1

0
1
0
0
0

2
2
3
1
0

4
8
10
13
1

1
81

3
42

1
71

0
5

0
15

5
214
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Spanish Wells includes Spanish Wells and Russell Island. South Eleuthera includes Wemyss Bight, Green Castle,
Tarpum Bay, Rock Sound, Deep Creek. Central Eleuthera includes Palmetto Point, Savannah Sound. North
Eleuthera includes Governour’s Harbour, James Cistern, Rainbow Bay, Gregorytown, Blackwood, Lower Bogue,
Harbour Island, Current Island.
Marsh Harbour includes the locality of Marsh Harbour. The Cays include Guana Cay, Elbow Cay, Man-o-War Cay,
Treasure Cay, and Green Turtle Cay. Abaco (other) includes Spring City, Murphy Town, Dundas Town, Cherokee
Sound, Casuarina Point, Central Pines, and Bahama Palms. Grand Bahama includes all settlements on Grand
Bahama.

Intent to Return
Yes
No
Maybe
Eventually
Blank

Spanish Wells*
72%
6%
9%
11%
2%

Mainland
37%
25%
15%
6%
18%

Total **
50%
17%
14%
7%
12%

*Percentages are based on answers divided by 66 households as there were 43 Red Cross forms included which did
not pose the question of intent to return and 4 households that have joined other households.
**From 167 households (66 SW, 101 Mainland)

Returns to Abaco
Based on follow-up surveys, it was reported that 18 individuals have left Spanish Wells to return
to Abaco. Most of these individuals left family members on Spanish Wells, particularly children
who were left with aunts or grandparents to finish the school year. There was only one household
who returned as an entire unit. There were four individuals that were introduced to Spanish Wells
during this time, joining other family members who had evacuated and established themselves
on Spanish Wells.
There were three households which included 11 individuals who have reported returning to
Abaco from the mainland. There are two households on the mainland who reported having
husbands who returned to Abaco to work.
Key Points
- The evacuee population on Spanish Wells came largely from Marsh Harbour and the
surrounding Cays.
- The evacuee population on Eleuthera came largely from other settlements on
Abaco.
- A large percentage of the population on Spanish Wells intended to return to Abaco
when completing the form.
- A quarter of the population who came to the mainland reported they did not intend
to return home.

Living Situation
This section provides a general idea of the types of living situations most common on Eleuthera
and Spanish Wells upon arrival.
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Living Situation as reported on intake forms
Spanish
Wells
Mainland
Total

Rental

Camp

Friends/Family

Own
Home

Unclear/Blank

Other

60

0

18

13

12

6

30
90

22
22

21
38

0
6

21
34

6
12

Total
109
100
209

All evacuees living in camps had found rentals as of January 1, 2020. Responses to follow-up
surveys showed that some families had moved in with other family members or friends. There
was not enough to data to report on this.
Appropriateness of accommodation
Individuals reported varying sizes of accommodation if it was mentioned in their questionnaire.
Most often the size of accommodation was mentioned when it was not sufficient to meet the
needs of the household, for example, when two families were sharing one room, or nine people
were living in a one-bedroom house.
Average costs of rent
The estimates of rental costs are based on the rental assistance provided by the One Eleuthera
Foundation to both Spanish Wells and residents of the mainland. Funds provided by OEF was
distributed to evacuees by the People’s Church. Based on the funds provided to the People’s
Church for rental assistance, and documented households supported, we can estimate that the
average cost of rent was approximately $2000/month. A few individuals explicitly documented
their rental costs on their forms, which ranged from $500-2300/month.
Based on the distribution of funds to households on the mainland, it is estimated that average
rental costs on the mainland were approximately $675/month. Rental costs reported on the
forms ranged from $500-900/month for housing on the mainland.
Key Points
- The majority of households on Spanish Wells and the mainland were living in rentals.
- Only evacuees who filled out forms in Spanish Wells reported living in their own
home.
- Only evacuees who filled out forms on the mainland reported living in
camps/shelters.
- Rental averages are assumed to be significantly higher on Spanish Wells than on the
mainland (based on financial assistance provided and households supported).
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Livelihoods
This section presents information on the types of employment evacuees had prior to Dorian and
the number of households who have at least one person who has secured employment during
displacement and types of employment on Eleuthera.
Type of employment prior to Dorian

Trades
Govt
Marine
Retail
Restaurant
Tourism
Education
Retired
Home care
Security
Fishermen
Agriculture
Office
Unclear
Blank
Other

SW (90)

NE (47)

CE (9)

SE (70)

8
3
2
9
6
2
4
10
3
0
3
0
11
4
72
10

5
1
1
3
7
3
2
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
0
4

2
1
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2

8
2
0
1
9
4
7
1
2
3
0
3
2
4
14
10

Amount of time at previous employment
Spanish Wells
0-6 mths
4
6-12 mths
2
1-3 yrs
9
3-5 yrs
6
5-10 yrs
12
10+ yrs
22
Total responses
55

Total
Mainland
15
4
1
4
17
10
9
1
3
5
0
5
4
4
14
16

Total
23
7
3
13
23
12
13
11
6
5
3
5
15
8
86
26

Mainland
14
13
26
7
7
17
84

Total
18
15
35
13
19
39
139

Households with at least one member employed post-Dorian
Spanish Wells
Mainland
Yes
8
57
Self-employed
4
9
Unclear
3
1
Abaco
4
0

Total
65
13
4
4
9

Total

19

Most common types of employment
Spanish Wells
One Eleuthera
1
Foundation
Tourism
0
Government
0
School
2
Restaurant
3

67

86

Mainland

Total

11

12

11
8
6
4

11
8
8
7

Key Points
- There were more retired individuals on Spanish Wells than mainland.
- There were more office and retail workers on Spanish Well.
- There were more trades, tourism or restaurant workers on the mainland.
- There were more teachers on the mainland.
- A lot of people left this question blank.
- There were a high number of individuals on the mainland who had worked under 3
years at their most recent employment.
- There were slightly more people on Spanish Wells who had worked a longer period
of time at their most recent employment.
- The majority of households with at least one person employed on the mainland are
in Rock Sound and Tarpum Bay.
- On the mainland, tourism and OEF were the biggest employers.

Assistance
This section highlights the number of individuals reporting that they received assistance, the
sources of this assistance and the type of assistance received.
Individuals reporting receiving assistance
Yes
No
Blank
Total

55%
15%
30%

Sources of assistance
Of all respondents (265)
Community
OEF
Red Cross
Social Services
Food Fair
Camp Symonnette

21
16
16
15
13
13

8%
6%
6%
5.5%
5%
5%

147
40
78
265
Of ‘yes’
respondents (147)
14%
11%
11%
10%
9%
9%
10

People’s Church
Churches
Spanish Wells
Community Centre
Private donations
Shelter (Nassau)
Other
Yes, but no
organization listed

13
10

5%
4%

9%
7%

8

3%

5%

7
5
16

2.5%
2%
6%

5%
3%
11%

36

13%

24%

Reported assistance received
Food
Clothing
Housing
Voucher
Supplies
Water*
Money/Visa
Toiletries
School supplies
Baby items
Medical
Building supplies

Of all respondents (265)
76
28%
52
20%
37
14%
24
9%
13
5%
9
3%
9
3%
6
2%
5
2%
3
1%
2
1%
2
1%

Of ‘yes’ respondents (147)
52%
35%
25%
16%
9%
6%
6%
4%
3%
2%
1%
1%

*Likely that those getting support were getting water as well, but weren’t documenting it.

Most common assistance requested
Spanish Wells
Food
34
Housing
13
Rental assistance
39
Job
17
Clothing
3
Utilities Assistance
23
Transportation
18
Financial
9
Renovation
12
assistance

Mainland
55
57
29
41
37
6
10
8

Total
89
70
68
58
40
29
28
17

4
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OEF Distribution Centre4
For mainland Eleuthera, we received, sorted, managed, and distributed relief supplies as follows,
between September 2019 and March 20, 2020, when the Distribution Center closed.
4

The One Eleuthera Foundation. (2020). Hurricane Dorian Relief Program Progress Report.
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OEF registered evacuees: 265 visits by 88 households with 234 individuals, reaching 73%
of this population
Unregistered evacuees/walk-ins: 58 visits by 29 households representing at least 47
individuals
In order to receive services, clients had to produce proof of eligibility. The “unregistered”
qualification indicates sufficient proof of evacuee status. Either intake forms were required, but
not yet posted to our Evacuee Database, or there was proof of eligibility without registration
enforcement.
OEF Distribution of resources
Month
Food
Clothing
Sept
6
7
Oct
17
8
Nov
19
11
Dec
70
30
Jan
54
1
Feb
31
10
Mar
79
0
Totals
276 (35%)
37 (5%)

Household
21
16
3
14
54
7
6
121 (15%)

Toiletries
7
13
10
40
5
14
46
135 (17%)

Baby
0
0
7
13
10
2
6
38 (5%)

Water
2
5
2
56
35
31
11
142 (18%)

Misc
0
1
1
0
2
7
36
47 (6%)

Key Points
- Over 50% of the evacuee population reported receiving some sort of assistance.
- More people said that the community they were in provided more assistance than
any specific organization.
- One individual reported receiving assistance from NEMA. One individual explicitly
acknowledged that they had received $0 from NEMA.
- Most evacuees reported receiving assistance in the form of food, clothing, housing
and financial/grocery vouchers.
- Request for assistance (rental and utilities) were higher on Spanish Wells upon filling
in the form.
- Request for renovation assistance was higher on Spanish Wells.
- Requests for employment and physical goods (food and clothing) were higher on the
mainland.
- Food was the main resource distributed from the OEF Distribution centre in Tarpum
Bay on mainland Eleuthera.

Discussion
This report has provided a snapshot of the Hurricane Dorian displaced population on Eleuthera
and Spanish Wells based on the information collected on the intake forms. This section
introduces some of the gaps and challenges identified through the data which is then followed
by some next steps.
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Missing segments of the population
The data does not account for persons who did not register with the One Eleuthera Foundation
or the Red Cross. It is likely that displaced persons who did not fill in a form, may not have done
so because they didn’t need resources or because they were fearful of registering with a formal
organization. There was very little data collected from Haitian nationals in the forms. This
vulnerable population is therefore not included in the data set. This gap in the data limits our
understanding of the needs and supports available of the most marginalized population in The
Bahamas, a gap which will need to be addressed more thoroughly in order to prepare and
respond to future hurricanes.
Financial challenges
The data highlights the challenges of covering the costs of living with the available employment
opportunities. In addition to daily costs, many evacuees were paying mortgages at home or trying
to rebuild their homes. Due to the limited employment opportunities and high cost of rent,
particularly on Spanish Wells, the financial stability of the evacuee population is challenged. This
could result in a cascading of impacts that will limit the evacuee population’s ability to cope and
adapt to social, economic and environmental stresses in the future.
In addition, the stresses introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic have added to the financial
challenges of many displaced households and individuals. While this data does not capture the
pandemic specific challenges faced by evacuees, it should be recognized that many evacuees that
were making progress is returning to a ‘new normal’ have been affected by the virus-related
restrictions.
Accessing assistance
The data reveals that just over half of the OEF and Red Cross respondents reported that they
received assistance. This suggest that there is either a lack of communication of resources
available, or that there is not enough capacity to respond to a disaster of this magnitude. The
majority of the assistance was reported to have come from non-government organizations,
suggesting that government capacity to support displaced populations needs to be strengthened.
Host communities
The introduction of over 600 people to the islands of Spanish Wells and Eleuthera has impacted
the receiving settlements. Eleuthera and Spanish Wells has been incredibly welcoming to the
evacuee population, though there are some sentiments of fear and untrustworthiness that were
observed across settlements. The introduction of nearly 300 people to the small island of Spanish
Wells (population: 1551, Government of The Bahamas 2010), has put pressures on the housing
market, education and employment. The introduction of 138 children to schools across Eleuthera
has stressed the educational systems resources, requiring non-profit organizations to supply
desks, chairs and school supplies.
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Next Steps
While the data provides an overview of the general characteristics and needs of the displaced
population, more information is needed in order to better understand the ability of individuals
and households to cope and adapt to displacement following a Category 5 Hurricane. The data
provides insight into the resources, services and supports available to the evacuated population
following the storm as well as highlighting the services and supports requested in the short-term.
Data collected on Spanish Wells and Eleuthera can be compared to and analyzed with national
statistics which have documented the movement of evacuees through Nassau and other
surrounding Family Islands as well as those who have remained in Abaco. Comparing coping and
adaptive capacity of hurricane-affected persons in relation to mobility nationally, could provide
insight into what services and supports are required following a storm, where they should be
located and the duration of the programs.
A qualitative assessment of the displaced population will lead to a more nuanced understanding
of the factors that influence decision-making in the immediate and short-term displacement of
individuals and households. Interviews, focus groups and questionnaires will provide insight into
how economic, social and political factors of displacement influence one another and what
supports are necessary for individuals and households to realize a ‘new normal’ following
disaster.
A longitudinal study could provide details into how and when the needs of the displaced
population changes over time. Once housing, food and clothing was secured, and children were
enrolled in school, there may be more requests for mental health supports, small business loans
and counselling.
The immediate and short-term response of Abaco, Eleuthera and Spanish Wells has been ad hoc
and relied on local capacity, informal networks and the donation of resources to support people
hurricane-affected populations. The question of how the Bahamas, and the larger Caribbean
region, anticipate, cope with and adapt to the losses, damages, and displacements associated
with more intense hurricanes continues to be a topic of discussion locally, nationally and globally.
The impacts of Hurricane Dorian on The Bahamas illustrate the urgency of identifying proactive
adaptation and disaster planning strategies that address the specific priorities of island
populations.
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1. Introduction
One Eleuthera Foundation (OEF) developed an emergency response program to aid people
that evacuated to Eleuthera as a result of the 2019 Hurricane Dorian. The program was in
operation between September 2019 – March 2020. In May – June 2021, as a follow-up to this
emergency response program, households that were assisted by OEF were asked to participate
in a survey. The survey assessed general wellbeing, households in need of rent or utility support
and candidates in need of immediate, small business support. The survey also assessed interest
in educational/job retraining courses from the Center for Training & Innovation (CTI), interest in
OEF’s volunteer program and solicited feedback on how OEF support can be improved. The
survey was administered via telephone and the full list of survey questions can be found in
Appendix 1 and 2.
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2. Results
One hundred and sixteen households that evacuated to Eleuthera as a result of Hurricane
Dorian and were assisted by OEF took part in the survey. However, three of the respondents did
not answer questions beyond the first question and so have been excluded from analysis.1 The
analysis thus reflects 113 total households.

Of the 113 households that took part in the survey, 39 households (35%) remain in Eleuthera
while 74 households (65%) have left Eleuthera (Figure 1).

Are you still living in Eleuthera?

35%

Yes

No

65%

Figure 1: Households still living in Eleuthera

1

Respondents 12709914986, 12645327029 and 12645086298 only answered the first survey question.
These respondents were excluded from further analysis.
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2.1. Results for households still located in Eleuthera

2.1.1. Demographics of households still located in Eleuthera
The 39 households still living in Eleuthera are spread among a number of settlements. As
seen in Figure 2, the majority of households are located in Spanish Wells (11 households, 28%)
followed by James Cistern (5 households, 13%) and Tarpum Bay (4 households, 10%).

What settlement are you living in now?
Spanish Wells
James Cistern
Tarpum Bay
Rock Sound
North and South Palmetto Point
Hatchet Bay
Harbour Island
Governor's Harbour
Wemyss Bight
Waterford
Upper Bogue
Gregory Town
Current

11
5

4
4
3
3

2
2
1
1
1
1
1
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Figure 2: Eleuthera settlements where households are currently living

Since moving to Eleuthera, household size has remained relatively consistent. The
majority of households have not had anyone permanently leave their household (28 households,
72%), nor permanently join their household (35 households, 90%). However, 11 households
(28%) have had a member of their household leave Eleuthera permanently. This was due to
adults leaving to find employment or children leaving to live with other family members or to
attend school. Four households (10%) indicated that extended family, mostly children, had
permanently joined their households in Eleuthera. Households took in these extended family
members largely to assist the parents of children.
The majority of respondents (26 households, 67%) indicated that they plan to stay in
Eleuthera permanently (Figure 3). The majority of these households that are planning to stay in
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Eleuthera permanently indicated that they now consider Eleuthera to be their home and that
they are settling in well with jobs, businesses and plans to build housing. Some respondents
indicated that they are originally from Eleuthera and are happy to return and reconnect with
family. Only a few responded that they had no choice but to remain in Eleuthera due to a lack of
housing in Abaco.

Five households (13%) responded that they do not plan on remaining in Eleuthera
permanently. The high cost of living in Eleuthera and the desire to return to Abaco once the
situation there improves were identified as the main reasons for those that are not planning to
stay in Eleuthera permanently.

Are you planning to stay in Eleuthera
permanently?

8

Yes

No

Not Sure

5
26

Figure 3: Households currently in Eleuthera and planning to stay permanently

The majority of households (30 households, 77%) rent their current home in Eleuthera.
Only 3 households (8%) own their current home in Eleuthera while another 3 households (8%)
live with family. Another 3 households (8%) have other living arrangements – living with friends,
with church family or need to find housing.

Before Hurricane Dorian, the majority of respondents rented their home (21, 54%). There
were more home owners before Dorian (11 households, 28%), but the same number of people
6

living with family (3 households, 8%). Another 4 households had other living arrangements before
Dorian – living with friends or in homes that were owned by family members.

Do you own, rent or live with family?
21

Rent

30
4

Other

3
Before Dorian

3
3

Living with Family

After Dorian
11

Own

3
0

5

10

15

20

Number of households

25

30

35

Figure 4: Home ownership before and after Dorian for households still in Eleuthera
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2.1.2. Rent and utility assistance needed for households in Eleuthera
The vast majority (29 households, 74%) indicated that they needed rental assistance.
Assistance requested ranged between $300 to $1,000 monthly. Only 10 households (26%)
indicated that they did not need rental assistance. These were all 3 of the owners along with 3
renters, 3 living with family and 1 with other living arrangements - living with church family.

Similarly, the vast majority (29 households, 74%) indicated that they needed utility
assistance. Nine households (23%) responded that they did not need assistance while 1
respondent did not answer this question. The most requested utility assistance was for
electricity, mostly Bahamas Power and Light (BPL) but also St. George’s Power. Requested
amounts for BPL ranged between $60-$350 per month. The sole request for St. George’s Power
was for $500. Assistance with paying Water and Sewerage utility bills was also requested, ranging
between $100-$300 per quarter. Internet assistance was also requested, ranging between $30$100 per month.

As detailed in Figure 5, 23 households (59%) requested both rent and utility assistance.
Six households (15%) wanted only utility assistance. Five households (13%) requested only rent
assistance. Four households (10%) indicated that they needed neither rent nor utility assistance.

Do you need rent or utility assistance?
Neither

4

Utility only

6

Rent only

5

Rent and utility

23
0

5

10

15

20

25

Number of households
Figure 5: Households in Eleuthera requesting rent or utility assistance
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Twenty-seven respondents (69%) indicated that they needed additional help to meet the
needs of their household beyond rent or utility assistance. Assistance with procuring groceries
and clothing was mentioned most frequently. Respondents also indicated a need for assistance
with medication, transportation, renovations or building homes and help to obtain vital
documents such as passports.
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2.1.3. Wellbeing of households in Eleuthera
About half of the respondents (18 respondents, 46%) rated their current overall quality
of life as “good”. Thirteen respondents (33%) rated current quality of life as “neither poor nor
good”. Three respondents (8%) chose a rating of “poor”, while 5 respondents (13%) selected a
rating of “extremely poor”. Notably, no respondents indicated that their current overall quality
of life is “extremely good”.

How would you rate your overall quality of life
now?
Extremely good

0

Good

18

Neither poor nor good

13

Poor

3

Extremely poor

5
0

5

10

15

20

Number of respondents
Figure 6: Current overall quality of life for respondents in Eleuthera

More than half of the respondents think that their current quality of life is worse than it
was before Hurricane Dorian. Ten respondents (26%) thought that current quality of life is “much
worse” as compared to before Dorian while 15 respondents (38%) selected “worse”. Eleven
respondents (28%) indicated that their current quality of life is “about the same” as before
Dorian. Only 2 respondents (5%) thought that their quality of life was “better” since Dorian and
only 1 person (3%) said that their life is “much better” now than before Dorian.
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Compared to before Hurricane Dorian, how is
your current quality of life?
Much better

1

Better

2

About the same

11

Worse

15

Much worse

10
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Number of respondents
Figure 7: Current quality of life compared to before Hurricane Dorian for respondents in Eleuthera
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2.1.4. Employment and training needs for households in Eleuthera
The majority of respondents (24 respondents, 62%) are currently employed. Fifteen
respondents (38%) are the only employed person in their household. Nine respondents (23%) are
employed and also have other people in their household that are employed.

Fifteen respondents (38%) indicated that they were not currently employed. Of these
unemployed respondents, 7 of them (18% of total households in Eleuthera) didn’t have any other
employed people in their household, indicating that there are no employed people in the
household. Eight respondents (21%) are not employed but other members of their household
are employed.

For households with people that were unemployed, a third (13 respondents, 33%)
indicated that they were looking for work. Another 14 respondents (36%) are not looking for
work. The remaining respondents did not provide a response as to whether unemployed people
in their home are looking for work or not. Reasons given for eligible adults not looking for
employment included a lack of job opportunities, job opportunities being diminished because of
the COVID-19 pandemic, medical conditions preventing work and in one instance, a job was
pending and waiting to be finalized.

About half of the respondents (19 respondents, 49%) said that there are specific skills
they would like to obtain to support their employment. A wide range of responses were given
including computer skills, business housekeeping, accounting skills, management, cake baking,
landscaping or construction, language classes (Spanish or Creole), security officer certification,
office/clerical work training, carpentry, housekeeping, tutoring and beekeeping.
Respondents indicated varied interest in training areas that are offered by the Centre for
Training and Innovation (CTI) as detailed in Table 1. Twenty-four respondents (62%) were
interested in one or more of the CTI training areas while 15 respondents (38%) were not
interested in any of the training areas. Respondents could select more than one training area.
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Business Fundamentals was the most popular option followed by Accounting and Finance, Trade
Skills and Sales and Marketing.
Table 1: CTI training areas of interest for respondents in Eleuthera

CTI Training Area
Career Development
Workplace Essentials
Project Management
Sales and Marketing
Trade Skills (Carpentry, Electrical, Culinary,
Plumbing, Tiling)
Accounting and Finance
Business Fundamentals

# of Respondents
Interested
1
2
2
6
7
8
10

In terms of how often respondents would be available to attend training offered by CTI,
the most popular response was 2-3 times per week (15 respondents). There was an even spread
among people able to attend 1-2 times per week (2 respondents), 3-4 times per week (2
respondents) and 5 or more times per week (3 respondents).
There was a strong preference for the mode of CTI training to be blended (a mixture of
face to face and virtual/remote) with 10 respondents selecting this method. The next most
popular option was only face to face training (8 respondents) and least popular was only
virtual/remote training (5 respondents).

In terms of time for CTI training, most popular was evenings (17 respondents) followed
by mornings (11 respondents). Weekdays were preferred over weekends (19 respondents vs. 12
respondents).
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2.1.5. Small business needs for households in Eleuthera
Only four respondents (10% of total respondents still in Eleuthera) currently own a small
business. These businesses include a restaurant, making natural drinks, dry cleaning and customs
brokerage. The majority of respondents (35, 90%) do not currently own a business. However, 30
respondents (77% of total respondents in Eleuthera) indicated that they are interested in starting
a small business.

Twenty-eight respondents (72% of total respondents in Eleuthera) indicated that they
need assistance for either their current or potential new business. Of those requesting business
assistance, about half requested only small grants for equipment (13 respondents, 46% of those
requesting business assistance), about another half requested both business plan development
and small grants for equipment (12 respondents, 43% of those requesting businesses assistance)
and only 1 respondent requested only business plan development.

Respondents also identified small business assistance not offered by OEF that they would
be interested in. This included marketing/sales assistance, transportation, startup funding and
physical space to house their business.

The vast majority of those wanting business assistance (22 respondents, 79% of those
requesting business assistance) indicated that they would need more than $1,000 for their
business. Two respondents anticipated needing between $501 and $1,000 while 4 respondents
did not know how much money would be needed for their business. However, the vast majority
of respondents (26 out of 28) said that they did not have any funds to invest in their business.
Only 1 respondent said that they had about $500 to invest in their business while 1 person did
not provide a response.

Conversely, respondents indicated that they had a lot of time to invest in their small
business. Twenty respondents said that they could devote time every day for their business while
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3 respondents said that they could give 6 days a week for their business and another 3 could give
5 days a week.

2.1.6. Overall ranking of potential OEF assistance by households in Eleuthera
Respondents were asked to rank the importance of potential assistance that may be
provided by OEF for their households. Across all respondents, rent assistance was ranked as most
important, followed by small business assistance. Utility assistance was ranked as third most
important while CTI training was generally ranked as least important.

2.1.7. Volunteering Interest for households in Eleuthera
The majority of respondents (24, 62%) expressed interest in volunteering with OEF. As
detailed in Table 2, the OEF pillars with the most interest in volunteers were Heritage and
Operations, followed closely by Education. Environment, Health and Economy were of least
interest while 4 respondents were not sure which pillar they would be interested in volunteering
for.

Table 2: OEF pillars of volunteering interest for households in Eleuthera

OEF Volunteer Pillars
Economy
Health
Environment
Education
Heritage
Operations
Not Sure

# of Respondents
Interested
1
2
3
6
7
7
4
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2.2. Results for Households that left Eleuthera
2.2.1. Demographics of households that left Eleuthera
Of the 113 households that took part in the survey, 74 households (65%) have left Eleuthera.
As detailed in Figure 8, the majority of households left Eleuthera in 2020 (51 households, 69%),
while 16 households (22%) left in 2019 and only 7 households (9%) left in 2021. Of the 51
households that left Eleuthera in 2020, more than half (37 households) left between July to
December 2020. There were 2 households that departed as early as September 2019, less than
one month after Hurricane Dorian.

Number of Households Leaving Eleuthera in
2019, 2020 and 2021

7

16

51

Left Eleuthera in 2019

Left Eleuthera in 2020

Left Eleuthera in 2021

Figure 8: Year of departure from Eleuthera

The majority of households (69 households, 93%) have relocated to Abaco. Only 2
households (3%) have relocated to Grand Bahama, 2 households to Nassau and 1 household to
Exuma.
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What island are you living on now?
1

Exuma

Nassau

2

Grand Bahama

2
69

Abaco
0

10

20
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40

50

60

70

80

Number of households
Figure 9: Island that households that have left Eleuthera are living on now

Most households (26 households, 38%) have relocated to Marsh Harbour, Abaco as
detailed in Table 3.
Table 3: Settlement that households that have left Eleuthera are living in now

Which settlement are you living in now?
Central Pines, Abaco
Rolleville, Exuma
Sweetings Cay, Grand Bahama
Pineridge, Grand Bahama
Guana Cay, Abaco
Cooper’s Town, Abaco
Bahama Palm Shores, Abaco
Cherokee Sound, Abaco
Dundas Town, Abaco
Casuarina Point, Abaco
Hope Town, Abaco
Spring City, Abaco
Elbow Cay, Abaco
Man o War Cay, Abaco
Murphy Town, Abaco
Marsh Harbour, Abaco

# of
respondents
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
7
12
26
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The vast majority of households (65 households, 94%) had all members of their household
leave Eleuthera. However, 9 households did not relocate all members. Seven of these households
left some members in Eleuthera, due to lack of job opportunities in Abaco or the need for children
to stay in school in Eleuthera. One household sent children to live in the United States. One
household has members scattered through multiple islands in The Bahamas.

Reasons given for leaving Eleuthera were varied and respondents provided more than
one reason in some cases. As detailed in Table 4, the majority of respondents indicated that they
left to find employment. In some cases, jobs that were affected by Hurricane Dorian became
available and so households returned to Abaco. Other common reasons provided were to rebuild
homes or that households simply preferred Abaco and wanted to return home.
Table 4: Reasons for households leaving Eleuthera

Reason for leaving Eleuthera
COVID-19 lockdowns affecting quality of life and employment
Reconnect with family members in other islands
Eleuthera expensive or difficult to live in
Preferred Abaco; Abaco is home
Rebuild their home
Difficult to find work in Eleuthera, jobs available in other
islands

# of
respondents
3
6
11
16
30
34

The majority of households (30 households, 41%) own their current home. A relatively
even number of households either rent their current home (19 households, 26%) or live with
family (18 households, 24%). Another 7 households (9%) have other living arrangements – living
with friends or in a rent to own program.

Before Hurricane Dorian, the majority of these households owned their home (43
households, 58%). There were an equal number of renters before Dorian (19 households, 26%),
and less households living with family (6 households, 8%). Another 5 households had other living
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arrangements before Dorian – living with friends, in homes that were owned by family members,
renting to own or were in the process of building their own homes.

Do you own rent or live with family?
43

Own

30
19
19

Rent

Before Dorian
6

Living with Family

After Dorian

18
5

Other

7
0

5
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15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Number of households

Figure 10: Home Ownership before and after Dorian for households that left Eleuthera

There is a relatively even split between households that are currently living in the same
home that they were in before Dorian (35 households, 47%) and those that are currently in a
different home than they were in before Dorian (39 households, 53%). The majority of those that
are in the same home now that they were in before Dorian owned their home before Dorian (26
households).
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2.2.2. Wellbeing of households that left Eleuthera
Most respondents rated their current quality of life as either “good” (28 respondents,
38%) or “extremely good” (1 respondent, 1%). Twenty-four respondents (32%) rated their
current quality of life as “neither poor nor good”. Sixteen respondents (22%) felt that their
current quality of life is “poor” and 3 respondents indicated a current “extremely poor” quality
of life.

How would you rate your overall quality of life
now?
Extremely good

1

Good

28

Neither poor nor good

24

Poor

16

Extremely poor

3
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Number of respondents
Figure 11: Current overall quality of life for respondents that left Eleuthera

Compared to before Hurricane Dorian, the vast majority of respondents indicated that
their current quality of life is “much worse” (22 respondents, 30%) or “worse” (31 respondents,
42%). Much fewer respondents thought that compared to before Dorian, their current quality of
life is “better” (9 respondents, 12%) or “much better” (3 respondents, 4%). Eight respondents
(11%) felt that their current quality of life is “about the same” as before Dorian.
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Compared to before Hurricane Dorian, how is
your current quality of life?
Much better

3

Better

9

About the same

8
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Much worse
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Figure 12: Current quality of life compared to before Hurricane Dorian for respondents that left Eleuthera

The majority of respondents (30, 41%) indicated that their current quality of life is “about
the same” as it was compared to when they were living in Eleuthera after Hurricane Dorian.
Twenty respondents (27%) felt that their quality of life is “better” than it was when living in
Eleuthera after Dorian and another 4 respondents (5%) felt that their quality of life is “much
better”. Fourteen respondents (19%) felt that their current life is “worse” than when living in
Eleuthera after Dorian while 5 respondents (7%) indicated “much worse”.
To improve their current quality of life, most respondents indicated that they needed
greater financial stability, help in rebuilding their homes and for Abaco in general to rebuild.
Other reasons included desiring a change in political leadership and the need for the COVID-19
pandemic to end.
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Compared to when you were living in Eleuthera
after Hurricane Dorian, how is your current
quality of life?
Much better
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Figure 13: Current quality of life compared to living in Eleuthera after Hurricane Dorian for respondents that have left Eleuthera

While the majority of respondents (41, 55%) are not considering moving back to
Eleuthera, 29 respondents (39%) are considering returning to Eleuthera. Four respondents did
not answer this question. Reasons given for possibly returning to Eleuthera were largely related
to the prospect of finding employment in Eleuthera, reconnecting with family in Eleuthera or
preferring the communities in Eleuthera as compared to Abaco.
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2.2.3. Employment and training needs for households that left Eleuthera
The majority of respondents (41 respondents, 55%) are currently employed. Six
respondents (8%) are the only employed person in their household. Thirty-five respondents
(47%) are employed and also have other people in their household that are employed.

Thirty respondents (43%) indicated that they were not currently employed. Of these
unemployed respondents, 14 of them (19% of total households that left Eleuthera) didn’t have
any other employed people in their household, indicating that there are no employed people in
the household. Eighteen respondents (24%) are not employed but other members of their
household are employed.
For households with people that were unemployed, roughly half (32 respondents, 43%)
indicated that they were not looking for work. Another 27 respondents (36%) are looking for
employment. Reasons given for eligible adults not looking for employment included being near
to the age of retirement, trying to get businesses reopened, medical conditions preventing work
and preferences or needs for women to remain at home as homemakers.
More than half of the respondents (43 respondents, 58%) said that there were no specific
skills that they would like to obtain to support their employment. However, 27 respondents (36%)
indicated that they would like to obtain additional skills. These were quite varied and included
computer skills, teacher’s certificates, bookkeeping/accounting, boat registration, cosmetology,
organic farming, chicken breeding, clerical skills, housekeeping, nursing, business administration,
baking and marine mechanics.

Respondents indicated varied interest in training areas that are offered by CTI as detailed
in Table 5. Half of the respondents (37 respondents, 50%) were interested in one or more of the
CTI training areas while the other half (37 respondents, 50%) were not interested in any of the
training areas. Respondents could select more than one training area. Business Fundamentals
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was the most popular option followed by Accounting and Finance, Trade Skills and Project
Management.

Table 5: CTI training areas of interest for respondents that have left Eleuthera

CTI Training Area
Career Development
Workplace Essentials
Project Management
Sales and Marketing
Trade Skills (Carpentry, Electrical, Culinary, Plumbing,
Tiling)
Accounting and Finance
Business Fundamentals

# of Respondents
Interested
1
3
7
6
10
12
14

In terms of how often respondents would be available to attend training offered by CTI,
the most popular response was 2-3 times per week (18 respondents). Thirteen respondents
indicated that they can attend training 3-4 times per week and only 2 respondents could attend
training 5 or more times per week.

There was a strong preference for the mode of CTI training to be only virtual with 18
respondents selecting this method. The next most popular option was blended (a mixture of face
to face and virtual/remote) (12 respondents) and least popular was only face to face training (4
respondents).

In terms of time for CTI training, most popular was evenings (20 respondents) followed
by mornings (16 respondents). Weekdays were preferred over weekends (26 respondents vs. 9
respondents).
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2.3. Feedback on Assistance Provided by OEF after Hurricane Dorian
All 113 respondents were asked about the assistance that OEF provided to their household
as part of their Hurricane Dorian emergency relief program. The majority of respondents were
able to identify a range of ways that OEF assisted them, including helping to find housing in
Eleuthera, rental assistance, food and clothing assistance and even emotional support.
Respondents largely felt that OEF assistance filled most of their household needs (51
respondents, 45% of total respondents) or some of their household needs (29 respondents, 26%
of total respondents). A minority of respondents (10, 9%) felt that OEF assistance filled very little
household needs or all household needs (6 respondents, 5%).

How did past assistance that you received from OEF meet your
household's needs?
Filled all household needs
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Filled most household needs
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Filled very little household needs
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However, 23 respondents out of the 113 total number of respondents (20%) stated that
they either did not receive assistance from OEF or were not sure that assistance that they
received in Eleuthera was from OEF.
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Respondents were largely very complimentary of the assistance provided by OEF after
Hurricane Dorian and expressed deep gratitude. However, they also provided feedback on how
assistance provided by OEF could be improved. Suggestions include to provide assistance for
longer periods of time -particularly rent assistance, provide assistance with procuring equipment
needed for work such as laptops, provide assistance with facilities to wash clothing to reduce
time spent hand washing clothing, provide transportation, follow up on people after assistance
ends, provide cash in hand for small purchases, better screening of who assistance was provided
to in order to ensure that assistance was going to those most in need, additional assistance to
find employment, provide debit cards for purchases and to provide healthier food choices.
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